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Spring 1985

Everett Carll Ladd — On Mandates, Realignments, and The 1984 Presidential Election

Stanley E. Hilton — The Argentine Factor in Twentieth-Century Brazilian Foreign Policy Strategy

Richard P. Nathan
Fred C. Doolittle — Federal Grants: Giving and Taking Away

Robert Powell — The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence

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Adam M. Garfinkle — U.S. Decision Making in the Jordan Crisis: Correcting the Record

Book Reviews

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

EVERETT CARLL LADD analyzes the 1984 presidential election as a massive electoral endorsement of the incumbent arrived at early and firmly. Looking beneath the election's immediate context, Ladd sees a slowly unfolding contemporary realignment that differs fundamentally from its New Deal predecessor because of the prominent part played by dealignment—the weakening of voter ties to any party.

STANLEY E. HILTON assesses the impact of the Argentine challenge on Brazil's foreign policy. After discussing how Argentina was perceived as Brazil's major threat in the twentieth century, he evaluates the factors that in the early 1980s seemed to bring an end to the two nations' historic rivalry for paramountcy in South America.

RICHARD P. NATHAN and FRED C. DOOLITTLE present the most recent findings of their fourteen-state study of the effects of the Reagan administration's changes and cuts in federal grant-in-aid programs, relating them to research findings from the 1970s when federal aid was increasing.

ROBERT POWELL reconsiders the theoretical foundations of strategic nuclear deterrence. He identifies two theories of deterrence that rest on distinctly different sets of implicit assumptions and traces the implications of those different assumptions.

RICHARD M. SAUNDERS examines the role of military force in the foreign policy of the Eisenhower administration. He argues that Eisenhower's general reluctance to use force as a foreign policy instrument resulted from a particular set of political beliefs, an appreciation for the nature of presidential power, and an understanding of the broader implications of the use of force.

ADAM M. GARFINKLE reanalyzes U.S. decision making in the Jordan Crisis of September 1970. He contends that the accepted scholarly accounts of critical aspects of U.S.-Israeli coordination during that crisis are not supported by the available evidence.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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On Mandates, Realignments, and the 1984 Presidential Election

EVERETT CARLL LADD

After almost every presidential election, politicians and pundits try to discern what voters *really* intended to say. Of course, the most important thing about an election is its actual outcome, who got elected. But next come the competing efforts to interpret the outcome in a way favorable to one side or the other. This is neither surprising nor disturbing. Various groups and interests have stakes in the long-term course of American public policy; naturally, they choose to relate election outcomes to what they want that course to be. This continuing policy struggle gets expressed by the idea of a "mandate." Who got a mandate from the voters to do what?

In the pages of this journal four years ago, I discussed the Reagan-Carter election against the backdrop of the argument about what kind of a mandate the new president had won.[1] Rejecting both the view that Ronald Reagan's victory was the culmination of a coherent swing to the right and the view that it was nothing more than the rejection of Jimmy Carter, an unpopular incumbent, I maintained that Reagan had received a positive mandate to take the country in a new direction—but that the mandate was necessarily brittle.

Its lack of firmness had three related sources: First, a more highly educated electorate, in the personality-emphasizing world of TV-centered electioneering,

[1] Everett Ladd, "The Brittle Mandate: Electoral Dealignment and the 1980 Presidential Election," *Political Science Quarterly*, (Spring 1981): 1.

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is increasingly cut loose from stable and enduring party ties and carried by the currents of the day. Sharp shifts of direction occur easily in this environment of electoral dealignment. Second, large proportions of the electorate display so much ambivalence on major policy questions, most notably on the proper role and scope of government, that they commit themselves only incompletely to either party's positions. Finally, the quadrennial referendum on the president's performance is so affected by swings in the economy and other areas of national life and is subject to such a high and diverse set of public expectations that it can never be narrowly ideological. A president's mandate is to do things "good for the country." The referendum will go for him and his party when he is seen meeting this demanding performance test; it will go against him when he is not. Voters wanted the Reagan administration to reduce inflation, increase economic growth, and strengthen the U.S. position in foreign affairs. But a mandate so tied to broad and general standards, awarded by voters so little bound by party loyalties, is inherently unstable.

Now, with four years hindsight and another election behind us, I have been given the opportunity to review not just the American electorate's continuing course but my own efforts at charting it. Addressing the latter seems to me the most direct way of accomplishing the former. Most of the specifics of my 1980 argument seem still to apply. But the context is very different now. Ronald Reagan's 1984 mandate is "brittle," of course, for the same reasons that his 1980 mandate was—the performance-oriented, what-have-you-done-for-us-lately mood of an electorate that no longer considers voting for "my party" a sociological or psychological imperative. But the context in which I wrote four years ago extended well beyond the confluence of factors that were, and still are, weakening voters' ties to the political parties. Most importantly, the setting for "The Brittle Mandate" was a cycle, some fifteen years old, in which *presidential failure* was establishing itself as the norm. I did not insist that failure would be continuing, but I did not seriously entertain any other outcome.

There was another possibility, however, to which I referred in an article written two months before the 1980 balloting.

> What are the prospects for all these conditions—eroding party loyalties, extreme electoral fluidity in the highly visible and personality-centered offices, and a fragile stability with the Democrats lightly if extensively ascendant elsewhere—being changed in the course of Campaign '80? [They were non-existent.]
>
> If change is to occur, it will come in response to the actual performance of political leaders in the years ahead. What if a candidate won the presidency and then proceeded to achieve these things: to advance a series of programs that are, objectively, more effective responses to our national needs than those of the past; to secure a set of modest but coherent changes in the way political institutions operate so that they become more responsive and responsible; and, to convince a clear majority of his fellow citizens that what he has done is sound.

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> Were this to happen, it is likely that the realignment that [Richard] Scammon and [Ben] Wattenberg think they see aglimmering and that countless observers over the past three decades have thought they detected, would actually take place.[2]

The Reagan Referendum of 1984

Inevitably, a president's bid for reelection becomes a referendum on him and his administration. Voters must pass judgment on whether the leadership and approach of the preceding four years deserve to be continued. To be sure, presidents try to turn things around, at least somewhat, and make the election a vote on the deficiencies of their opponents—especially when things are not going well and they know many people are dissatisfied. In 1980, for example, Jimmy Carter's reelection campaign strove to focus attention on the president's challengers: first, on Senator Edward Kennedy, who contested Carter for the Democratic nomination; and then Ronald Reagan, the Republican nominee. "Looking at the perceptions that people had about the president," Patrick Caddell—Carter's pollster and campaign guru—observed with admirable if perhaps excessive candor, "there was no way we could survive either a primary or general election contest if we allowed it to become a referendum on the first three years of the Carter administration."[3] But in the end, Campaign '80 did become a referendum on the leadership of Jimmy Carter and voters' dissatisfaction expressed itself in Carter's defeat.

The 1984 presidential election was a referendum, too, but one with very different implications because it went *for*, rather than *against* the incumbent. Reagan won it at three different levels.

The Personal Dimension of Leadership

The first thing Reagan had going for him was that a substantial majority of Americans had come to like him personally and consider him an effective leader. Throughout Campaign '84, the polls showed Reagan getting high marks on the personal dimensions of his leadership—high absolutely, and high in comparison to the grades given his Democratic opponent, Walter Mondale. Actually, the verdict on Reagan seems to have been in when the campaign started. In a poll taken in November 1983, the *Los Angeles Times* asked respondents to locate themselves in one of four categories. (See Table 1).

"Which one of these statements," respondents were asked, "comes closest to

[2] Everett Ladd, "Realignment? No. Dealignment? Yes.," *Public Opinion* (October/November 1980): 13.

[3] Interview by the author with Patrick Caddell and Richard Wirthlin, published in *Public Opinion* (December/January 1981): 2.

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TABLE 1

Assessments of Reagan: The Person and The Policies (percents)

	All Respondents	*Democrats*	*Respondents earning less than $10,000*
"I like Ronald Reagan as a person and I also like most of his policies."	53	42	36
"I do like Ronald Reagan as a person but I don't like most of his policies."	29	37	40
"I don't like Ronald Reagan as a person but I do like most of his policies."	6	5	7
"I don't like Ronald Reagan as a person and I don't like most of his policies."	12	15	17

SOURCE: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, 12–17 November 1983.

the way you feel about President Reagan?" Among all respondents, a very high 82 percent said they liked Reagan as a person. What was even more striking, 79 percent of Democrats said they liked Mr. Reagan, as did 76 percent of those with incomes under $10,000.[4]

The *Los Angeles Times* poll and other surveys also showed an endorsement of Reagan's policies. One sees in the above data, for example, that 59 percent said they liked "most of [Reagan's] policies." And, despite a great deal of criticism of administration actions as unfair to the poor, 43 percent of those with family incomes under $10,000 a year declared for the Reagan approach.

Valence Issues

When they indicated backing for Reagan's approach, many voters were undoubtedly saying they were generally satisfied with the way things were going for themselves and the country. We refer to these assessments of "the nature of the times" as *valence issues*. There is no partisan dispute over the desirability of peace internationally and economic prosperity domestically. Sometimes these conditions are achieved, however, while on other occasions they are not. The traditional, common-sense assumption is that incumbent presidents seeking reelection are rewarded when valence issues, the nature of the times, are seen as broadly favorable. But no incumbent since 1964 had benefited from a favorable mix of valence issues until Reagan did in 1984. We had almost forgotten what it was like.

In January 1981, when Reagan first took office, just 27 percent of those surveyed nationally by the polling firm of Yankelovich, Skelly and White said that

[4] These data are from a national survey taken 12–17 November 1983 by the *Los Angeles Times*.

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FIGURE 1

Changes in National Optimism/Pessimism

Question: (So) (As) far as you are concerned, do you think that (following year named) will be better or worse than (present year named)?

Question: Do you expect (following year named) to be a better year for you than (current year named), about the same, or not as good as (current year named)?

Question: Now, at the start of this interview I asked you what (following year named) looks like to you in personal terms. Thinking about the country as a whole, what kind of year do you think (following year named) will be for the nation—better than (current year named), about the same, or not as good as (current year named)?



SOURCE: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of 11 November–4 December 1983.

"things . . . in the country" were going very well or fairly well. But by December 1983, the proportion had risen to 60 percent.[5] Similarly, when Gallup asked a cross section of the public in early December 1983 whether they expected that 1984 would be better or worse for them than 1983 had been, the proportion answering better was the highest Gallup had found since first posing this question in 1971 (Figure 1). The Roper Organization got the same pattern of answers when it queried respondents about their expectations for 1984—for themselves personally and for the country. In January 1984, 49 percent of those interviewed told the ABC News/*Washington Post* poll that they saw the nation's economy getting better, compared to just 19 percent who saw it getting worse, and 31 percent as staying about the same.[6] And on election day, 57 percent of voters interviewed by CBS News and the *New York Times* rated the U.S. economy as better

[5] Surveys by Yankelovich, Skelly and White, the latest cited that of 6–8 December 1983. For a complete review of these data, see the "Opinion Roundup" section of *Public Opinion* (February/March 1984): 21–26.

[6] Survey by ABC News and the *Washington Post*, 16–17 January 1984.

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TABLE 2

"Compared to Four Years Ago, is the U.S. Economy Better Today, Worse Today, or About the Same?" (Percent)

	Better Today	*Worse Today*	*About the Same*
Total	57	19	21
By Age			
18–24 years of age	64	18	17
25–29	57	19	22
30–44	58	18	22
45–59	57	20	21
60 and older	54	20	22
By Occupation			
Professional/Managerial	66	15	19
White Collar	58	17	23
Blue Collar	54	21	24
Farmer	49	22	26
Student	59	21	18
Unemployed	27	49	22
By Income			
Under $12,500	38	35	24
$12,500–$24,900	54	19	25
$25,000–$34,900	59	17	22
$35,000–$50,000	69	13	17
$50,000 and over	76	9	15
Union Member	45	29	24
By Race			
White	62	14	20
Black	15	56	27
Hispanic	42	29	27
By Sex			
Male	62	17	18
Female	52	20	24

SOURCE: CBS News/*New York Times* Exit Poll, 6 November, 1984.

than it had been four years earlier, compared to just 19 percent who thought it was worse, and 21 percent about the same. This view was shared widely, though certainly not by black Americans (Table 2).

Actual economic performance undoubtedly contributed to the general satisfaction with the country's performance. There had been substantial economic growth since the 1982 recession and three consecutive years of low inflation. But noneconomic considerations seemed to have entered in as well. After the buffeting the American sense of nation took in the 1970s—from the agony of the long and deeply divisive war in Vietnam, the Watergate scandals and the first resignation of an American president, the sense of frustration over the pro-

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tracted hostage seizure in Iran during the Carter administration, and sundry other difficulties—the United States was regaining its historic self-esteem and optimism. Ronald Reagan called it "the new patriotism"; whatever the name one gives it, it included a lot more than how the economy was doing.

The New Political Economy

In Ronald Reagan the Republicans had a highly popular incumbent president, seeking reelection at a time when the economy was doing well, a clear majority felt reasonably satisfied with overall national performance. This is enough to explain why Reagan decisively defeated Walter Mondale on 6 November 1984. It isn't enough, though, to explain the deep concern many Democratics have expressed about the long-term position of their party. "Democrats are in the same position as the French aristocracy at the time of the Bourbon Restoration," William Schneider wrote in December 1984. "We can pretend that nothing has really happened, but the *ancien regime* is dead. Things will never be the same. The problem for the Democrats is to avoid the fate of the Bourbons, of whom Talleyrand said, 'They learned nothing and they forgot nothing.'"[7]

New ideas. This gloomy assessment isn't new. Democratic leaders worried all during the 1980 campaign that their party was floundering intellectually and that the country was turning against its approach to governing. Above all, many Democrats agreed, their greatest problem was the public's dissatisfaction with the party's economic approach. The onset of high inflation served as a focal point. Frustration with inflation could be seen across the social spectrum, and it was acute among the Democrats' traditional working-class and lower-middle-class constituents.

David Vogel has argued that a resolute pragmatism distinguishes the American thinking on questions of political economy. "The American public has supported whichever 'side' has offered the most effective program for promoting real economic growth." From the 1870s through the 1920s, the ascendancy of private business and its success in limiting governmental intervention ultimately rested on business's capacity "to manage successfully the transformation of America from an agrarian to a modern industrial society." The Great Depression changed that. "Americans supported the reforms of the New Deal because they represented an effective alternative for restoring the viability of the American private sector. . . . What gave political credibility to liberal forces in America during the quarter-century following the Second World War was their ability to argue effectively that the expansion of the welfare state and the adoption of the principles of Keynesian economics were not only compatible with economic prosperity, but essential to it."[8]

[7] William Schneider, "Half a Realignment," *The New Republic*, 3 December 1984, 19.

[8] David Vogel, "The Inadequacy of Contemporary Opposition to Business," *Daedalus*, 109 (Summer 1980): 47–57.

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Party of prosperity. In the 1970s another shift occurred. The Democrats' approach was no longer associated with growing prosperity, and Americans became receptive to "something new." The public had not endorsed any specific set of policy changes. Certainly it had not endorsed the contemporary conservative judgment that "government is the problem, not the solution": it still wanted the state to do a great deal. But the public had turned against the contemporary liberal judgment that "the growth of government is the solution, not a problem": government needed to be reined in, and government-caused problems like inflation needed to be brought under control.

This was the mandate of 1980. Two years later in the congressional elections of November 1982, we were given a good opportunity to see just how strong the electorate's 1980 call for changes in policy direction had been, and how much sympathy it had for Reagan's attempts after two years of decidedly mixed results. At that time, unemployment was over 10 percent and the country was mired deep in recession. Typical of voters' answers were their responses in a big election-day survey taken by NBC News of persons leaving polling stations around the country. "Which of the two political parties do you think is better able to handle the nation's economic problems?" Since the New Deal, the Democrats' margin over the Republicans had been large and persistent on this type of question. Add to that the troubled state of the economy in 1982, with the GOP in power, and one might have expected a substantial majority to say the Democrats were to be preferred on economic matters. Not so. Voters split evenly as to which party had the better approach. Even in the traditionally Democratic state of Michigan, hard hit by the recession, the Democrats were given the edge by only a narrow plurality.

If it could manage this level of endorsement in the face of economic adversity, the Reagan administration seemed assured of favorable assessment of its general approach if the economy turned around fairly quickly. By 1984 the economic climate had vastly improved. And in a poll taken by CBS News and the *New York Times* from 30 September to 4 October 1984, registered voters by a margin of two-to-one (54 to 27 percent) answered "the Republicans" when asked "Which party is . . . better able to insure a strong economy?" Walter Mondale strongly criticized the Reagan administration for the soaring federal deficit, and many agreed with him that the deficit was a serious problem. But, polls showed, more people thought Reagan and the Republicans could cope successfully with this problem than believed Mondale and the Democrats could.

The view from Mondale's camp. During the 1984 campaign some politicans and analysts argued that Reagan's lead resulted largely because people liked him and because he was such a good television performer. It was a triumph of personality over policy. Peter Hart, who did polling for Mondale throughout the campaign, emphatically rejects this view, calling it "deadwrong and backward thinking." Hart's interpretation is similar to the one presented above—emphasizing that the Reagan presidency was seen to be politically successful in a number of different regards. "The answer has three parts, and the first relates

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to mood. People feel better. Sixty percent of the voters were saying that the country was headed in the right direction, the highest mark I have seen going directly into an election. Only 28 percent said that things were seriously off on the wrong track. Second, there was an affirmation of the economic policies. We had come out of a recession. There is one other aspect that Dick [Reagan's pollster Richard Wirthlin] didn't touch upon as much as I would, and that is the importance of leadership. Voters perceived Ronald Reagan as a strong leader, and they thought Walter Mondale was deficient in that area."[9]

Results: A Firm, Early Decision

The high degree of volatility in the electorate's expressed presidential preferences throughout the 1980 campaign accrued in part from the weakness of partisan attachments. It also resulted from a situation where large majorities viewed the incumbent as an ineffective leader and were dissatisfied with the direction of public policy and with national performance. But at the same time they were uncertain that the available alternative would do any better. In 1980 there simply wasn't a settled judgment until the end of the campaign.

In 1984, however, very different conditions applied. Party ties were still weak, but the referendum on the incumbent president went decisively his way. As a result, the electorate was anything but volatile; its commitments were strikingly constant throughout the long campaign. Table 3 shows the findings of four polling organizations that posed Reagan-Mondale trial heats from February 1984 to just before the election. Though these polls at times disagreed with one another, perhaps because of differences in sampling and other survey methods, the most striking conclusion is how much they generally agreed. More importantly, we see from these repeated polling efforts how very stable the electorate was throughout the campaign.

In 1980 large numbers of voters remained undecided and volatile about how to vote right to the end of the contest—producing an unprecedentedly large proportion of last-minute deciders. The decision to reelect Reagan, however, was made early. Noting that the president's final vote margin was almost exactly what his margin had been in their opinion poll taken ten months earlier, editors of the *New York Times* suggested that "it's possible . . . that everything that happened in-between was just a digression. The voters . . . made up their minds a long time ago."[10] The exit poll by the *Los Angeles Times* on 6 November confirmed this. An extraordinary 47 percent of those interviewed said they had decided who they would vote for sometime *before* the first primaries in February, while another 21 percent had decided before September. The earliest deciders broke two-to-one for Reagan (Table 4).

[9] Interview by the author with Peter Hart and Richard Wirthlin for *Public Opinion*, 13 December 1984.

[10] "And Still Champion," *New York Times* editorial, 7 November 1984.

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TABLE 3

Reagan—Mondale Trial Heat
February-November 1984

Gallup	*Reagan percent*	*Mondale percent*
Registered Voters		
February 10–13	52	42
March 2–6	50	45
March 16–19	52	44
April 6–9	54	41
April 11–15	52	44
May 3–5	50	46
May 18–21	53	42
June 6–8	53	44
June 22–25	56	37
July 13–16	53	39
July 27–30	53	41
August 10–13	52	41
September 7–9	55	40
September 21–24	57	39
September 28–30	56	39
October 15–17	58	38
October 26–28	57	40
November 2–3	59	41
ABC News/Washington Post	*Reagan percent*	*Mondale percent*
Registered Voters		
February 13–15	50	45
May 16–22	51	43
July 5–8	51	44
September 7–11	56	40
September 22–October 2	55	37
October 2–7	55	37
October 8–9	56	41
October 12–16	54	42
October 22–23	54	42
October 29–November 1	57	39
November 3–5	54	40

(*continued*)

Realignment and Dealignment

For two decades now, political scientists and other commentators have stumbled and sloshed around a conceptual swamp called *realignment* that we have created for ourselves. The main reason we have had such difficulty dealing with contemporary partisan realignment is that we have expected it to be like the one acted out in the 1930s—the great New Deal realignment, presided over by Franklin D. Roosevelt, that brought the Democrats to power as the new majority party. The New Deal realignment came like a flash of lightening. While the Republicans'

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TABLE 3 (*continued*)

CBS News/New York Times	*Reagan percent*	*Mondale percent*
Registered Voters		
February 21–25	49	37
March 5–8	50	33
March 21–24	51	31
April 23–26	48	35
June 23–28	50	35
July 12	52	34
August 5–9	54	38
September 12–16	57	35
September 30–October 4	59	33
October 9	58	38
October 14–17	59	33
October 21	56	40
October 23–25	56	37
October 31–November 3	58	37
Gordon Black/USA Today	*Reagan percent*	*Mondale percent*
Registered Voters		
February 17–21	57	35
March 2–6	54	34
March 13–17	54	35
April 26–May 2	54	39
May 29–June 1	58	35
September 4–11	57	35
September 25–October 1	60	35
October 14–18	61	36
October 21	61	34
October 25–27	59	36
November 1–4	60	35

majority status had been eroded by earlier developments such as the changing ethnic makeup of the United States following the big immigration of 1900–1924, the GOP was still clearly ascendent when the Depression began with the stock market crash in the fall of 1929. By 1936, however, the GOP had been humbled and tossed aside, a thoroughly beaten and confused minority. The New Deal realignment was as complete and decisive as it was rapid. By 1936 the Democrats were unquestionably the majority party at all levels: they were the presidential majority, dominated Congress, held sway in the state houses, and had a substantial lead over the Republicans in party identification. The New Deal realignment was accompanied by an unambiguous strengthening of Democratic party loyalties across the electorate.

Clearly, nothing like the above had occurred in American electoral politics since the 1930s. If a set of changes in the partisan balance must closely resemble those of the New Deal, we have not had a realignment in recent years. There has

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TABLE 4

Time During Campaign of Presidential Vote Decision

"How long ago did you finally decide for whom you would vote?"
(In percents.)

Today (6 Nov, Election Day)	4
Over the weekend	2
Last week	3
After the presidential debates two weeks ago	13
During the campaign in September	10
During the conventions in July and August	12
During the primaries from February to June	9
Before then	47

How People Voted, By When They Decided

	Reagan	*Mondale*
Today (6 Nov, Election Day)	48	52
Over the weekend	45	55
Last week	55	45
After the presidential debates two weeks ago	43	57
During the campaign in September	53	47
During the conventions in July and August	51	49
During the primaries from February to June	62	38
Before then	63	32

SOURCE: Exit Poll conducted by the *Los Angeles Times*, 6 November 1984.

been no galvanizing event comparable to the Depression. The Republicans have been dominating presidential elections, but the Democrats have maintained ample majorities in the U.S. House of Representatives, governorships, and state legislatures. Growing numbers of Americans have voted independently—splitting their tickets and deciding their votes on the basis of the candidates and issues in individual elections, rather than going down the line for "my party."

There seems no good reason, however, why "realignment" must be reserved for partisan developments like those of the 1930s. Something substantial has happened, and realignment is a good word for it. First, major shifts in voter alignments have been evident in recent years. Second, there is a new majority party in presidential voting, the Republicans. Third, the mix of issues differs greatly from that of the New Deal period. Fourth, dealignment, the weakening of voters' ties to the parties, seems better understood as a distinguishing feature of the present realignment than as an alternative to realignment. The proper question seems not whether a realignment has occurred, but rather where it is being pushed by the experiences of the Reagan era.

New Patterns in Realignment

If one wants to locate the time and place of the curtain raiser in our modern realignment drama, it almost certainly has to be 1948 in the American South.

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White southerners had been the strongest link in the New Deal coalition and the most loyal supporters of the Democratic party since the Civil War. In 1948, however, they began their long march away from the Democrats. The States Rights party led by Strom Thurmond of South Carolina seized on white racial protest against Truman policies, split off from the national Democratic party, and carried four southern states. Democrat Harry Truman won the support of just 53 percent of white southerners. In subsequent elections over the 1950s and 1960s, regional opposition to the national Democrats' civil rights policies combined with the increasing attraction that a rapidly industrializing and newly-prosperous South felt for the Republicans, to produce a massive swing to the GOP presidentially. Jimmy Carter, the first true southerner to be nominated for president by a major party since the Civil War, and clearly the beneficiary of substantial regional loyalties, was nonetheless unable in 1976 to win a majority of the vote among southern whites, and in 1980 he got only about one-third of this vote. Although 85 percent of white southerners voted for Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936, just over a quarter of them backed Walter Mondale in 1984 (Table 5).[11]

Over the last three decades a number of other groups that had been mainstays of the New Deal coalition have swung gradually to the Republicans. Labor leaders went all out for Mondale, but the blue-collar vote went for Reagan and the union vote (that is, voters from households where at least one adult was a union member) gave Mondale only a modest margin. Catholics have swung from their historic attachment to the Democratic party, and a majority of them voted for Reagan this year. These and other important shifts were influenced by Ronald Reagan's personal popularity, but they antedated the Reagan presidency by many years and reflected deep-rooted social changes.

The group alignments evident in the 1984 presidential voting represent an extraordinary shift from those of the New Deal era. Even in cases where a group comes down on the same partisan side now as it did then, its position in the larger electoral scheme is often different. For example, black Americans gave a majority of their votes to the Democrats during the New Deal, and they do so now. But the Democratic share has gotten much bigger since 1964, and blacks are now a much larger component of the Democrats' electorate than ever before.

A note on the gender gap. The gender gap made its first appearance in American national politics in the 1980 election campaign. Pollsters noticed right away that Reagan did less well among women than among men in trial heats with President Jimmy Carter. In the November balloting Reagan ran well ahead of Carter among male voters, but could only break even with the president among women. In office, Reagan's presidential approval ratings were also consistently weaker among that majority of the American electorate who were women. It isn't surprising, then, that many Democrats thought they saw an opening. Mondale clearly hoped that Geraldine Ferraro's candidacy would widen the "gender

[11] For further discussion of the long-term shift in group voting, see Everett Ladd (with Charles Hadley), *Transformations of the American Party System*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Norton, 1978).

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TABLE 5

1984 Presidential Vote, by Social and Political Group
(in percents)

	Reagan	Mondale
***Education*		
Less than high school education	48	52
High school graduate	59	41
Some college	63	37
College graduate	63	37
Post-graduate training	55	45
**Occupation*		
Professional or manager	62	37
White-collar worker	59	40
Blue-collar worker	53	46
Full-time student	51	48
Unemployed	31	68
Homemaker	63	36
Retired	62	37
**Union Household*	45	53
**Income*		
Under $12,500	46	53
$12,500–$24,999	57	42
$25,000–$34,999	59	40
$35,000–$50,000	67	32
Over $50,000	68	31
***Present Financial Status Compared to 4 years ago*		
Better	81	19
Same	51	49
Worse	27	73
***Ethnicity*		
Asian	72	28
Black	9	91
Hispanic	47	53
Whites	67	33
***Italian	61	39
German	70	30
Irish	62	38
Eastern European	54	46
***Religion*		
All Protestants	61	39
Baptist	51	49
Episcopalian	60	40
Lutheran	66	34

(continued)

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TABLE 5 (*continued*)

	Reagan	*Mondale*
Methodist	65	35
Mormon	85	15
Presbyterian	68	32
Other Protestant	68	32
Catholic	59	41
Jewish	32	68
None	34	66
**White Voters By Region*		
East	57	42
Midwest	67	32
South	72	28
West	65	34
**Party and Race*		
White Democrats	31	68
Black Democrats	3	96
***Age*		
18–24 years	59	41
25–29 years	61	39
30–39 years	57	43
40–49 years	59	41
50–59 years	62	38
60 years and older	60	40
***Ideology*		
Very liberal	30	70
Somewhat liberal	33	67
Middle-of-the-road	59	41
Somewhat conservative	82	18
Very conservative	81	19
***Party Identification*		
Very strong Democrat	7	92
Fairly strong Democrat	22	78
Independent	67	33
Fairly strong Republican	97	3
Very strong Republican	98	2
**Democratic Primary Supporters*		
Mondale	4	96
Hart	34	65
Jackson	6	93

* These variables are taken from the exit poll conducted by CBS News and the *New York Times*, 6 November, 1984.

** These variables are taken from the exit poll conducted by the *Los Angeles Times*, 6 November, 1984.

*** These variables are taken from the exit poll conducted by NBC News, 6 November, 1984.

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TABLE 6

The Gender Gap in Presidential Voting, 1984 (percents)

	Reagan	Mondale
Exit Poll by NBC News		
All Women	55	45
All Men	64	36
Exit Poll by the Los Angeles Times		
All Women	56	44
All Men	63	37
Exit Poll by ABC News/Washington Post		
All Women	54	46
All Men	62	38
Exit Poll by CBS News/New York Times		
All Women	57	42
All Men	61	37

	Women		*Men*	
	Reagan	*Mondale*	*Reagan*	*Mondale*
By Age:				
18–29 years of age	55	45	61	37
30–44 years of age	54	46	62	37
45–59 years of age	58	41	63	36
60 years and older	64	35	62	37
By Region:				
Northeast	47	52	57	42
Midwest	59	41	63	35
West	57	42	62	37
South	63	36	64	36
By Education:				
Less than high school	46	52	54	46
High school graduate	60	39	61	38
With some college	58	41	63	36
College graduate	53	47	65	34

gap" in his favor by providing women with a further encouragement to desert Reagan.

The Ferraro nomination was historic, and it will undoubtedly bolster women's position in electoral politics—something that is occurring generally. Since 1975, for example, the number of women holding state and local office has increased by 250 percent. Data indicate, however, that the Ferraro nomination had little impact on the 1984 presidential vote. Moreover, the gender gap, while persisting, was hardly decisive. The four big exit polls taken 6 November—by the *Los Angeles Times*, CBS News and the *New York Times*, ABC News and the *Washington Post*, and NBC News—all showed Reagan winning a large majority

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of the vote among women. The NBC polls put the gender gap at nine points, the widest of the four. The CBS News/*New York Times* poll put it at just four points, less than in 1980. What gap there was seems to have been greatest between college-educated men and women, and geographically between men and women in the Northeast. It was smallest—indeed, nonexistent—in the case of the elderly, high school graduates, and men and women living in the South (Table 6). Is the gender gap, such as it is, better understood in terms of relative Reagan weakness among women, or strength among men? Survey data suggest that this glass may be both half empty and half full.

The Republican Presidential Majority

Another element we have in mind when we speak of partisan realignment is the displacement of the previous majority party and the emergence of a new majority. At the presidential level such a shift has occurred. The GOP has been victorious in four of the last five presidential elections, winning 55 percent of the total two-party vote over this span. Three of the Republican victories have been landslides—in 1972, 1980, and 1984. The one election the Democrats won, in 1976, is in a sense the most graphic confirmation of the GOP's ascendancy: Jimmy Carter and the Democrats managed only the narrowest win in 1976, even though the Republican party had been decimated by the Watergate scandals.

Americans don't elect their presidents by national popular vote majorities, of course, but by electoral votes, which go winner-take-all to the popular vote victor in each state. In 1984 Reagan showed the extraordinary breadth of his support by winning 49 of the 50 states. Moreover, for the last five contests the electoral vote maps have looked even more decisively Republican than the popular vote distributions. There are twenty-three states all carried by Nixon in 1968 and 1972, Ford in 1976, and Reagan in 1980 and 1984. These states have 202 electoral votes, about three-fourths of the 270 electoral votes needed for a presidential victory (Figure 2). By contrast only the District of Columbia has given its support to all of the recent Democratic nominees—Humphrey in 1968, McGovern in 1972, Carter in 1976 and 1980, and Mondale in 1984.

Shifts in party identification. Throughout the 1984 campaign, politicians and pollsters perused survey data for indications of whether party identification was beginning to shift toward the Republicans, reflecting the GOP's persisting margin in presidential balloting. Party loyalties usually change only after actual voting behavior shifts; at any point they reflect yesterday's, not today's, political agenda. In view of this lag, there is special interest in the partisan attachments of young voters. Their ties are not wholly cut loose from yesterday, because family socialization continues to shape them; but they are more reflective of today's commitments than are those of older voters.

Generational conversion? Does the current political generation differ from its predecessors? Perhaps. In the late 1970s polls for the first time began showing the Republicans doing their best at the extreme of the age continuum: among

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FIGURE 2

States Voting Republican in Each of the Last Five Presidential Elections, 1968–1984 (crosshatched). Numbers indicate electoral votes.



those between 18–24 and among the very oldest voters who came of age before the Great Depression. This pattern has become firmer. The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) surveys taken in 1983 and 1984 suggest, for example, that current generational experience is more supportive of the GOP than any other reaching back to the 1930s (Table 7). The Democrats do best among the generations that reached maturity at the height of the Franklin D. Roosevelt years and in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Republicans' best groups are those that came of age politically in the Roaring Twenties and after 1975. The contrast shown by the NORC data between representatives of the 1960s generation and that of the late 1970s is especially striking. The Democrats' edge over the Republicans is 25 points among those 30–33 years of age, compared to just 4 points among those in their early-to-mid-twenties.

Some surveys taken around the time of the 1984 presidential elections indicate that, for the first time since the Depression, the Republicans may even have more support than the Democrats among the young. For example, a poll taken by CBS News and the *New York Times* between 30 September and 4 October 1984 found

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TABLE 7

Most and Least Democratic Age Groups (percent)

	Democrat	*Republican*	*Independent*	*Democratic minus Republican*
All ages	39	25	36	+14
Ages 62–65	48	22	30	+26
Ages 30–33	43	18	39	+25
Ages 22–25	31	27	42	+4
Ages 78 and older	31	43	26	−12

SOURCE: General Social Surveys, National Opinion Research Center; composite of surveys conducted in 1983 and 1984.

53 percent of persons 18–29 years of age either clearly identified with the GOP or leaned to it, compared to just 37 percent for the Democrats. Similarly, the *Times*/CBS News poll of 8–14 November 1984 showed the GOP with its biggest advantage in the 18–29-year cohort, where it led the Democrats 50 percent to 42 percent when "leaners" were included.

A stronger Republican showing. Looking at all age groups in the population and the findings of a number of different surveys, one sees clear Republican gains. Table 7 shows the results of a number of queries about party identification, using various question wordings and different samples. The main difference with regard to the samples stems from the fact that some of the polls cited are *exit polls*—samples of those who had just voted—rather than polls of all registered voters or the entire adult population. Those who vote have been shown to be more Republican, although only slightly so, than the entire potential electorate.[12] The principal differences we see in Table 8 from one 1984 poll to another do not seem to result from question wording or from whether the survey was of all potential voters or of actual voters. Timing is the important consideration. For example, the CBS News/*New York Times* national telephone poll of mid-October 1984 gave the Democrats a 14 point lead over the Republicans in party identification, whereas that same organization's telephone survey of 8–14 November found the two parties tied. The Republicans got a lift out of the decisive decision made by voters to cast their ballots for the incumbent Republican president.

The political transformation of the white South. The shift in party preference of certain groups is especially striking. Long after they began voting Republican presidentially, southern whites still gave the Democrats a large margin over the Republicans in party identification. But according to the exit poll taken by the *Los Angeles Times* on election day 1984, 37 percent of the southern white elec-

[12] Raymond Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), 109–110.

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TABLE 8

Party Identification in the U.S., Fall 1980 and Fall 1984 (percents)

	1980				1984		
Poll	*Dem.*	*Rep.*	*Ind.*	*Poll*	*Dem.*	*Rep.*	*Ind.*
CBS/*New York Times*				ABC/*Washington Post*			
Sept. 10–14	46	23	31	Sept. 7–11	39	26	34
Roper				Gallup Surveys of			
Sept. 27–Oct. 4	48	25	26	Sept. 21–24, 9/28–30; Oct. 15–17,			
Gallup				10/26–28	39	35	26
Oct. 10–13	45	26	29	Roper			
CBS Exit Poll				Sept. 15–22	44	31	25
Nov. 8	45	30	26	CBS/*New York Times*			
ABC/*Washington Post*				Oct. 14–17	40	26	34
Exit Poll Nov. 8	40	27	33	Harris			
Gallup				Oct. 26–Nov. 5	42	33	20
Nov. 7–10	42	26	32	CBS Exit Poll			
CBS/*New York Times*				Nov. 6	38	35	26
Nov. 7–12	46	24	30	*Los Angeles Times*			
				Exit Poll Nov. 6	34	30	36
				CBS/*New York Times*			
				Nov. 8–14	32	32	36
					(44(D), 47(R) when leaners distributed)		

1984 Question Wordings:

CBS News/*New York Times* Telephone Polls: "Generally speaking, do you usually consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?" (IF INDEPENDENT OR DON'T KNOW, ASK:) "Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican party or to the Democratic party?"

CBS News/*New York Times* Exit Poll (voters fill out questionnaire after leaving voting stations): "Do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, an Independent, or a Republican?"

Los Angeles Times Exit Poll: "Do you consider yourself: a very strong Democrat; a fairly strong Democrat; an Independent; a fairly strong Republican; a very strong Republican; something else."

Roper: "Regardless of how you may have voted in the past, what do you usually consider yourself—a Democrat, a Republican, some other party, or what?"

Gallup: "In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?"

ABC News/*Washington Post:* "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent or what?" (Asked of those who did not respond Republican or Democrat) "Do you lean more towards the Republican party or the Democratic party."

torate described themselves as Republicans, compared to just 23 percent Democrats (Table 9). This is an historic first. Never before the 1984 campaign had a plurality of white southerners identified with the party that had once sent the Grand Army of the Republic marching through Georgia.

Peter Hart, polling for the Democrats, and Richard Wirthlin, polling for the Republicans, recorded shifts in party identification among white southerners

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TABLE 9

Party Identification by Group
1984 (percent)

	Democratic	*Republican*	*Independent*
		Race and Ethnicity	
Asian	28	36	36
Black	81	4	15
Hispanic	52	20	28
Non-Hispanic white	26	34	40
Southern whites	23	37	40
Non-southern whites	27	33	40
		Religion	
Protestant	33	32	35
Catholic	35	25	10
Jewish	13	17	10
Other	34	33	33
None	48	21	31
		Region	
East	32	28	40
Mid-West	33	29	38
South	37	29	34
West	33	34	33
		Income	
Less than $10,000	48	22	30
$10,000–20,000	36	30	34
$20,000–30,000	33	29	34
$30,000–40,000	28	31	41
Over $40,000	25	35	40
		Sex	
Male	30	31	39
Female	36	29	35
		Political Ideology	
Liberal	54	13	33
Middle	31	23	46
Conservative	18	50	32

Source: Exit Poll conducted by the *Los Angeles Times*, 6 November 1984.

comparable to those shown by the *Los Angeles Times* exit poll. For example, a survey by Hart in Alabama in December 1983 had found 53 percent of whites identifying as Democrats and just 24 percent as Republicans. But in Hart's last poll just before election day, the proportion of Alabama whites identifying with the Democrats had dropped to 29 percent, while the Republican share had risen

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to 41 percent. In December 1983, then, the Democrats' margin was 29 points; eleven months later the GOP had a 12 point edge: the net swing in party identification among white Alabamans was 41 percentage points.[13]

But has party identification become a different kind of measure? These extraordinary shifts in professed partisan ties obviously point to a big change in party fortunes. But what do they say about the present-day meaning of party identification and its constancy? We have long assumed that party identification reflected deep loyalties—not easily changed. A group might vote for another party in a given presidential election, even in a number of elections, and still not abandon its ancestral party ties. White southerners managed to keep their Democratic identities in 1948, 1968, 1972, and 1980—when political currents were pushing them away from the Democrats and toward the Republicans at the presidential level. Why did they swing so massively to the GOP in professed party ties in 1984? Was there a straw that broke the proverbial camel's vertabrae? The shift was especially striking in the white South, but all across the electorate there was unprecedented movement in partisan identification during Campaign '84. Is party identification ceasing—in this age of dealignment—to suggest any psychological imperative? Is it becoming something more casual than it has ever before been—little more than a reflection of current political preferences?

New Lines in Policy Conflict

We also associate realignment with a new mix of issues, particularly those involving government's proper role in economic affairs. Here the approach of most Americans is highly pragmatic—whatever works must be right. During the New Deal, the national government assumed a variety of new responsibilities and won general approval for its performance. When the society got markedly richer in the post-World War II years, popular expectations of what should be achieved in the governmental sector, as in the private sector, naturally rose. Just as Americans came to expect more leisure time, more consumer goods, and higher standards of living, they looked for more governmental service in extending educational opportunities, helping those in need, assuring adequate incomes in old age and retirement, protecting the environment, and the like. But the other side of this pragmatic, nonideological posture toward government has involved a readiness to criticize it whenever its actions seem not to work as well as they should. Over the late 1960s and 1970s, as American government began doing so much more, it presented a much bigger target for criticism.

Dealignment

The present realignment is accompanied, indeed distinguished, by the continued weakening of voter loyalties to political parties in general. I posed a false

[13] Interview by the author with Peter Hart and Richard Wirthlin for *Public Opinion*, 13 December 1984.

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dichotomy when, in these pages four years ago, I questioned whether a realignment *or* a dealignment was occurring. The larger change in voter alignments we are experiencing includes a greater inclination on the part of many voters not to express any underlying party preference, or to leave the candidate of their professed party with very little hesitancy, and in general to make party identification a more casual matter than it ever has been before. The contemporary electorate is less anchored today than in most of American history. Whatever their future assessment of the Reagan administration and Republican performance, or of the Democrats, voters are not going to recreate the extent and degree of stability in party ties that they displayed in the New Deal era. It takes less to move this electorate from one party to the other, from one election to the next.

One manifestation of the diminished strength of party ties is a high frequency of split-ticket voting. In this regard, 1984 fitted neatly into the experience of modern U.S. elections. Gallup regularly asks: "For the various political offices, did you vote for all the candidates of one party, that is, a straight ticket, or did you vote for the candidates of different parties?" For the last five presidential elections the proportions saying they voted a *straight ticket* have been a fairly *consistent minority*: 37 percent in 1968, 44 percent in 1972, 41 percent in 1976, 37 percent in 1980, and 43 percent in 1984. The specific consequences of this proclivity for ticket splitting can be quite dramatic—as in Nebraska where Democratic Senator J. J. Exon edged out Republican challenger Nancy Hoch, even though Reagan overwhelmed Mondale 71 percent to 29 percent in that state's presidential balloting.

The Two-Tier Electoral System

The present realignment also manifests a kind of split personality: the presidency has been dominated by the Republicans in recent elections, but Congress, state legislatures, and other offices have hardly become GOP bastions. In the 1984 balloting the Republicans retained control of the U.S. Senate, but they dropped two seats. In the House their gain of seventeen seats still left them trailing the Democrats 183 to 252. Among state legislatures, the GOP picked up roughly 300 seats in 1984, but the Democrats continued their overall ascendancy, holding over 1,300 more seats than the Republicans nationally and 300 more outside the South. The Democrats' overall position in offices held was only modestly diminished, even in the face of the Reagan landslide.

Some observers explain the two-tier electoral system by Americans' liking for separation of powers and checks and balances. If the direction the Republicans propose for national policy is to be encouraged by the election of Republican presidents, isn't some check on it useful in Congress and the state houses? Besides, a great many people are highly ambivalent about the role of government and other central policy issues. What better way to express their mixed feelings than by ordaining divided party control?

Other observers stress the importance of structural factors that influence

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TABLE 10

Total Campaign Receipts in U.S. House of Representatives Races, January 1, 1983 to October 17, 1984

	Total Receipts	*Receipts from PACs*
Democratic incumbents	$68,729,000	$31,147,000
Democratic challengers	$10,922,000	$3,306,000
Democratic open-seat candidates	$7,324,000	$1,664,000
All Democratic candidates	$86,975,000	$36,117,000
Republican incumbents	$43,402,000	$15,941,000
Republican challengers	$21,866,000	$3,795,000
Republican open-seat candidates	$7,508,000	$2,165,000
All Republican candidates	$72,776,000	$21,901,000
All major party candidates	$159,751,000	$58,018,000

Source: Michael J. Malbin and Thomas W. Skladany, "Campaign Finance, 1984: A Preliminary Analysis of House and Senate Campaign Receipts," a paper presented at the American Enterprise Institute Public Policy Week, Washington, D.C., 3–6 December 1984.

voting at the various levels. For example, members of Congress now have large staffs and other resources of incumbency that are useful in advancing their reelection. Gaining high levels of "name recognition," and emphasizing their nonpartisan service to constituents, they can often divorce their own electoral fortunes from those of their parties' presidential nominees. In addition, incumbents frequently outspend their challengers by substantial margins. Table 10 suggests the big financial edge that congressional incumbents of both parties enjoyed in the 1984 elections, partly because political action committees (PACs) have such a proclivity for backing incumbents with whom they deal in pressing their various policy objectives. The Democrats entered the modern period with a big edge in congressional seats, and the advantages of incumbency have been theirs more than the Republicans'.

Both of these explanations of the two-tier voting system seem to have some validity. A great many people are ambivalent on many big policy issues and express that ambivalence by dividing governmental control—easily done given the American separation of powers. And the resources of incumbency are such that many candidates can insulate themselves from broader swings in public preferences. The precise mix of these two sets of factors isn't known. We do know that the present "realignment with a split personality" is proving to be remarkably enduring.

The Next Act

". . . I would tell you that the forces that put together the Democratic New Deal coalition are dead. It is past history and indeed we are moving into a new era."

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The wishful thinking of a Republican? No, the post-election analysis of the Democrat who polled for Walter Mondale in 1984, Peter Hart. The Republicans' pollster, Richard Wirthlin, agreed with Hart. There has been, Wirthlin observed, "a rejection of the New Deal agenda that had dominated American politics since the mid-1930s."[14]

The social changes ending the New Deal era in American politics have been unfolding gradually over the last quarter century. We have not had anything like the thunderbolt that brought the realignment of the 1930s. But the sweeping transformations that I and others have labelled "postindustrialism" have long since worked themselves out far enough to alter fundamentally partisan attachments and voting.[15]

The transition from the industrial to the postindustrial era has been especially difficult for the Democrats. They were the party of the dominant, successful policies, and the ascendent coalition of groups in the former era; and like other majority parties of the country's past—the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian Democrats and the Republicans in the years of industrial nation-building—they have lost ground as new collections of interests, issues, and groups have established themselves. Conversely, the Republicans have made impressive gains. They have dominated presidential balloting over the last five elections. A majority of Americans now see them as "the party of prosperity." In party identification, the GOP has closed the gap on the Democrats more than at any time in the last five decades. Four Gallup polls taken in September and October 1984 showed the Republican percentage in party identification only four points below the Democratic percentage—the smallest gap shown by a sustained series of Gallup polls since 1940.

The current realignment differs greatly from its predecessors, however. In particular, voter ties to political parties are much weaker than in earlier eras, and a far larger proportion of the electorate makes its voting decisions afresh each year, based on its rating of current performance. With the Republicans controlling the White House, the next act in our long-playing realignment drama will be based on the public's perceptions of GOP performance in serving the country's social and economic well-being. Will the approach of the Reagan administration ultimately be seen as *successful*, not merely *promising*? Or will it crash against deepening economic problems and social conflict? If there is to be a firmer, broader Republican majority, it will result from the public's continuing to find the GOP a successful governing party.

[14] Ibid.

[15] See Ladd, *Transformations of the American Party System.* The most complete treatment of the postindustrial setting remains Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Postindustrial Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

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The Argentine Factor in Twentieth-Century Brazilian Foreign Policy Strategy

STANLEY E. HILTON

The most dramatic event in the politics of the so-called Southern Cone of South America in the past several years was the visit to Argentina by Brazilian President João Figueiredo in May 1980. Coming at the end of a turbulent decade in Brazilian-Argentine relations characterized by intense and often shrill verbal warfare, keen politico-economic competition in adjacent countries of the La Plata basin, and atomic rivalry with ill-concealed military overtones, Figueiredo's trip possessed unusual significance in contemporary terms. The two governments, Argentine Foreign Minister Carlos Pastor proclaimed, were now abandoning "competitive schemes" in order to forge "a zone of peace and security that embraces an entire fringe of the South Atlantic."[1] But while the journey of the Brazilian leader represented a mutual desire to terminate the dangerous friction that had marred relations in the 1970s, it also looms, in its political symbolism and results, as perhaps the most significant development in the agitated history of the contest between the two nations for supremacy in the Southern Cone of South America, indeed, for continental hegemony, in this century. This article seeks to place in perspective the efforts recently made by Brasília and Buenos Aires to create a cooperative, rather than a competitive, framework for their relationship. The analytical focus here is two-fold: the image(s) of Argentina held by the Brazilian foreign policy elite in the twentieth century and the

[1] *O Estado de São Paulo* (São Paulo), 7 May 1980.

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strategy devised by Brazilian policy makers to contend with the perceived Argentine challenge.

Brazilian Threat Perceptions

If the record demonstrates that Brazilian foreign policy strategy in this century has been primarily a function of threat perception, it also shows that the enduring image of Argentina as an aggressive, expansionist state lies at the core of the sense of threat that has pervaded Brazilian strategic circles for generations. During the "Old Republic" (1889–1930), Brazilian observers carefully studied Argentina's commercial and political efforts in the basin and concluded that, in her drive for continental supremacy, she was seeking systematically to isolate Brazil, a Luso-African island in an Indo-Spanish archipelago, by establishing a modern version of the Vice-Royalty of La Plata, the Spanish colonial administrative unit that had included Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia and whose capital had been Buenos Aires. "She sees in Brazil an obstacle to her ambitions of continental hegemony. . . ," a Brazilian naval captain commented in a secret memorandum to the president in 1918. "That is why Argentine policy continues to have as its goal the diplomatic isolation of Brazil in South America." General Augusto Tasso Fragoso, the army chief of staff, was equally unequivocal in the mid-1920s, warning that Argentina was endeavoring to enclose Brazil in a "circle of iron." That was also the conclusion of a special Itamaraty (Foreign Ministry) study prepared in 1927. "Argentine expansionist plans are aimed directly at Brazil . . . ," it cautioned, adding that "the whole thrust of the foreign policy of the Argentine Republic consists in isolating Brazil in America."[2]

Argentina's military activities gave an ominous dimension to her perceived *Einkreisung* policies. Turn-of-the-century naval purchases followed by a World War I build-up and then by unprecedented defense budgets in the 1920s generated deep anxiety in Rio de Janeiro,[3] where the possibility of war between the two countries was a permanent theme of strategic discussion. With justification during the tenure of Foreign Minister Rio Branco (1902–1912) Brazil feared an Argentine attack, possibly following an ultimatum designed to block execution

[2] Captain A. C. Souza e Silva, memorandum, August 1918; Estado-Maior do Exército (hereafter cited as EME), cited in Minister of War to Foreign Minister, 15 May 1926; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter cited as MFA), memo, 4 May 1927, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty (hereafter cited as AHI), Rio de Janeiro (hereafter cited as Rio).

[3] See, for example, Foreign Minister to Minister of Navy, 26 May 1905, AHI; Military Attache Armando Duval (Buenos Aires) to EME, 2 October 1917, Arquivo do Exercito, Rio; Estado-Maior da Armada (hereafter cited as EMA) to Minister of Navy, 28 May 1918, Arquivo da Marinha, Rio; Armando Duval, *A Argentina: potência militar*, 2 vols., (Rio: Imprensa Nacional, 1922); Brazilian ambassador (Buenos Aires) to MFA, 23 July 1926, 23 November 1926, 10 April 1927, AHI; Commander Frederico Villar, "A orientação militar argentina," *O Jornal* (Rio), 15 September 1926; (Major) Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, *A Questão dos armamentos na America do Sul* (Rio: Rodrigues, 1927), 10–12; Minister of Navy to Foreign Minister, 1 November 1927, AHI; [Admiral José Penido], memo, n.d. [1928], José Carlos de Macedo Soares Papers, Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, Rio.

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of their naval program.[4] Divergent policies during World War I—Brazil joined the Allies while Argentina remained neutral—resuscitated fears of a military confrontation, which were fueled in the 1920s by diplomatic clashes, Argentine military preparations, and the volatile Chaco territorial dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay. Brazilian naval and diplomatic analysts in the Southern Cone became progressively alarmed as the decade wore on; the embassy in Chile even predicted in 1927 that Argentina actually would attack Brazil "within five years."[5]

The anxieties of Brazilian policy makers regarding Argentina's geopolitical ambitions heightened dramatically during the turbulent 1930s. A coup d'état early in the decade brought military regimes in Buenos Aires that intensified spending on the armed forces, an ominous signal monitored continuously by Brazilian agents.[6] An especially grave development was Argentina's apparent intrigue in the bitter Chaco War (1932–1935) that finally erupted between Bolivia and Paraguay. Brazilian observers were convinced that Buenos Aires was encouraging Paraguay, a country they regarded as an Argentine colony. General Pedro de Góes Monteiro, then Brazilian minister of war, argued in 1934 that Buenos Aires wanted the conflict to drag on because it represented "a step toward conquest of its long-desired hegemony." Ambassador Oswaldo Aranha carried that message to Washington, admonishing the State Department that the "real crux" of the issue was Argentina's clandestine support of Asunción. Army intelligence experts went so far as to state in 1935 that Argentine interests probably had been responsible for the outbreak of the war.[7]

What was behind the perceived machinations of the historic rival? Brazilian official opinion was unanimous: Buenos Aires was seeking to establish economic

[4] Brazilian minister (Buenos Aires) to MFA, 15 November 1906; MFA to Brazilian ambassador (Washington), 3 January 1907, AHI; Senator Ruy Barbosa to President Afonso Pena, 7 May 1908, Afonso Pena Papers, Arquivo Nacional (hereafter cited as AN), Rio. The Argentine foreign minister in 1908 privately acknowledged that his policy had been to "isolate" Brazil; in fact, he urged the government that year to attack Brazil if the latter persisted in its naval program. Roberto Etchepareborda, *Historia de las relaciones internacionales argentinas* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Pleamar, 1978), 43–51. Frank D. McCann, Jr., "The Brazilian General Staff and Brazil's Military Situation, 1900–1945," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 25 (1983): 304–305 has additional information on Brazil's concern about possible Argentine aggression.

[5] Stanley E. Hilton, "Brazil and the Post-Versailles World: Elite Images and Foreign Policy Strategy, 1919–1929," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 12 (1980): 344–346, 349–350; Naval attaché (Santiago) to Minister of Navy, 24 October 1927, AHI.

[6] Naval attaché (Buenos Aires) to EMA, 26 March 1936, June 8, 1936, Arquivo da Marinha; chargé d'affaires Oswaldo Furst (Buenos Aires) to Hildebrando Acioly (MFA), 2 April 1937, 3 May 1937, Hildebrando Acioly Papers (private), Rio; MFA to Ministry of War, 25 February 1932, 18 August 1936, 27 January 1937, 3 March 1938, AHI.

[7] Pedro de Góes Monteiro to Oswaldo Aranha, 2 February 1934, Coleção Presidência da República (hereafter cited as PR), AN; State Department, memo, 15 November 1934, Record Group 59, file 724.3415/4337, National Archives, Washington; EME, *Synthese das informações colhidas sobre a guerra boliviana-paraguaya no Chaco Boreal* (Rio: Imprensa Militar, 1935), Arquivo do EME (hereafter cited as AEME), Ministério da Guerra, Rio.

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sway over adjacent Spanish-speaking countries in pursuit of its historic goal of encircling and isolating Brazil. Rio de Janeiro continued to attribute an irredentist dimension to Argentina's strategy. Not only was Argentina aiding Paraguay financially, President-dictator Getúlio Vargas wrote in 1934, but it was concentrating troops on the Bolivian border "and advocates the reabsorption of Bolivia as a detached part of the Vice-Royalty of La Plata." Argentine authorities, he subsequently pondered, were trying to "transform Buenos Aires into a great emporium of raw materials and make tributaries of that port out of all the regions whose production can be channeled into the La Plata Basin." The Brazilian Army General Staff hammered on that theme. "Since Argentina has never been able to reconcile herself to the dismemberment of the Vice-Royalty of La Plata," read one of its reports in 1935, her leaders had substituted "economic imperialism" for territorial aggrandizement.[8]

The risk of military confrontation with Argentina seemed to assume new immediacy in those circumstances. Because it would facilitate an Argentine thrust into southern Brazil, the general staff was unenthusiastic about a plan for an international bridge across the Uruguay River, and similar pessimism pervaded the Ministry of War and Itamaraty. The volatility of the Chaco embroglio and Brazil's undisputed military inferiority vis-à-vis Argentina were dominant concerns of Monteiro during this period, and in August 1934 Foreign Minister José Carlos de Macedo Soares (1934–1936, 1956–1958) alerted Brazil's missions in South America to the possibility of the country's being dragged into the conflict, a preoccupation that Vargas also expressed.[9] The suspension of hostilities and the opening of peace talks in Buenos Aires reduced tensions somewhat, but there was permanent wariness in Rio de Janeiro. The general staff went ahead with work on plans for the defense of the southern states and Mato Grosso. As the obstructionism of the Argentine foreign minister in the peace negotiations became patent, Brazilian attentiveness sharpened.[10] An intense public and official outburst in Buenos Aires that blocked Brazil's bid to strengthen its dilapidated navy by leasing six aged destroyers from Washington in 1937 confirmed suspicions and led to redoubled efforts to bolster border defenses.[11] Monteiro, now

[8] Getúlio Vargas to Aranha, 24 December 1934, 17 June 1937, Oswaldo Aranha Papers, Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea (hereafter cited as CPDOC), Rio; EME, *Synthese das informações.* See also Colonel Gil Castelo Branco, memo, November 1936, AHI; Captain Renato Guillobel, memo, n.d. [November 1936], Macedo Soares Papers.

[9] EME, *Relatório dos Trabalhos do Estado-Maior durante o Ano de 1933* (Rio: Imprensa Militar, 1934), AEME; EME to Minister of War, 12 March 1934, Pantaleão da Silva Pessoa Papers (private), Rio; Monteiro to MFA, 24 March 1934, 26 January 1935; Macedo Soares, circular, 22 August 1934, AHI; Vargas to Aranha, 24 December 1934, Aranha Papers.

[10] EME, *Relatório [. . .] 1935* (Rio: Imprensa Militar, 1936), AEME; Orlando Leite Ribeiro (Buenos Aires) to Vargas, 24 August 1935, PR; MFA memo, 18 February 1936, AHI; Furst to Acioly, 29 April 1937, Acioly Papers; EMA to Minister of Navy, 16 March 1937, Arquivo da Marinha; Aranha to Vargas, 4 June 1937, Getúlio Vargas Papers, CPDOC.

[11] Stanley E. Hilton, *Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930–1939: The Politics of Trade Rivalry* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975), 182.

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chief of staff, visited Argentina in 1938 and returned convinced that there was real danger of sudden attack. As a new world conflict approached, preoccupation with the Argentine challenge remained keen within the high command, whose fears were compounded by the conviction that all neighboring Spanish-speaking countries were potential allies of Argentina.[12]

World War II brought new tensions as Argentine leaders took the country down a neutralist and ultimately pro-German path. Brazilian observers were disconcerted by the growing strength of militant authoritarian nationalists in Argentina. Aranha, the wartime foreign minister (1938–1944), expressed the general anxiety in Rio de Janeiro when he confided in mid-1941 that he was afraid of an "eventual attack on Brazil by the Argentine if Brazil is openly lined up against Germany."[13] After the United States entered the war, the South American rivals followed sharply divergent policies. Despite its increasing participation in the Allied cause that culminated in the dispatch of an expeditionary force to Europe, the Vargas regime was less concerned about the Axis menace to the northeastern hump of Brazil—a matter of high priority to Washington—than it was with the threat from a pro-Axis Argentina.[14] The major fear in this regard was that Buenos Aires might launch an attack in coordination with fifth columnists in southern Brazil, which explains why military leaders remonstrated with Washington that they could not concentrate defense efforts solely in the northeast.[15]

It was not only the recalcitrant "neutrality" of Buenos Aires that alarmed Brazilian authorities, but the establishment there in mid-1943 of a military regime apparently bent on exporting its brand of authoritarian nationalism. Playing a prominent role in that regime was a clique of army officers, the *Grupo de Oficiales Unidos* (GOU), of which Colonel Juan Perón was a key member and which explicitly advocated what Rio de Janeiro feared: a neutralist bloc of like-minded governments in the Southern Cone in order to isolate Brazil and combat the influence of the United States.[16] A nationalist coup in Bolivia in December 1943, effected apparently with Argentine support, was a dramatic storm signal. In ensuing weeks Ambassador José Rodrigues Alves in Buenos Aires alerted

[12] Lourival Coutinho, *O General Góes Depõe* (Rio: Coelho Branco, 1958), 340–341; EME, Relatório [. . .] 1938 (typewritten), AEME; Monteiro, Diretrizes gerais para os Trabalhos do E.M.E. no Decorrer do Ano de 1939 (mimeographed), 21 October 1938, Pedro de Góes Monteiro Papers, AN; Monteiro to Minister of War Eurico G. Dutra, 10 June 1939, 11 August 1939, AEME.

[13] U.S. ambassador (Rio) to State Department, 16 July 1941, RG 59, 810.20 Defense/1329. See also Monteiro to Dutra, 11 July 1940, 26 July 1940, 6 August 1941, AEME.

[14] Stanley E. Hilton, "Brazilian Diplomacy and the Washington-Rio de Janeiro 'Axis' during the World War II Era," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 59 (1979): 211.

[15] Monteiro to (General) Carvalho, 4 August 1942; Carvalho to Aranha, 23 December 1942; Dutra to Carvalho, 17 July 1943, Estevão Leitão de Carvalho Papers, Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro; Monteiro to Dutra, 24 August 1942, AEME; Dutra to Vargas, 6 December 1943, AHI.

[16] Robert Alexander, *The Perón Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), 13. On the Argentine military and national policies during this period, see Robert A. Potash, *The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928–1945* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969), 182–238.

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both Aranha and Vargas to the perils in Argentine policy; the air attaché there called attention to the GOU's impact on that policy; and Monteiro, now a member of the inter-American political defense committee in Montevideo, urged active mobilization to counter Argentine irredentism. Aranha shared his colleagues' concern. "The reestablishment of the Vice-Royalty of the Plate economically and politically directed and controlled from the mouth of the great River," he wrote to U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, "is what dominates today and is what always has been the constant of Argentine policy."[17]

Argentina's external conduct in the post-war period seemingly justified Brazilian disquiet. While maintaining an unusually high level of expenditures on the armed forces in the late 1940s,[18] the Perón regime (1946–1955) embarked on a vigorous campaign to promote closer ties with adjacent Spanish-speaking states. Buenos Aires signed a spate of commercial, financial, and cultural agreements with Uruguay, Chile, and Peru, but its major targets were Paraguay and Bolivia. In 1946 the Argentine strongman announced an ambitious program of future cooperation with Paraguay that resulted in a 1950 accord to encourage Argentine investments and a 1953 pact of "economic union."[19] In the case of Bolivia, during the war Buenos Aires had negotiated oil concessions and an agreement to build a railroad linking Tacuiba (Argentina) to Santa Cruz; now in the late 1940s Perón made a state visit to La Paz, intensified work on the railroad, and offered Bolivia a commercial outlet to the sea. In the early 1950s, his government used propaganda, labor delegations, and vigorous economic diplomacy to draw the Andean country into its orbit.[20]

Expectedly, the level of threat perception in Brazil remained high during the Perón era. Elite articulations of opinion regarding Perón's intentions revealed the persistence of the belief that Brazil, in the words of one editorialist, was the target of a drive to "alter the political geography of South America" through resurrection of the "former Vice-Royalty of La Plata." Monteiro, again minister of war (1945–1946), minced no words: the Perón regime was "the true Nazi menace of the Americas" and was "gearing itself for a military clash with Brazil." Private warnings early in 1946 from the Brazilian military attaché in

[17] José Rodrigues Alves to Vargas, 27 December 1943, 10 February 1944, Vargas Papers; Alves to Aranha, 24 February 1944, Aranha Papers; Air Attaché Luis Neto dos Reis to Air Minister Pedro Salgado Filho, 25 January 1944, 9 March 1944, Pedro Salgado Filho Papers, AN; Monteiro to Aranha, 8 March 1944; Monteiro to Vargas, 28 May 1944, Vargas Papers; Aranha to Cordell Hull, 17 May 1944, RG 59, 832.00/5-3144.

[18] Potash, *The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1945–1962* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1980), 4, 76–83.

[19] Juan Perón, interview, *La Prensa* (Buenos Aires), 25 March 1948; Brazilian ambassador (Buenos Aires) to MFA, 7 January 1950, AHI; *Hispanic American Report* 6 (September 1953): 38, (November 1953): 33, 38.

[20] *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), 1 November 1947; *La Prensa*, 4 January 1949; *Democracia* (Buenos Aires), 26 June 1949; Brazilian ambassador (La Paz) to MFA, 6 April 1953, Vargas Papers; *Hispanic American Report* 7 (October 1954): 27.

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Buenos Aires about Perón's geopolitical goals, coupled with alarm signals from various sources about his military build-up, deepened the pessimism of the high command. Agreeing that Perón was "a new South American Hitler," Monteiro's successor cautioned President Enrico Dutra (1946–1950) that the Argentine leader was feverishly expanding Argentina's arms industries and clearly was endeavoring to recreate the "Vice-Royalty of La Plata." Both Itamaraty and the Navy Ministry followed suit, calling Dutra's attention to Argentina's purchases of weapons from foreign suppliers. General Dutra, who as minister of war during 1936–1945 had kept a close eye on the Argentine challenge, had Itamaraty complain to the State Department late in 1948 that Perón intended to forge "a Platine confederation dominated by the Argentine" and that his "megalomania" might lead him into "dangerous adventures." The following month leaders of the *União Democrática Nacional* (UDN), the middle-class liberal party to which Foreign Minister Raul Fernandes (1947–1950) belonged, dispatched a special emissary, future senator Arnon de Mello, to Argentina to study peronista activities. He somberly concluded that the ideas of the GOU governed Perón's strategy. "Perón clearly is preparing for war against Brazil . . . [which] is the great obstacle to the expansion of peronista Argentina along the lines of her imperialistic geopolitics," he told the UDN national committee.[21]

The sense of urgency with which the army high command championed expansion of the highway and railroad system in southern Brazil during the early 1950s was a function of its perceptions of the peronista threat. That transportation grid was "the key to our defensive strategy in case of a continental war in the far South," Minister of War Estillac Leal in 1951 pointed out to Vargas, then in his second presidency (1951–1954). General Henrique Lott repeated the admonition to Vargas's successor in 1955. Reflecting the permanent wariness at Itamaraty, the head of the political department gave a confidential lecture to the new war college, the *Escola Superior de Guerra* (ESG), in 1951 in which he underscored the immediate necessity of measures to defend Brazil "against the threat of reconstitution of the former Spanish vice-royalties, particularly that of La Plata." Preoccupation with that possibility underlay the vigorous opposition that both Vargas and Foreign Minister João Neves da Fontoura (1946, 1951–1953) expressed to the idea of forming blocs in South America. In a confidential talk at the ESG in May 1955, just weeks before Perón's overthrow, an Itamaraty representative stressed the now familiar "Vice-Royalty" theme, warning that the

[21] *Correio da Manhã* (Rio), 26 June 1946; Monteiro, quoted in State Department, memo, 28 January 1946, RG 59, Office of American Republics Affairs, Brazil Memoranda, Box 28, vol. 10; Military Attaché Oswaldo Cordeiro de Farias (Buenos Aires) to Monteiro, 29 April 1946, 21 May 1946, Monteiro Papers; Minister of War to Dutra, 5 February 1947, PR; MFA to Dutra, 31 October 1947, AHI; Minister of Navy to Dutra, n.d. [November 1947], PR; U.S. ambassador (Rio) to State Department, 28 October 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States* [henceforth *FRUS*], *1948*, 9 vols., (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973–1976), IX, 350; Arnon de Mello, Situação Político-Militar da Argentina e suas Relações com o Brasil (mimeo), 22 December 1948.

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peronista regime saw in a greater Argentine economic sphere a means of achieving "political hegemony" in South America.[22]

Brazilian analysts were relieved by the caudillo's removal from power, but the mistrust of Argentina's intentions did not abate and that country remained the explanatory key to Brazil's national strategy. Indeed, commented a high-ranking Itamaraty official in 1958, the rivalry with Argentina was "the most powerful and persistent" determinant of that policy, a judgment repeated two years later by another Itamaraty spokesman. The permanence of that strategic concern explained why, as a prominent technocrat publicly acknowledged in 1962, "everybody who takes the course at the War College [ESG] studies the hypothesis of war with Argentina." The uneasy eye that military planners kept on Argentine efforts to broaden ties with Bolivia in the mid-1960s was another suggestive sign.[23]

The 1960s proved to be the relative calm before the storm. A resurgence of peronismo in the early 1970s and a vigorous diplomatic campaign in Spanish America by the regime of General Alejandro Lanusse in Buenos Aires seemingly directed against Brazil brought to the surface all the latent antagonisms. Reflecting the pervasive apprehension about Argentina's apparent *Einkreisungspolitik*, the prestigious newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo* (11 October 1970) charged that country with seeking to "integrate the Amazon forests to its sphere of influence." The victory of peronista candidate Hector Campora, who proclaimed the necessity of renewing the foreign policy of the late 1940s and early 1950s, in the presidential elections of 1973 deepened Brazilian concern. "The alignment with Spanish-speaking countries, initiated by Perón in the past through the so-called 'economic union pacts,' . . . may become a source of conflict," editorialized the influential *Jornal do Brasil* (18 March 1973) "insofar as they seek to encircle Brazil economically and politically, tending toward a gradual isolation of our country on the continent." The president of the opposition party caustically denounced the peronistas' idea of "resuscitating the myth of Hispanism, with its obvious aggressiveness toward Brazil's alleged imperialistic Lusitanism" as a "lame version of the arrogant *deutsch* [sic] *über alles*."[24] After Perón himself returned from exile to take power again, the *Jornal do Brasil*

[22] Newton Estillac Leal to Vargas, 26 July 1951; Henrique Lott to President João Café Filho, 7 March 1955, PR; Heitor Lyra, quoted in José de Meira Penna, *Política Externa: Segurança e Desenvolvimento* (Rio: AGIR, 1967), 24; João Neves da Fontoura, *Depoimentos de um ex-Ministro* (Rio: Organização Simões, 1954), 13–25, 52–59; Fontoura to Vargas, 10 June 1953, Vargas Papers; Vargas, *Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional [. . .] 1954* (Rio: Imprensa Nacional, 1954), 23; M.D. Gibson, lecture C-44-55, 17 May 1955, Escola Superior de Guerra, Macedo Soares Papers.

[23] Luis Bastian Pinto (MFA), lecture CI-51-58, May 1958; see, too, Pinto, "A Política Exterior do Brasil na América Latina," *Revista Brasileira* de Política Internacional 2 (1959): 56; Miguel do Rio Branco (MFA), lecture C-47-60, n.d. [1960], Escola Superior de Guerra, Macedo Soares Papers; Glycon de Paiva, "A remessa de lucros e os investimentos estrangeiros," *Digesto Econômico* 19 (1962): 12, EME, *Boletim de Informações* (January 1966): 7.

[24] *Jornal do Brasil* (Rio), 21 March 1973.

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(23 November 1973) sounded a general alert: "The desire to marginalize its neighbor [Brazil] . . . is merely part of the Argentine government's global scheme to build a powerful alliance of Spanish American countries around Brazil." Perón's death in 1974 did little to change that conviction. Suggesting enduring caution in Brasília, a naval spokesman late in 1975 pointed to traditional distrust as a potentially volatile element in the Argentine-Brazilian relationship, while the army chief of staff called the attention of a congressional committee to Argentina's efforts to bolster her armed forces. In the late 1970s, Brazilian observers still were patently suspicious of the historic antagonist that, said one analyst in 1977, was "vying step by step for hegemony in the Southern Cone."[25]

Argentina's nuclear progress gave an ominous tinge to the verbal warfare between the two countries. Buenos Aires had established an early lead in developing a nuclear program based on natural uranium reactors, whose military potential is considerably greater than that of reactors using enriched uranium — a fact carefully noted by Brazilian military observers.[26] After inauguration of the Atucha I reactor in 1974, Argentine scientists announced that producing a nuclear weapon depended solely on a political decision, and when Argentina and India signed an atomic energy accord in May, there was immediate speculation in Brazil that the La Plata adversary in fact would be able to manufacture nuclear arms. By the spring of 1975 Brazilian public opinion was taking increasing note of that possibility. According to one report in May, military and civilian experts had met in secret session to study the matter and concluded that Buenos Aires could well be already in the process of constructing such arms. Brazil's controversial nuclear accord with West Germany, signed shortly afterward, may have been in part a response to the perceived Argentine challenge, and subsequent reaffirmations of Argentina's capacity to develop a nuclear arsenal only reinforced Brazil's determination to accelerate its own nuclear project.[27]

The Holding Action

Throughout the twentieth century the image of Argentina held by the Brazilian foreign policy elite has been remarkably consistent. The important question now becomes: how has that perception been translated into policy? The strategy de-

[25] Captain Guenter Ungerer, "Situação Econômica na América do Sul e Suas Influências na Avaliação da Nossa Estratégia Naval," *Revista Marítima Brasileira* 95 (December 1975): 117–118; Isaac Gomes, "Diplomacia brasileira está agora na vantagem," *O Globo* (Rio), 13 November 1977. On general tension between the two countries, see H. Jon Rosenbaum, "Argentina-Brazilian Relations: A Critical Juncture," *World Today* 29 (1973): 537–546; Benavides Correa, *Habrá guerra proximamente en el cono sur?* (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1974).

[26] "Usina Atômica de Córdoba," *Cultura Militar* 24 (1973): 33.

[27] *O Estado de São Paulo*, 31 May 1974; *Jornal do Brasil*, 14 July 1974, 17 November 1977. On the West German agreement, see Norman Gall, "Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All," *Foreign Policy* 23 (1976): 155–201; on nuclear rivalry and capabilities, see Stephen M. Gorman, "Security, Influence, and Nuclear Weapons: The Case of Argentina and Brazil," *Parameters* 9 (1979): 52–65.

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vised by Brazilian leaders to meet the perceived threat consisted, throughout most of the century, of four basic elements: the improvement of national defense capabilities, especially through weapons modernization and the development of defense industries; a holding action toward Argentina, consisting of the maintenance of official cordiality and intensification of bilateral economic contacts; a special relationship with the United States; and an expansion of ties with other countries of the La Plata basin, particularly Bolivia and Paraguay. The analytical emphasis here will be on the diplomatic components of Brazilian strategy. The military dimension during much of the century has been evaluated; suffice it to note here that the periodic purchase of hardware abroad and the now decades-long drive to develop military industries have been a function largely of the Argentine challenge.[28]

U.S. Ambassador William Pawley remarked once in the late 1940s that "the whole Brazil-Argentina ploy is a little difficult to understand [because] Brazil courts Argentina on the one hand and commits unfriendly acts on the other." The explanation for the apparent inconsistency is simply that Brazilian leaders saw in the holding action a means of attenuating and managing friction. To disregard the frequent protestations of historic fraternity and solidarity by Brazilian spokesmen as insignificant rhetoric of the moment would be to overlook their strategic character and the importance of diplomacy to a militarily weak country. The tradition of the holding action was launched during the Old Republic when Manuel Campos Salles in 1900 paid the first state visit to Buenos Aires by a Brazilian president. Cordial relations with a prosperous Argentina were in Brazil's interest, explained elder statesman Joaquim Nabuco in 1907, because they tended to strengthen the hand of the peace party in Buenos Aires. President Afonso Pena, in a typical gesture, planned a festive reception for the Argentine president-elect that year, arguing that it was "good politics" to make such displays of cordiality. Foreign Minister (Baron) Rio Branco (1902–1912) regarded the holding action, when buttressed by rearmament, an extremely useful instrument for calming turbulent political waters and championed a formal *entente cordiale* in the Southern Cone. At the embassy in Buenos Aires, Tasso Fragoso, then attaché, seconded the Baron's arguments. "We should treat Argentina with real fraternity," he wrote privately, "but without neglecting our [military] defenses for a single moment." One of Rio Branco's prominent disciples, Domício da Gama, himself a future foreign minister, at times despaired of achieving any effective understanding with Argentina. He was certain, he wrote in 1909, that "all efforts to make friends of these two countries will be in vain." Nonetheless, he urged Itamaraty in 1912 to continue the Baron's policy of "ceremonious friendship" toward the Buenos Aires government in order not to

[28] Stanley E. Hilton, "Military Influence on Brazilian Economic Policy, 1930–1945: A Different View," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 53 (1973): 73–74, 88; Hilton, "The Armed Forces and Industrialists in Modern Brazil: The Drive for Military Autonomy (1889–1954)," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 62 (1982): 631, 633, 646–647, 651–652, 663–664.

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weaken the position of those Argentines that might desire rapprochement. The "ABC Pact"—an agreement between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile designed to avoid hostilities among them—signed in 1915 was a significant component of the wartime holding action, although the Argentine congress failed to ratify it.[29] During the 1920s, as tensions sharpened, Itamaraty assiduously endeavored to maintain official friendship, sending reassuring messages to Buenos Aires, censoring Brazilian press attacks on Argentina, and admonishing Brazilian delegates to inter-American conferences to show special cordiality toward their Argentine colleagues.[30]

During the Vargas era, Brazilian leaders seldom lost an opportunity to make fraternal gestures. Foreign Minister Afrânio de Melo Franco (1930–1933) bent every effort to that end, promoting in 1933, for example, a visit by the Argentine chief executive to "help dissipate mutual suspicions." As skepticism deepened in Rio de Janeiro about Argentine intentions in the Chaco dispute, Brazilian authorities redoubled efforts to placate Buenos Aires. As a Ministry of War spokesman put it, it was vital to maintain the "most cordial relations" with Argentina at that critical juncture. In late 1934 Vargas seemed to echo Rio Branco. "Our policy has been one of cordial friendship with Argentina . . . ," he wrote. "We should continue it, but we need to take military precautions." A few months afterward he became the second Brazilian president to make a state visit to Buenos Aires and on his return commented that he was more than ever convinced of the need to intensify the "policy of cordiality" toward Argentina. Later in the decade he invited the Argentine vice-president and army chief of staff to Brazil and sent Monteiro to Argentina on a good will trip. The general brought back information that belied Argentine protestations of solidarity. Aranha, now in charge of Itamaraty, pointed out to Vargas, "but . . . , without placing credence in those declarations, we must do everything to transform them from niceties into realities." Aranha then launched a determined campaign for détente, endeavoring to establish a special rapport with his Argentine colleague.[31]

During World War II the necessity of the holding action seemed all the more urgent. Two speeches by Aranha in mid-1940 and a personal letter to his Argentine counterpart, all stressing an alleged communion of interests and sentiments,

[29] William Pawley (Rio) to Spruille Braden, 11 September 1946, RG 59, 732.35/9–1146; Joaquim Nabuco to Rio Branco, 3 January 1907; Rio Branco to Domício da Gama, 26 February 1909, AHI; Tasso Fragoso to Malan d'Angrogne, n.d. [1909?], Tristão de Alencar Araripe, *Tasso Fragoso: Um pouco de história do nosso Exército* (Rio: Biblioteca do Exército, 1960), 454; Gama to J. F. Assis Brasil, 2 February 1909; Gama to Eneas Martins (MFA), 12 March 1912, Domício da Gama Papers, Instituto Histórico e Georgráfico Brasileiro. On the ABC Pact, see Miguel A. Scenna, *Argentina-Brasil: Cuatro Siglos de Rivalidad* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones La Bastilla, 1975), 292–294.

[30] Hilton, "Brazil and the Post-Versailles World," 356–357.

[31] Afrânio de Melo Franco to Caio Melo Franco, 1 October 1933, Virgílio de Melo Franco Papers (private), Rio; Minister of War to General Pantaleão da Silva Pessôa, 2 January 1934; Minister of War to EME, 2 January 1934, Monteiro Papers; Vargas to Aranha, 24 December 1934, 22 June 1935, Aranha Papers; Aranha to Vargas, 3 April 1938, Vargas Papers; Aranha, speeches, 9 April 1938, 11 April 1938; Aranha to José Maria Cantilo, 18 August 1938, Aranha Papers.

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set the tone for official wartime dialogue. Monteiro again visited Buenos Aires in 1941, calling for intimate cooperation, and Aranha, on the eve of Pearl Harbor, made a similar trip to send conciliatory signals. Brazilian leaders in ensuing months clung tenaciously to diplomatic cordiality as a means hopefully of encouraging Buenos Aires to reconsider its truculent refusal to cooperate in hemisphere defense. When the Argentine military seized power in mid-1943, Rio de Janeiro insisted on being among the first foreign governments to recognize the new regime. Brazil's position vis-à-vis Argentina, Aranha reminded Ambassador Rodrigues Alves, was "much more complex" than that of the United States, which urged delay in recognition. Aranha went so far as to state publicly that Argentina's domestic situation was her own business and to call on other hemispheric countries to support the new regime. Vargas instructed Rodrigues Alves to continue to use friendly counsel and persuasion with Argentine leaders, a policy at variance with the U.S. State Department's hard line.[32] Brazil's quiet diplomacy probably made it easier for Buenos Aires finally to sever ties with Berlin in January 1944. As relations between the United States and Argentina nonetheless steadily worsened because of Axis influence in that country, Rio de Janeiro renewed its lobbying for conciliatory treatment of the archrival, arguing for its rapid reinstatement in the inter-American system and for its inclusion in the United Nations.[33] Vargas personally pressed Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr. in this regard.

For U.S. Ambassador Adolf Berle in Rio de Janeiro, Vargas's attitude toward Argentina and the United States merely reflected his "incurable habit of playing both ends against the middle," but clearly the holding action was more than a simple bargaining maneuver. "It is to the best interests of Brazil to be on friendly terms with Argentina no matter who is president there," Monteiro explained to Berle's successor. While privately decrying Perón's aggressive foreign policy and opposing United States arms sales to Argentina, the Dutra government urged a reconciliation between those two countries and insisted on Argentina's being brought into the new inter-American defense structure—not out of altruism, to be sure, but because the high command hoped that Brazil's own security would be enhanced by making Argentina a signatory of the hemisphere defense treaty.[34] Dutra's meeting with Perón on the border in May 1947 to dedicate an

[32] Aranha, speeches, 2 January 1940, Aranha Papers, 31 May 1940, *Jornal do Brasil*, 1 June 1940; Aranha to Julio Roca, 21 September 1940, Aranha Papers; Dutra to Vargas, 11 July 1941, Vargas Papers; *El Argentino* (Buenos Aires), 12 November 1941; Aranha to Alves, 7 June 1943, 8 June 1943, AHI; *Correio da Manhã*, 10 June 1943; Alves to Vargas, 20 October 1943, Vargas Papers.

[33] Edward Stettinius, Jr., memo, 17 February 1945, Edward Stettinius, Jr., Papers, Box 279, University of Virginia Library; Vargas to Pedro Leão-Velloso, 8 February 1945, 7 March 1945, AHI; General Edelmiro Farrell to Vargas, 25 May 1945, 9 June 1945, Vargas Papers; *FRUS, 1945*, 9 vols., (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967–1969), I, 487–488.

[34] Adolf Berle to State Department, 25 February 1946, Adolf Berle Papers, Berle Diaries, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.; Pawley to State Department, 4 February 1947, RG 59, 710 Consultation 3A/2-447; MFA to Ambassador Carlos Martins (Washington), 5 January 1946, 24

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international bridge was one in a long series of gestures calculated to encourage détente in the La Plata area. At the end of Dutra's administration, as the peronista press scored him as a lackey of American imperialism, the United States embassy in Brazil had to acknowledge that, despite such provocation, Rio de Janeiro had "made every effort to maintain the most cordial relations with Argentina."[35]

On his return to power in 1951, Varges resumed his earnest attempt to cultivate Argentine good will. In April 1952, for example, he sent both his vice-president, João Café Filho, and Monteiro, now armed forces chief of staff, to Buenos Aires. The task of the general, who decorated Eva Perón while there, was to allay Argentine suspicion about Brazil's new mutual assistance pact with Washington. After Monteiro's return Rio de Janeiro even offered to conclude a bilateral defense agreement with Argentina.[36] During the Juscelino Kubitschek era (1956–1960) the arguments of new, generally younger members of the foreign policy elite that an entente with Argentina was necessary to enhance the international bargaining power of Latin America as a whole,[37] contributed to official interest in the holding action. Kubitschek invited Argentine President-elect Arturo Frondizi to visit Brazil, and Frondizi reciprocated. The return visit never occurred, however, although the embassy in Buenos Aires urged it because it would stimulate a politically cooperative attitude on Argentina's part.[38] Kubitschek's successor, Jânio Quadros, did meet Frondizi on the border in 1961 where they announced the creation of a permanent system of consultation. After a visit that year to Buenos Aires, Brazil's Foreign Minister Francisco Santiago Dantas proclaimed the "definitive elimination" of the historic rivalry. With the idea of regular high-level consultation now accepted, ensuing years provided frequent opportunity for the rhetoric of fraternity.[39]

The establishment of military rule in Brazil in 1964 saw no interruption of the holding action. Vasco Leitão da Cunha, the first foreign minister of the new order, invited his Argentine counterpart to Brazil, explaining that a "more intimate relationship" between the two countries would be a force for continental

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March 1946, 1 April 1946; MFA memo, 1 April 1946, AHI; Minister of War to Aranha, 24 February 1947, Aranha Papers.

[35] *New York Times*, 22 May 1947; U.S. embassy (Rio) to State Department, 8 August 1950, RG 59.

[36] João Café Filho, *Do Sindicato ao Catete* 2 vols. (Rio: José Olympio, 1966), I, 260–261; Brazilian ambassador (Buenos Aires) to Vargas, 19 February 1952, 29 April 1952; Monteiro to Lusardo, 15 September 1952, Vargas Papers.

[37] See, for example, Helio Jaguaribe, *O Nacionalismo na Atualidade Brasileira* (Rio: Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros, 1958), 278–280.

[38] Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Relatório [. . .] 1958* (Rio: Imprensa Nacional, 1958), 33, *Relatório [. . .] 1959* (Rio: Imprensa Nacional, 1959), 17, 96–97; Ambassador Mario Gibson Barbosa (Buenos Aires) to Ambassador Aguinaldo B. Fragoso (MFA), 22 July 1958; MFA memo, n.d., Aguinaldo B. Fragoso Papers (private), Rio.

[39] Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Relatório [. . .] 1961* (Rio: Imprensa Nacional, 1963), 11; Francisco Santiago Dantas, *Política Externa Independente* (Rio: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1962), 47.

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stability.[40] During the 1970s the Emilio Médici and Ernesto Geisel governments made special efforts to establish diplomatic rapport, but the task was herculean in view of the divergent positions the two countries adopted on practically every international issue from territorial rights in the Antarctic to reform of the Organization of American States (OAS) and from relations with Cuba to economic utilization of La Plata resources. Médici nonetheless invited General Lanusse to Brasília, and when Perón died, Geisel decreed an official three-day mourning period and then took his entire cabinet to a mass for the deceased caudillo. At the end of 1978, on the eve of assuming the presidency, Figueiredo added his voice to the chorus of cordiality, pointing to the "historic ties" allegedly uniting Brazil and Argentina and promising the latter "special treatment" during his administration.[41]

Promotion of trade has been an important component of the holding action since the 1930s when Brazilian strategists developed a keen awareness of the political usefulness of growing industrial strength and consciously set out to open new markets in the Basin in large part as a means of enhancing Brazil's geopolitical posture.[42] With specific regard to Argentina, Aranha in 1938 succinctly defined Brazil's reasoning. "An essentially agricultural and pastoral country, Argentina will perforce become a great market for our industrial establishment," he explained. "The question of good [political] relations with Argentina can only be resolved through that interdependency of [economic] interests . . . ." Rio de Janeiro's campaign to develop an industrial export capacity ultimately proved successful in Argentina during the war when Brazil supplanted Great Britain as the major supplier. Brazilian army spokesmen, with an eye on the historic political estrangement, endorsed trade concessions, and Itamaraty repeatedly urged them "for motives of a political nature." After a trip to Buenos Aires, where he noted "open hostility" toward Brazil, the head of Itamaraty's economic department insisted in 1944 that the immediate material gains from intensified trade would be "insignificant" when compared to its "great diplomatic and political importance."[43]

Trade in the postwar period inevitably was affected by the swings in political relations. The Brazilian ambassador in Buenos Aires mused in December 1949 that Argentina was one of the "most promising" markets for Brazilian goods, but that one barrier was its fear of contributing, through its purchases, to

[40] Vasco Leitão da Cunha to Miguel Zavala Ortiz, 25 May 1964, Vasco Leitão da Cunha Papers, CPDOC.

[41] *Folha da Manhã* (São Paulo), 2 July 1974; *Correio do Povo* (Porto Alegre), 5 July 1974; Brazilian embassy (Washington), *Boletim Especial*, n. 65 (31 October 1978).

[42] Stanley E. Hilton, "Vargas and Brazilian Economic Development, 1930–1945: A Reappraisal of His Attitude Toward Industrialization and Planning," *Journal of Economic History* 35 (1975): 769.

[43] Aranha to Brazilian ambassador (Washington), 16 November 1938, AHI; Hilton, "Vargas and Brazilian Economic Development," 775–776; Colonel Sylvio Raulino de Oliveira, memo, 26 November 1940; MFA, memo, 17 August 1943; M. Moreira da Silva to Aranha, 17 January 1944, AHI.

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Brazil's economic growth.[44] By the early 1960s total bilateral transactions had reached only $134 million. The Brazilian military regimes in the mid-1960s, however, were deeply uneasy about the growing ideological cleavage in South America and feared the political consequences of the formation of economic blocs such as the Andean Group; they, therefore, pushed for better trade relations with Argentina, reasoning that an understanding between the two major powers on the continent would discourage politico-economic fragmentation. Brazilian leaders, of course, were also committed to rapid industrialization and hence were interested in broadening the market for manufactures in that country. Buenos Aires declines the offer of a customs union made by Brasília through Minister of Planning Roberto Campos,[45] but tenacity ultimately paid dividends. By 1972 total bilateral exchanges amounted to a half billion dollars and then, despite severe political tensions, they jumped to $1.5 billion in 1979, by which time Argentina had become a major market for Brazilian industry. Both sides have a strong stake in this mutually beneficial trade, and Brazilian policy makers, at least, continued to see in commerce an additional means of keeping political strife within manageable limits. The prospects for friendlier relations, said Brazil's Foreign Minister Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro in December 1979, were now better because of the "complementarity of our economies."[46]

The Special Relationship with Washington

Brazilian leaders assiduously pursued throughout the first half of the century a special relationship with the United States, a country they regarded as a natural ally and logical source of preferential military and economic assistance in return for Brazil's running diplomatic interference for Washington in South America. Implicit in this approach was the assumption that Brazil and Spanish America were natural antagonists. Joaquim Nabuco, Brazil's first ambassador to Washington, joined Rio Branco as an architect of the special relationship, which he saw first as a means of defense against predatory European powers but which, as relations with Argentina deteriorated, he came to judge a source of additional protection against that country, especially in view of Brazil's continental isolation. In the early 1920s, Foreign Minister Felix Pacheco (1922–1926), echoing Rio Branco and Nabuco, argued that the United States, too, was "isolated" in the Americas "as is ours, by race and by language, coping constantly with the unjust and unfounded prejudices of the Spanish Americans." An Itamaraty official in 1934 was more explicit: an alliance with the United States would "contribute to strengthening, in a concrete and positive manner, Brazil's position vis-à-vis the Argentine Republic, which . . . is and always will be, increasingly, the nerve

[44] Brazilian ambassador (Buenos Aires) to MFA, 21 December 1949, AHI.

[45] Roberto Campos, "O pequeno mundo da rua Larga-1," *O Estado de São Paulo*, 28 January 1970, and "Reflexões sobre o pragmatismo responsável," *O Estado de São Paulo*, 29 May 1974.

[46] *O Estado de São Paulo*, 29 December 1979.

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center of our [foreign] policy." Thinking of the historic contest with Argentina, Monteiro gave the military's point of view when he declared that Brazil should follow "two simultaneous paths" that he defined as "intimate cooperation" with Washington and "economic penetration of the small countries on our border." State Department experts, studying Aranha's appeal for a united front toward Buenos Aires in 1944, correctly perceived that his aim was that of "aligning the United States with Brazil—not against the present Nazi-type regime in Argentina—but against Argentina itself." Lecturing at the General Staff School in 1946, an Itamaraty spokesman summed up prevailing strategic thought when he emphasized the "natural allies" thesis while pointing to the Argentine problem.[47]

The contours of Brazilian-American relations during much of the century have been traced;[48] what is of analytical interest here is Brazil's anxiety about, and growing disenchantment with, American moves to placate Argentina, which historically has sought to weaken both United States and Brazilian influence in South America. The destroyers episode in 1937 was a humilating disappointment and the following year Rio de Janeiro received another shock when Washington agreed to provide instruction to the Argentine air force. Protesting sharply, Aranha admonished the American ambassador that Buenos Aires was preparing "for the eventual possibility of sending bombing planes to Brazilian cities." During the war, at least after 1941, there was no American aid to Argentina, but Brazilian policy makers remained wary, as their bid for permanent alliance suggests. The destroyers episode was especially difficult to forget, as Vargas made clear in a letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944.[49]

The postwar period brought repeated disillusionment. Brazilian leaders opposed quarantine of the Perón regime, fearing radicalization of its policies; on the other hand, the last thing they wanted was American military aid to Argentina. Under the impact of the Cold War, however, and to promote arms standardization, Washington in 1947 opted to bring Argentina back into the hemispheric fold, even to the extent of including her in its modest surplus

[47] Nabuco to President Manuel Campos Salles, 12 July 1900; Nabuco to Nilo Peçanha, 15 October 1906, Joaquim Nabuco Papers, AN; Nabuco to Rio Branco, 3 January 1907, AHI; Felix Pacheco to Melo Franco, 12 April 1923, Afrânio de Melo Franco Papers, Biblioteca Nacional, Rio; Gilberto Amado to Macedo Soares, 27 November 1934, AHI; EME [Monteiro], Relatório [. . .] 1939 (typewritten), AEME; State Department memo, 10 June 1944, RG 59, 832.00/5-3144; R. Mendes Gonçalves, lecture, Escola do EME, 23 September 1946, AHI.

[48] E. Bradford Burns, *The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Frank D. McCann, Jr., *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1973); Hilton, "Brazilian Diplomacy and the Washington-Rio de Janeiro 'Axis,' "; Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960: End of the Special Relationship," *Journal of American History* 68 (1981): 599-624.

[49] Ambassador Mario Pimentel Brandão (Washington) to Aranha, 21 May 1938; Aranha to Brandão, 27 May 1938, AHI; U.S. ambassador (Rio) to State Department, 23 May 1938, *FRUS, 1938*, 5 vols., (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955-1956), V, 320; Vargas to Franklin Roosevelt, 13 April 1944, Vargas Papers.

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weapons sales.[50] The Truman administration, moreover, when it agreed to sell two used cruisers to Brazil in 1950, ceded two to Argentina as well; that same year, in a further effort to appease Perón, Washington granted his regime a loan equalling all the financial aid given to the Dutra government since 1946, gestures that provoked bitter resentment in Brazil. Six years later the Pentagon refused a request by the Kubitschek government to purchase a used aircraft carrier on the grounds that Argentina would be resentful.[51] Although Brazil did receive the lion's share of grant aid to Latin America during the 1950s, weapons standardization remained a central goal of the military assistance program of the Eisenhower administration and Argentina became one of the region's principal cash purchasers of American hardware. Naval planners in Washington judged Argentina's capabilities in antisubmarine warfare, the one area in which Latin American countries were expected to make a direct military contribution to hemisphere defense, to be superior to Brazil's and argued in the late 1950s that Buenos Aires should be accorded a funding priority second only to Rio de Janeiro and Mexico City. Washington's military grants and sales to Brazil in the 1960s were minimal and declined to only $76 million during 1968–1972, a period in which American assistance to Argentina was only $7 million less.[52]

Brazilian observers watched the postwar American rapprochement with Argentina in a state of increasing dismay and disgruntlement. "Do they not see," a high-ranking Itamaraty official asked incredulously, "that we are the only real friend they have among the Latin Americans?" The minister of war expressed to Dutra in 1947 his misgivings about American military sales to Argentina, and the following year the president, deeply worried about the fate of the special relationship, had Itamaraty broach with the State Department the apparent efforts by Buenos Aires to "drive [a] wedge" between Brazil and the United States. Other entreaties and informal protests, especially regarding American military assistance to Argentina, were made to no avail. Monteiro, on special mission in Washington in 1951, alerted his government to apparent pro-Argentine sympathies there, and the transfer of American cruisers to Argentina led Foreign Minister Fontoura to lodge a complaint with Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Admiral Renato Guillobel, the minister of navy, was so frustrated by Washington's appeasement of Perón and simultaneous failure to extend the aid that Brazilian planners wanted that he threatened in 1954 to have the contract for the American

[50] Potash, *The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1945–1962*, 77–82; Central Intelligence Agency, report ("Standardization-of-Arms Program in the Western Hemisphere"), 30 June 1949, Harry S Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

[51] Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War," 605–608, 610.

[52] National Security Council, minutes, 6 September 1956, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, National Security Council Series, Box 8, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; Vice-Chief of Naval Operations to Roger Ernst, 23 June 1959, Records of the President's Committee to Study the U.S. Military Assistance Program, Box 18, Eisenhower Library; Luigi Einaudi et al., *Arms Transfers to Latin America: Toward a Policy of Mutual Respect*, Rand Corporation Report R-1173-DOS (June 1973), 13.

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naval mission in Brazil cancelled. Demonstrating that resentment had not abated, a Brazilian editorial in 1975 charged the United States with disregard for Brazil, recalling as evidence Washington's policy regarding "the supply of arms to Brazil and to Argentina after the Second World War." Admiral Mario Flores, then commander of Brazil's Naval Transport Fleet, late in 1981 made the same point, lamenting that United States military assistance to Brazil since the postwar period had been extended "in a practically equal way" to Argentina, a fact that signalled American disregard for Brazil's relative importance in hemisphere defense.[53]

The consequence of American indifference to Brazil's strategic interests vis-à-vis Argentina was to contribute to the rapid erosion of Brazil's confidence in the special relationship, which finally disintegrated during the Kubitschek era. To replace the traditional policy of serving Washington as an intermediary with Spanish America, Brazilian strategists, in order to enhance Brazil's bargaining position, now decided to encourage the formation of a united Latin American bloc.[54] Since the mid-1950s the drive to promote a political understanding and develop economic relations with Spanish America has been intense. Kubitschek's "Operation Pan America," proclaimed in 1958, and the establishment two years later of the Latin American Free Trade Association by Brazil, Argentina, and five other states were major steps in that campaign. In more recent years Brazil has been the strongest ally of post-Allende Chile, endeavored to broaden relations with Uruguay, and has tenaciously pursued closer ties with the Andean bloc and with its Amazon Basin neighbors.[55] The contest with Argentina, however, demanded special attention to Bolivia and Paraguay.

Economic Alliance with Bolivia and Paraguay

Brazilian planners during the Old Republic articulated the need for increased influence in Bolivia and Paraguay and took preliminary steps in that direction,[56] but the first major moves occurred in the 1930s when the Vargas regime, partly for strategic reasons, devised a long-range program for binding them more

[53] Acioly to Aranha, 2 April 1947, Aranha Papers; Minister of War to Dutra, 5 February 1947, PR: Ambassador Herschel Johnson (Rio) to State Department, 28 October 1948, *FRUS, 1948*, IX, 350; Monteiro to Vargas, 30 July 1951, Vargas Papers; Monteiro to Fontoura, 30 July 1951, Monteiro Papers; Dean Acheson, memo, 5 April 1951, Dean Acheson Papers, Box 66, Truman Library; Renato de Almeida Guillobel, *Memórias* (Rio: Fundação IBGE, 1973), 541–543; *O Estado de São Paulo*, 11 January 1975; Admiral Mario Cesar Flores, "O Futuro das Relações Brasil-EUA: Aspectos de Segurança," *Revista do Serviço Público* 39 (1982): 104.

[54] Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War," 616, 620.

[55] Carlos Moneta and Rolf Wichmann, "Brazil and the Southern Cone," in Wayne A. Selcher, ed., *Brazil in the International System: The Rise of a Middle Power* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981): 164–170; Robert D. Bond, "Venezuela, Brazil and the Amazon Basin," *Orbis* 22 (1978): 635–650.

[56] Hilton, "Brazil and the Post-Versailles World," 357–358.

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closely to Brazil. The program called for improved communications and establishment of a permanent flow of raw materials and petroleum to Brazil in return for manufactured goods. Under Macedo Soares's aegis, Itamaraty began negotiations with La Paz that led to agreements in 1938 to build a railroad linking Corumbá (Brazil) to Santa Cruz de la Sierra and to undertake joint development of Bolivian oil fields. The following year the first of a long series of accords were signed with Paraguay providing for the construction of railroads, Brazilian technical aid, and the opening of Brazilian banks in that country.[57] During World War II Rio de Janeiro allowed cadets and officers from both countries to attend Brazilian military schools and in 1942 it sent its first military mission to Paraguay to train its cavalry.[58]

During the Perón era, strengthening ties with the two adjacent states loomed as an even more critical priority. "The intimate association with the United States . . . is not enough . . . ," the head of Itamaraty's political division urged in 1946. "In the second place, it is indispensable that we develop economic, cultural, and all other kinds of relations with Bolivia and Paraguay . . . ." There was urgency in Bolivia's case because Argentina was busy building its own railroad to Santa Cruz, where it now possessed oil rights. Foreign Minister Fernandes cautioned Dutra in 1948 that Brazil had to reach Santa Cruz first in order to contain Argentina, whose expansion in northwestern Bolivia would be "a serious threat" to Brazil's interests.[59] In 1955 the rail link was finally completed, three years before the Argentine line. Oil was the other key element in the policy of "drawing the eastern part of Bolivia closer to Brazil and, very especially, of impeding Argentine infiltration through the sub-Andean region toward the Amazon valley," Fernandes argued in 1950. One of Itamaraty's tasks was, therefore, to negotiate a clarification of Brazil's rights in the oil zone in view of similar Argentine claims.[60]

Progress was slow in the case of Paraguay. The Brazilian Ministry of War in 1948 emphasized that a railroad between the two countries would help solve "a problem of supreme importance for national defense, that is, the reduction of Argentine preeminence in Paraguay." Itamaraty agreed that rail links were an "imperious necessity," but budget constraints delayed the project, which later was replaced by a highway program. In other areas, meanwhile, the seeds of future cooperation were sown. Itamaraty in 1950 persuaded the National Security Council to approve making preliminary studies of possible joint Brazilian-Paraguayan use of the hydroelectric potential of the Paraná River, explaining that such cooperation would "counterbalance the growing Argentine influence in Paraguay." The second Vargas government also made studies of the possible

[57] Hilton, "Vargas and Brazilian Economic Development," 769–770, 773–774.

[58] Brazilian minister (Asunción) to MFA, 30 January 1942, 1 May 1942; Dutra to Aranha, 22 January 1943; Aranha to Dutra, 23 January 1943, AHI.

[59] Gonçalves, lecture, Escola do EME, 23 September 1946, AHI; Raul Fernandes, memo, quoted in Minister of Finance to Dutra, 15 December 1948, PR.

[60] Fernandes to Dutra, 3 April 1950, PR.

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integration of the road systems of the two countries and it signed several economic accords with Paraguay that were intended to "divert its commercial currents to our territory, alleviating the compression exerted on them by the Argentine Republic."[61]

During the Kubitschek period an elderly Macedo Soares returned to Itamaraty and intensified the policy he had helped to define in the 1930s. One of his first acts was to order a survey of trade possibilities with Paraguay which he saw as potentially "a real base of support for Brazilian politico-diplomatic action in the La Plata," and in October he signed the first general commercial treaty between the two governments. Kubitschek met Alfredo Stroessner that same month at Iguaçú Falls to inaugurate work on an international bridge across the Paraná River, a crucial link in a projected highway between Asunción and Paranagua (Brazil), and Stroessner subsequently made four trips to Brazil. In 1959 the highway was opened and Kubitschek's successors in the early 1960s pressed ahead with technical and economic cooperation, negotiating various agreements on communications and trade and elaborating joint hydroelectric plans.[62] Oil remained the important immediate question in relations with Bolivia because, as Álvaro Teixeira Soares, the ambassador to La Paz, privately stated, the projected exchange of manufactures for oil would contribute to the "spread of Brazil's influence throughout South America." Bolivian nationalism, however, proved to be a formidable barrier, forcing a reduction of Brazil's concession and limiting operations to private Brazilian firms. Only four ventured into Bolivia and all failed by the early 1960s. Teixeira Soares spoke for the government when he subsequently lamented the collapse of a scheme vital to a "long-range international political project" designed to bring Bolivia into Brazil's orbit.[63]

In the late 1960s Brazil, for both economic and political reasons, joined Argentina and the other countries of the La Plata basin in launching a multilateral development program for the region.[64] This provided a convenient mantle for Brazil's extraordinarily successful unilateral campaign in the 1970s. Exports to Bolivia, chiefly manufactures, leaped from a paltry $7.6 million in 1970 to over $120 million in 1975; Brazil became that nation's second-leading creditor and a

[61] General Alcio Souto (Conselho de Segurança Nacional) to Dutra, 23 April 1948; Minister of Finance to Dutra, 3 February 1949; Fernandes to Dutra, 31 October 1950; Fontoura to Vargas, 15 July 1952, PR.

[62] Macedo Soares to Juscelino Kubitschek, 11 November 1956, PR; Ministério das Relações Exteriores, *Relatório [. . .] 1956* (Rio: Imprensa Nacional, 1956), 42–45, *Relatório [. . .] 1957* (Rio: Imprensa Nacional, 1957), 44, *Relatório [. . .] 1965* (Rio: Imprensa Nacional, 1969), 20–22.

[63] Alvaro Teixeira Soares, lecture, Escola Superior de Guerra, 12 June 1956, Macedo Soares Papers; Macedo Soares to Kubitschek, 28 June 1957, PR; Peter S. Smith, "Bolivian Oil and Brazilian Economic Nationalism," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 13 (1971): 166–179; Teixeira Soares, *Amazônia: A exploração econômica do espaço geográfico e da integração do Homen* (Rio: Artes Gráficas, 1967).

[64] For details of the program see Peter J. Levin, "The Development Program of the Rio de La Plata Basin: A New Approach to Latin American Integration," *Journal of Developing Areas* 6 (1972): 493–522.

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participant in several development projects; Petrobrás, the Brazilian state-directed oil monopoly, was buying 60 percent of Bolivia's petroleum exports by that time. The most important potential dividend paid on this new spirit of collaboration was a plan, proposed by Brasília in 1973, by which it would finance construction of a gasline from the Bolivian oil fields to Brazil, buy fixed amounts of natural gas over a twenty-year period, and provide financial and technical assistance for a Bolivian industrial complex. The following year President Geisel and his Bolivian counterpart signed a treaty embodying that proposal and three years later they concluded another treaty by which Brazil pledged to purchase quotas from the output of part of the projected complex. The question of the price for the gas became an explosive issue in the agitated political atmosphere in Bolivia, where there were successive coups in the late 1970s, but Brasília sought to bolster its cause by reiterating in 1978 an offer to grant La Paz free commercial transit across Brazil to four ports on the Atlantic and by agreeing to increase its future gas purchases by almost 70 percent. Political turmoil in Bolivia continued to plague the undertaking, however, and it still found itself on the bilateral agenda when Figueiredo made a state visit to Bolivia in February 1984. The Bolivian chief executive joined him on that occasion in reaffirming a desire to fulfill the gas agreement which was then under sharp attack by the Bolivian left.[65]

Brazil watchers in Argentina sounded a sharp alert about the rival's gains in Bolivia, attributing them to Brasília's "imperialistic" designs on Bolivia's natural resources,[66] but they were even more alarmed by Brazilian advances in Paraguay. Brazil's influence here increased rapidly in the early 1970s through the mechanisms of trade—sales to that nation vaulted from less than $3 million in 1963 to almost $100 million by 1975—and investments that placed Brazil for the first time in a position to challenge Argentine economic domination of Paraguay. Brazil's major project there and the principal bone of contention as far as Buenos Aires was concerned was the joint Itaipu hydroelectric dam on the Paraná River. The Treaty of Itaipu, signed by Geisel and Stroessner in 1973, crowned two decades of discussion and stipulated that Brazil would finance construction of what would be the world's largest hydroelectric plant. For Argentine leaders, Itaipu, work on which began in October 1975, represented a giant step

[65] U.S. embassy (La Paz) to State Department, 14 October 1973 (unclassified); U.S. embassy (Brasília) to State Department, 17 December 1973 (unclassified), Department of State Archives, Washington; *O Estado de São Paulo*, 23 May 1974; Ministerio das Relações Exteriores, *Resenha de política exterior do Brasil* 4 (1977): 142–146; *Folha de São Paulo*, 9 April 1978; Brazilian embassy (Washington), *Boletim Especial*, n. 68 (18 December 1978); Empresa Brasileira de Notícias, *Resenha Semanal* (6–12 February 1984): 11–12; *Hoy* (La Paz), 24 February 1984.

[66] See, for example, Juan Guglialmelli, "Banzer-Buenos Aires-Brasilia," *Estrategia* 25–26 (November 1973–February 1974): 5–18; Florentino Diaz Loza, "Geopolítica del Brasil," *Estrategia* 29 (July–August 1974): 31; Scenna, *Argentina-Brasil*, 388; Pablo R. Sanz, *El espacio argentino* (Buenos Aires: 1976), 179–200.

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toward Brazilian hegemony in the Southern Cone.[67] They first made outright prevention of the project a national priority, claiming that it would nullify the economic feasibility of a smaller downstream Argentine-Paraguayan dam planned for construction at Corpus. Although Buenos Aires won general endorsement of its position in the United Nations and other international forums during 1972–1975, Paraguay and Bolivia sided with Brazil. In the face of such resoluteness Argentine policy makers decided by 1976 that internationalization of the dispute had been counterproductive and that the only recourse was to minimize losses through bilateral or trilateral diplomacy. There now followed four years of acrimonious discussion of technical issues, during which time there was a steady tilt of the balance of influence in the Southern Cone toward Brazil. The critical disadvantage facing Argentina was that while diplomats and technicians talked Itaipu was under construction, but Corpus was only on the drawing boards.

Brazilian-Argentine Entente?

It became clear as the Geisel administration drew to a close that a reconciliation was impossible without a change of actors because of personal antagonisms generated by years of frustrating encounters.[68] Inauguration of the Figueiredo government in March 1979 brought a reshuffling of diplomats at Itamaraty and the Brazilian missions in Buenos Aires and Asunción. Itaipu was rapidly becoming a *fait accompli* and Buenos Aires could hope to gain little from obstructionism. A series of conciliatory statements by Foreign Minister Saraiva Guerreiro helped to clear the political air and in October the three governments signed the elusive accord, which included mutually satisfactory technical guarantees.[69]

The end of the years-long Itaipu controversy, which had become more of a symbolic issue than a technical one, provided the emotional release necessary for rapid progress toward a broader entente that was encouraged by other factors as well. First of all, because of Brazil's historic endorsement of the Monroe Doctrine and efforts to forge a special relationship with Washington, Argentine leaders tended to regard Brazil as an instrument of United States policy—"subimperialism" was the peronista label—and judged any integration of interests impossible as long as Brasília pursued that relationship. By the mid-1970s, as a

[67] Marcelo Sanchez Sorondo, the victorious peronista candidate in the 1973 Argentine presidential elections, declared that the first task of his government would be to prevent Itaipu "by any means." *Jornal do Brasil*, 18 March 1973. For a representative statement of concern by a well-known Argentine geopolitician, see Juan Guglialmelli, "Itaipu-Corpus: operar en frente principal y no confundirse con los frentes secundarios," *Estrategia* 33 (March–April 1975): 5–16.

[68] Characteristically, the tenure of Foreign Minister Antonio Azeredo da Silveira at Itamaraty ended in 1979 in the midst of an exchange of tart diplomatic notes containing implicit charges of bad faith. U.S. Department of Commerce, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Latin America* (hereafter cited as *FBIS*), 7 March 1979, 8 March 1979.

[69] *O Estado de São Paulo*, 20 October 1979.

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result of the diversification of Brazil's external economic dependency, its 1975 nuclear treaty with Bonn, and its cancellation of long-standing bilateral military arrangements with Washington in 1977, it had become obvious that the historic special relationship was dead. Equally clear was a growing strategic preoccupation in both Brasília and Buenos Aires with the security of the South Atlantic in the face of the Soviet challenge and a resultant desire to resume the former joint naval maneuvers that had been suspended because of political differences.[70] Argentina's heated quarrel with Chile over the Beagle Channel undoubtedly was a further stimulus to an understanding with the northern neighbor. The major catalyst for the rapprochement, however, was probably mutual concern about the possibility of a nuclear arms race in the Southern Cone.[71] Three weeks after the Itaipu agreement, President Jorge Videla invited Figueiredo to visit Buenos Aires and, significantly, just three days later the chairman of Argentina's atomic energy commission sent out a broad signal: it was now possible, he said, to "think about" nuclear cooperation with Brazil. The latter quickly responded and in the ensuing months military and nuclear experts from both countries hammered out a draft agreement.[72]

In Buenos Aires the Brazilian chief executive told the press that Brazil and Argentina were newlyweds "who are now thinking about how many children they are going to have."[73] The immediate progeny were several: ten agreements and notes designed to intensify bilateral relations in various commercial, technical, and scientific fields. The first document signed was a ten-year nuclear agreement providing for an exchange of information and experts, cooperative research, joint uranium prospecting, and reciprocal transfers of nuclear materials. Videla then in August 1980 travelled to Brasília where he and Figueiredo signed seven additional protocols and conventions, including documents complementing the nuclear pact.[74]

[70] The literature on Brazil's anxiety over growing Soviet naval strength and Russo-Cuban penetration of sub-Saharan Africa is voluminous. See, for example, EME, *Boletim de Informações* (January 1966): 28–29; Admiral Hilton Moreira, "O Brasil e suas Responsabilidades no Atlântico Sul," *Segurança e Desenvolvimento* 21 (1972): 97–110; Captain Odilon Silva Filho, "Os Soviéticos nos Mares," *Revista Marítima Brasileira* 95 (April–June 1975): 43–50; editorials, *Jornal do Brasil*, 18 January 1976, 4 June 1977; Admiral Gualter Magalhães, "As Missões das Marinhas-Um Panorama Geral," *Revista Marítima Brasileira* 97 (January–March 1977): 12, 23–27, 33; Captain Luiz Doring, "Algumas Lições de Angola," *Revista Marítima Brasileira* 97 (April–June 1977): 14–15, 19; Captain Roberto Pereira, "Ação do Movimento Comunista Internacional na África Austral e Ocidental," *A Defesa Nacional* 65 (July–August 1978): 35–53; Colonel Tamoyo das Neves, "A Balança do Poder na África Austral e Ocidental," *A Defesa Nacional* 68 (September–October 1981): 115–134: Captain Sérgio Aquino, "Repercussões Militares da Expansão Soviética na África," *Revista Marítima Brasileira* 104 (April–June 1984): 51–61.

[71] Responsible Argentine nationalists had advocated a nuclear understanding for some time. See Juan Guglialmelli, *Argentina, Brasil y la Bomba Atómica* (Buenos Aires: Tierra Nueva, 1976), 22–25.

[72] *O Estado de São Paulo*, 16 November 1979, 4 March 1980, 8 May 1980.

[73] *FBIS*, 19 May 1980.

[74] *FBIS*, 27 July 1980; *La Nación*, 8 August 1980.

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Various elements in the contemporary political equation of the Southern Cone suggest that a new era is at hand. The history of relations between the two countries should temper optimism, of course, and there are rough spots in the bilateral relationship still to be smoothed out. Demonstrating that tradition does not die easily, the responsible Brazilian press early in 1983 sounded an anxious note about Argentina's post-Falklands rearmament. The *Jornal do Brasil* said flatly at one point that the new material was intended for use "in the struggle for the military and political hegemony of Latin America."[75] Brazilian military analysts, too, kept an attentive eye on Argentina's buildup. But the return to civilian rule in Argentina late that year substantially attenuated that concern. Economic ties between the two countries, moreover, have never been so mutually important: the Argentine foreign minister-designate predicted in 1981 that bilateral commerce would soon reach $3 billion.[76] It bears repeating that Brazil's abandonment of the special relationship with the United States has removed a major Argentine objection to integrative diplomacy. Remarks at a high-level bilateral seminar in Buenos Aires in November 1981 by recent Argentine foreign minister, Nicanor Costa Mendez, who opined that the Reagan administration would not attempt to resurrect "the special relationship with Brazil,"[77] reflected former Argentine sensitivity in that regard.

Détente has already paid dividends. The two countries, a week after Figueiredo's 1980 trip to Buenos Aires, announced immediate resumption of the annual joint naval maneuvers. "The perfect understanding existing between the Argentine and Brazilian navies," said the Brazilian navy minister, "tacitly implies a defensive alliance." Those maneuvers were a key feature of the bilateral security cooperation that Admiral Flores hailed in 1982 as necessary to "exorcise the spectres of regional antagonisms."[78] Other examples of military cooperation, such as the sale of military jet aircraft to Argentina or the training of Brazilian pilots by the Argentine air force for operations in Antarctica,[79] probably would not have been possible before 1980. Had the Argentine military regime not felt secure about its northern flank, furthermore, it more than likely would not have embarked on its ill-fated Falklands adventure; The understanding with Brasília seems to have facilitated a major foreign policy endeavor that military leaders in Argentina judged in the national interest. Although visibly embarrassed by

[75] Editorial ("Crise e Punição"), *Jornal do Brasil*, 14 April 1983; Navy Minister (Admiral) Maximiano da Fonseca, interview, *O Estado de São Paulo*, 18 June 1983; João Figueiredo, interview, *Correio Braziliense* (Brasília), 17 November 1983; Major José Pinto de Sá, "Minicomputadores em Campanha: Problemas e Soluções," *A Defesa Nacional* 70 (January–February 1984): 68; Colonel Octávio Tosta, "Geopolítica do Brasil," 119–120.

[76] *FBIS*, 24 March 1981.

[77] Nicanor Costa Mendez, "Os Dois Países no Cenário Internacional," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 24 (1981): 25.

[78] *FBIS*, 27 July 1980; Mario Cesar Flores, "Importância Estratégica do Atlântico Sul: Proteção à Navegação," *Cadernos de Estudos Estratégicos* 3 (1982): 19.

[79] *Jornal do Brasil*, 18 April 1973; *Correio Braziliense* (Brasilia), 3 August 1983.

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Argentina's aggression, Brazil leased military aircraft to Buenos Aires during the conflict; criticized American sanctions against Argentina, and has steadfastly supported its claim to sovereignty over the islands.[80] The nuclear dimension acquired by the historic rivalry certainly has encouraged détente—and apparently even an embryonic entente. Indeed, the political significance of the nuclear agreement may outweigh its technical importance, although the latter has been substantial. Argentina, for instance, loaned Brazil 240 tons of uranium and in November 1983 Brazil finished building a reactor pressure vessel for Argentina's Atucha II plant. Nuclear cooperation appears to have mitigated the impact in Brazil of the announcement that month that Argentine scientists had completed the nuclear cycle and could enrich uranium. In reply to a letter from his Argentine counterpart, Figueiredo expressed "deep satisfaction" with the achievement and Brazilian military authorities emphatically denied later the onset of a nuclear arms race, pointing to the new relationship with Buenos Aires as evidence to the contrary.[81]

The historian is tempted to suggest, on projecting the events of the early 1980s against the backdrop of historical patterns of Brazilian-Argentine relations, that policy makers in Buenos Aires may finally have reached the conclusion dictated by statistics: Argentina, a nation of less than 30 million people, simply cannot hope to surpass economically, and hence politically, an industrial country of nearly 120 million that constitutes the world's eighth largest economy. The only thing that might have allowed Argentina to overcome that natural handicap was an undisputed nuclear capacity. Brasília's determined drive to attain nuclear autonomy, however, promised to eliminate that potential trump card. The painful fact to traditional geopoliticians in Argentina was that their country really is in no position to challenge Brazil effectively for long-range influence in other countries of the Southern Cone. Brazil, in other words, had triumphed in the generations-long struggle for paramountcy in the region, and wisdom dictated, especially in view of Brasília's receptivity, a policy of cooperation rather than one of confrontation.

[80] *Jornal de Brasília*, 6 May 1982; *Jornal do Brasil*, 7 December 1982; *O Estado de São Paulo*, 2 January 1983.

[81] *O Estado de São Paulo*, 19 November 1983, 29 November 1983; *Correio Braziliense*, 1 December 1983; *O Globo* (Rio), 10 December 1983.

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Federal Grants: Giving and Taking Away

RICHARD P. NATHAN
FRED C. DOOLITTLE

In their relations with Washington, long-time state and local officials may feel a bit like Job when he was tested by the Lord who giveth and then taketh away. The period from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s was one of burgeoning growth of federal aid. The year 1978, when California's Proposition 13 fiscal earthquake erupted, was the turning point. After that, Jimmy Carter pulled back. Ronald Reagan accelerated this federal retrenchment, focusing his efforts on domestic programs and particularly on grants-in-aid to states and localities, which declined in absolute terms by 12 percent in fiscal year 1982, the first such decline in twenty-five years.

As a result of this shift in the federal aid cycle, researchers have an opportunity to test theories about how state and local governments respond to federal aid policy changes. Do theories developed on the upside of the cycle predict behavior on the downside? As is often the case, this neat question oversimplifies the situation. Federal aid cuts under Reagan varied greatly by program, tended to be exaggerated, were often slow to take hold, and in some cases were undone by subsequent congressional action to soften the effects of the severe 1981–82 recession.

The Upside and Downside

One of the central questions of federal aid analysis on the upside of the aid cycle was whether grant funds were used for new spending on the purposes specified

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in the statutes. Federal aid, it was held by many observers, simply allowed states and localities to cut taxes or avoid tax increases. In studies we conducted on the upside of the cycle, we consistently found much less substitution than many observers expected.[1] By substitution, we refer to the use of federal aid by state and local governments for basic facilities and services that would have otherwise been funded out of their own resources.

In the case of general revenue sharing, the community development block grant (CDBG), and the Community Employment and Training Act (CETA) public service jobs program, we found on the whole that state and local governments had very good reasons for avoiding substitutive behavior. Among the main reasons were the unreliability of federal aid, so that substitution may mean getting stuck with higher built-in spending levels than local taxpayers want when federal aid is cut; the fact that federal regulations prohibit or discourage substitution in many programs; the activities of interest groups linked to federal purposes; and often a pro-spending preference on the part of officials of the bureaucracies responsible for programs which receive federal aid.

We found that states and localities, especially the latter, were wary even of revenue sharing when it was enacted in 1972. They preferred to use this federal largesse for additive purposes so that if the federal money machine was turned off or greatly changed as federal fiscal flows often are, the officials of the recipient state and local governments would not be left having to raise taxes at a time when they did not want to do so. We found the same situation for CDBG and the CETA public service jobs program. There was less substitution, using a disaggregative field research approach, than was predicted by other observers of the aggregative view of federal aid scene. Specifically, these findings challenged the results of earlier studies done on an aggregated basis using national economic and financial data, which found that, like drug addicts, states and cities took federal aid into their fiscal bloodstream and tended to become "hooked"—highly dependent—on these outside resources.

Symmetry suggests that if there is low substitution on the upside, there would be *low replacement* of federal aid on the downside. By replacement, we mean the use of state and local revenues from their own sources (taxes, fees, etc.) to pay for programs and activities funded by federal aid programs that have been cut. In the study we have been conducting for the past three years on the effects of cuts and changes in federal aid programs made during the Reagan period, we

[1] Most of the earlier research was done at The Brookings Institution. See Richard P. Nathan, Charles F. Adams, Jr., and Associates, *Revenue Sharing: The Second Round* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977); Paul R. Dommel and Associates, *Decentralizing Urban Policy, Case Studies in Community Development* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982); Richard P. Nathan, Robert F. Cook, V. Lane Rawlins, et al., *Public Service Employment: A Field Evaluation* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981); and James W. Fossett, *Federal Aid to Big Cities: The Politics of Dependence* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983).

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have found a generally low overall level of federal aid replacement.[2] The level of replacement varied among program areas. It was highest in areas of traditional or longstanding state and local concern, for example, health and infrastructure programs such as highways and mass transit. In areas clearly identified as federal—viewed as "their" (the federal government's programs)—replacement was generally low.[3] Examples are public assistance (aid to families with dependent children and food stamps), employment and training, community antipoverty services, and community development. To amplify and explain these findings, it is necessary to look in more detail at the types of changes made in the Reagan period and the ways in which state and local governments and services have been affected by these changes. The effects on states and cities, as matters turned out, do not begin to rival the misfortunes of Job.

Federal Aid Policy on the Downside

The year 1978 marked the high point for federal aid. Nine billion dollars in antirecession grants pushed total aid to nearly $64 billion, an amount not exceeded since in real terms.

Table 1 shows the changes in federal aid in the post-1978 Carter administration as antirecession grants ended and the president retreated from his efforts to implement a "national urban policy" and began to trim domestic spending. Grants here are grouped into three major categories. *Entitlement* grants are programs administered by state and local governments providing benefits to all persons who meet eligibility rules set by federal statute. Important examples are medicaid, food stamps, and aid for families with dependent children (AFDC).[4] *Operating* grants finance a wide range of service programs in health, social services, employment and training, and community development operated by state or

[2] The study is a multiyear field network evaluation funded by the Ford Foundation and the Commonwealth Fund. Field associates in the following states and large cities are participating in the research: Arizona and Phoenix; California and Los Angeles; Florida and Orlando; Illinois and Chicago; Massachusetts and Boston; Mississippi and Jackson; Missouri and St. Louis; New Jersey and Newark; New York and Rochester; Ohio and Cleveland; Oklahoma and Tulsa; South Dakota and Sioux Falls; Texas and Houston; and Washington and Seattle. For a discussion of study results through the end of 1982, see Richard P. Nathan, Fred C. Doolittle, and Associates, *The Consequences of Cuts: The Effects of the Reagan Domestic Program on State and Local Government* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Urban and Regional Research Center, 1983).

[3] The local bargaining process that heavily influences the effect of federal grants on local finances is described in Richard P. Nathan, "State and Local Governments Under Federal Grants: Toward A Predictive Theory," *Political Science Quarterly* 98 (Spring 1983).

[4] Assistance costs in food stamps and unemployment insurance, both administered by states, are not included in federal aid totals. However, federal grants to the states for administration of these two programs are included in grant totals. Food stamps assistance costs are fully federally funded and unemployment insurance benefits are financed by earmarked payroll taxes. Unemployment insurance was not included in this study.

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TABLE 1

Federal Aid in Real Terms, 1978–84 (in billions of dollars)

Fiscal Year	Total Outlays	Entitlements	Capital	Operating
Carter Pulls Back Over Three Years, 1978–81				
1978	77.9	20.6	18.3	38.9
1981	73.1	23.9	17.0	32.1
Change	−4.8	+3.3	−1.3	−6.8
	(−6%)	(+16%)	(−7%)	(−18%)
Reagan Makes Sharp Cuts in 1981				
1981	73.1	23.9	17.0	32.1
1982	64.1	22.7	14.9	26.5
Change	−9.0	−1.2	−2.1	−5.6
	(−12%)	(−5%)	(−12%)	(−17%)
But Then Further Cutting Stops, 1982–84				
1982	64.1	22.7	14.9	26.5
1983	64.9	22.9	14.3	27.7
1984 (est.)	66.0	22.4	15.8	27.8
Change	+1.9	−.3	+.9	+1.3
	(+3%)	(−1%)	(+6%)	(+5%)

Source: Office of Management and Budget.

Entitlements include medicaid, unemployment insurance administration, food stamp administration, child nutrition, supplemental security income administration, AFDC, and refugee assistance.

local government or nonprofit organizations. *Capital* grants help finance capital facility construction, operation, and maintenance.

Between fiscal years 1978 and 1981, spending in all federal aid categories grew in nominal terms, but inflation converted nominal increases into real declines. In this new era of fiscal restraint, Congress, at the president's urging, phased out economic stimulus grants begun in 1976–77. Operating programs, especially the $4.8 billion countercyclical public service employment program under CETA, took the heaviest cuts. But capital grant outlays also declined in real terms as the $3.1 billion countercyclical local public works program ended. Entitlement programs, on the contrary, continued to grow rapidly with increases in medicaid, food stamps, and public assistance leading the way.

In August 1981 Congress accepted President Reagan's budget proposals and enacted sharp cuts in federal aid, as shown in the middle section of Table 1. Spending dropped even in nominal terms; all categories of aid felt the crunch, with operating grants, the easiest to cut quickly, experiencing the largest percentage of decline. One operating grant, the public service employment program, was an easy target since many Democrats, as well as Republicans, felt the program should be ended. The elimination of the public service jobs program amounted to almost half the total reduction made in operating grants.

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The cuts in entitlement programs are especially notable in light of the worsening recession in 1982. In 1981 Congress accepted Reagan proposals to restrict AFDC and food stamp eligibility for the working poor by cutting earnings "disregards," limiting total income, and allowing states to impose work requirements for welfare eligibility. The Reagan administration originally proposed a ceiling on federal contributions to state medicaid programs—no more than 105 percent of 1981 spending. In one of the few 1981 defeats for the President, a House version of medicaid legislation ended up in the final reconciliation bill. House Democrats substituted provisions calling for reductions in the federal matching rate but which were waived for states that kept 1982 expenditure growth under a target rate or that adopted specified program changes. Congress also increased the states' ability to meet these spending goals by increasing state authority to choose services, define eligibility, and negotiate cost control agreements with providers.

The decline in capital outlays reflects cuts and rescissions made in late 1981 and state and local government hesitancy to borrow for capital projects in the face of high interest rates. The federal aid cuts made in fiscal year 1982 would have affected outlays with a delay, but many were reversed. In most recent recessions, federal aid has increased as part of a program to stimulate the economy. The recent recession was no exception, but the increase came later and was smaller than in the past.

Three congressional actions led to increased aid and these increases tended to favor capital programs. Congress rejected Reagan proposals for further cuts in federal aid programs, basically ignoring the fiscal year 1983 Reagan budget. The recession also provoked two legislative increases in aid. The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA) increased the federal gasoline tax from four cents to nine cents per gallon and used the proceeds to increase spending for federal highway, airport, and mass transit programs. The Emergency Jobs Act of 1983 boosted the fiscal year 1983 budget authority for a wide range of existing federal grants by $2.8 billion. The largest increases came in the community development block grant ($1 billion), social services block grant ($255 million), health resources and services ($175 million), and employment and training ($173 million). For operating grants, outlays rose immediately, while for capital grants the outlay effect was delayed.

The overall effect on spending is shown in the lower portion of Table 1. Total outlays increased slightly in real terms from 1982 to 1984 because of increases in operating and capital programs. Operating grant increases came primarily in 1983, with the jobs bill, while capital program growth occurred in 1984. The recession itself kept spending on entitlements nearly constant *despite* the cuts in eligibility made in 1981.

In sum, funding for federal aid dropped sharply with passage of the president's fiscal year 1982 budget. From 1982 to 1984 congressional rejection of later Reagan budget proposals and restoration of some of the 1981 cuts during the

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TABLE 2

Changes in Block Grant Appropriations (in millions of current dollars)

Program	*1981*	*1982*	*1983*	*1984*
Community Development [1]	3,675	3,456	4,456	3,468
Social Services [1]	2,991	2,400	2,675	2,700
Low-income Energy Assistance	1,850	1,875	1,973	2,072
Education	561	503	479	479
Community Services [1]	524	365	342	317
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, Mental Health [1]	519	428	469	462
Maternal and Child Health [1]	454	374	478	399
Primary Health Care [1]	324	281	360	351
Preventive Health	93	79	86	88
Total	10,991	9,761	11,318	10,336

1981 figures are for the predecessor categorical programs. The table gives appropriation levels for the programs and does not include carryover funding from previous categorical programs (see below).

[1]. Program received additional appropriation in 1983 under the Emergency Jobs Act of 1983.

recession plus recession-induced increases in public assistance rolls meant that federal aid outlays in real terms stayed on a plateau below the 1981 level.

Administrative Changes in Grants

Congress also changed the administrative structure of many grant programs, as a result increasing the role of state governments. Three changes were especially important.

The New Block Grants. In 1981 Congress created six new block grants to the states in health, education, and community services and modified three existing programs (see Table 2).[5] Under most of the block grants the administrative changes were coupled with cuts in federal funding in 1982. But states, as it turned out, often had more program flexibility than the appropriation levels might suggest because of carryover funding in some of the health programs, authority to transfer limited amounts of funds from some block grants to others, and forward funding of federal education aid (cuts made in August of 1981 did not affect services until the fall of 1982).

The Move to Formula Grants. The new block grants are part of a general effort by the Reagan administration to shift from discretionary project grants that often go to local governments and nonprofit agencies to formula grants directed to state governments. Reagan officials appear to view project grants as giving federal agencies too much influence over the use of federal aid and rewarding

[5] The primary care block grant was never implemented during Reagan's first term and is not discussed in this article.

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larger jurisdictions, especially big cities, that have the staff to play the grantsmanship game.[6]

Job Training Partnership Act. The first Reagan budget eliminated the public service employment program and cut training funds by nearly 25 percent. In 1983 Congress replaced CETA with the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), a program of grants to states for training. JTPA envisions a large policy role for governors and private sector representatives at the expense of local governments and nonprofit organizations.

Despite the Reagan administration's loss of momentum after 1981, federal aid is different now from 1981. The rapid growth in entitlement spending ended, many operating grants are funded below 1981 levels, and funding for federal capital programs is much more uncertain than in the past. Finally, state governments have assumed a greater role in federally aided programs in relation to local governments and nonprofit service providers.

The State and Local Setting

For most jurisdictions, the 1982–83 recession created greater fiscal problems than the federal aid funding cuts did. The combination of the recession, plus federal aid cuts, pushed many state governments into deficits. State and local finances, however, have tended historically to be volatile. Tax increases in 1982–83 coupled with the economic recovery brought a revival of state government fortunes and put the entire sector back into surplus. Of course, not all governments in the country, or even in the study sample, were affected by macroeconomic developments in the same way, but the trends in the state-local fiscal situation were clear.

Some states faced tax and spending limitations enacted by the legislature or voters that constrained revenue in special ways. The California field researchers describe the situation in their state as follows:

> California is the leader in fiscal limits, with voters having passed four tax reduction or limitation initiatives since 1978. These actions reduced revenues available to California governments by $14 billion in fiscal year 1982–83, more than twice the amount of the nation-wide reductions in federal aid that occurred between 1981 and 1982.

Other states felt less extreme versions of the taxpayers revolt in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Our field research reveals similar broad state and local policy priorities in the sample jurisdictions. First, in many states economic development was a top priority of the state administration. State and local officials, battered by a severe

[6] See George Peterson, "Federalism and the States," in John L. Palmer and Isabel Sawhill, eds., *The Reagan Record* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984), 230.

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recession, sought ways to improve their tax base. Expanding employment, especially by diversifying into new high technology industries, was a common goal.[7]

Second, infrastructure issues were especially important in the mid-1980s. The share of local government spending going to infrastructures had declined since the 1960s, and spending on structures declined in absolute amount from 1980 to 1983. State spending on infrastructures also declined as a percentage of expenditures. Couple this with a strong belief in the importance of infrastructure in economic development and the attention paid by states and local governments to new methods of financing capital programs is understandable.

Third, medical care for low income persons (primarily medicaid) was a fast growing state and local expenditure during the late 1970s and early 1980s.[8] From 1970 to 1979 annual increases in state government expenditures for medical care for low income persons averaged 18 percent; by 1982, the category constituted more than 10 percent of all state expenditures. Cost containment was a high priority.

All things considered, the economic recovery and an improvement in their financial situations provided state and local governments with some policy flexibility. For many the issue came down to this: should they assume new responsibilities in the face of a federal pullback or should they lower taxes, avoiding another taxpayer revolt but leading to a decrease in public services? We present a summary of the program effects of federal aid changes in Reagan's first term.

Entitlement Grants

Despite the Reagan changes in these programs, total spending on AFDC and medicaid grew from 1981 to 1983 because of the recession (see Table 3). For food stamps and child nutrition (school lunch, school breakfast, daycare meals), spending dropped in 1982 with the changes and rose in 1983 with the recession.

This growth in spending makes it hard to discern the important and lasting effects of the 1981 Reagan changes. There is wide agreement among the field associates that the cuts in entitlement programs—especially AFDC, medicaid, and food stamps—were the most important of the Reagan changes under study. Moreover, except for medicaid, the state-local responses to these changes suggest that the public—especially in conservative states—perceives these programs to be a federal government responsibility. Many associates report that the state was seen as an agent, rather than a partner, of the federal government.

[7] See David Arnold, "Gubernatorial Management of State Economic Development Policy," paper prepared for the national conference of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, New Orleans, 18–20 October 1984, mimeo. See also National Governors' Association, *Governors' Priorities: 1984* (Washington, D.C.: 1984).

[8] See David J. Levin, "Receipts and Expenditures of State Governments and of Local Governments," *Survey of Current Business* (May 1983 and September 1984).

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TABLE 3

Federal Outlays on Selected Entitlement Grants to State and Local Governments, fiscal years 1981–84 (in millions of dollars)

Program	*1981*	*1982*	*1983*	*1984 (est.)*
AFDC	7,763	7,804	8,191	not available
Child Nutrition	3,259	2,853	3,101	3,379
Food stamps, including coupon value	11,470	11,014	12,653	12,061
Medicaid	16,833	17,391	18,985	20,237

Source: Office of Management and Budget.

Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)

The 1981 changes had a clear immediate effect on the states in the sample: more than half reported a decline in expenditures and caseload in 1982 despite the recession. Even in states with little net change in the caseload, the 1981 changes removed many families from the rolls by tightening federal eligibility rules to exclude or lower the grants to many families with nonwelfare income. The overall caseload and total benefits paid to recipients dropped roughly 10 percent below the levels expected under the previous program rules. There was almost no replacement of these cuts.

Though federal statutes do define program eligibility and restrict the use of AFDC funds, the states also have a considerable policymaking role under AFDC. States set the standard of need for eligibility and the benefit level. A few of the sample states made changes in their AFDC programs during the study period that had the effect of countering the 1981 provisions. However, the associates report that most of these changes were made for reasons unrelated (or at least it was claimed) to the 1981 Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act (OBRA) changes. Some sample states took what were explicitly stated to be steps to counter the effects of the 1981 changes. Ironically, this group includes Mississippi and New York, two states often contrasted for their welfare policies. Mississippi raised its standard of need to restore some former recipients to eligibility.[9] However, state officials report the real purpose of getting families back on AFDC was not to restore the small monthly payments under that program but to get the families back on medicaid.[10] New York picked up some former AFDC recipients on state/local-funded home relief.

The Reagan administration has argued that with the rolls pared of "high income" recipients, states would be moved to increase payments for the remaining

[9] The 1981 act limited eligibility to families with gross income less than 150 percent of the state's standard of need.

[10] AFDC recipients are automatically eligible for medicaid. In many states, including Mississippi, people not receiving AFDC or other federal categorical public assistance programs are not eligible for medicaid.

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caseload of "truly needy" recipients just as California did after instituting similar reforms in 1971 under Reagan's governorship. The response this time was different. A comparison of AFDC benefit levels adjusted for inflation reveals that in the two years before OBRA went into effect, the sample states' average AFDC benefits for a family of four with no other income declined 15 percent. In the two years after OBRA, it declined another 5 percent.

The 1981 AFDC amendments offered the states the option of adopting new employment and training programs for AFDC recipients. "Workfare" (usually defined as compulsory employment at the minimum wage to work off the AFDC grant) is the most important of these options. Two states in the sample, Oklahoma and South Dakota, established broad-gauged workfare programs; the remaining states either set up pilot projects in a portion of the state or did not implement the program. A number of sample states that did not adopt workfare stepped up employment services and job training to AFDC recipients.

What has happened to the AFDC recipients cut off the rolls in 1981? Many predicted that working recipients cut off because of earnings would quit their jobs and return to AFDC. Did this happen? The studies examining the 1981 changes are surprisingly consistent in their conclusion that this did not happen.[11] The return rate—about 15 to 20 percent on AFDC a year later—appears to be similar to the return rate for normal case terminations. Most people cut off AFDC continued to work, usually at low paying jobs, and many encountered economic hardship trying to make it on their reduced income.

Food Stamps

Food stamp spending has historically been sensitive to employment levels; so the decline experienced in 1982 was unusual. The 1981 changes paralleled those in AFDC by tightening income eligibility. The deepening recession in 1983 did drive expenditures above 1981 levels in all the sample states except Florida where the arrival of Cuban refugees had swelled the caseload a year earlier in 1981–82. Again, state governments did not increase spending to compensate for food stamp cuts. What response there was came at the local level, primarily from nonprofit food programs which served many more people in 1982–83 than 1981. The deepening recession was reportedly a more important reason for this increase than the food stamp cuts.

Medicaid

The response of states in the study to the changes in medicaid reveals different attitudes from those toward other public assistance programs. Even in conserva-

[11] For example, see Research Triangle Institute, "Final Report: Evaluation of 1981 AFDC Amendments," submitted to the Office of Family Assistance, Social Security Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, under Task Order #1, Contract Number 600-82-0095, 15 April 1983; and U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), "An Evaluation of the 1981 AFDC Changes: Initial Analysis," GAO report PEMD-84-6, 2 April 1984.

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tive states, associates found support for the medicaid program. From South Dakota, for example, one associate reported that despite federal policy changes raising state costs, "there has been no legislative resistance to the program." The Mississippi field researcher offered some possible reasons for the special treatment of medicaid:

> First, the general population perceives this to be a joint federal-state program rather than exclusively federal. Second, the medical profession has provided indispensable support for the program. Third, over 40 percent of medicaid funds directly aid the elderly. The threat of turning the aged poor into the streets has proven to be effective in obtaining additional funds.

The support of health care providers, including private physicians and hospitals, and the focus on the elderly in nursing homes are especially important reasons why medicaid is treated differently from other federal aid entitlement programs. In addition, state and local officials probably believed that if they did not protect medicaid services, state and local public health care facilities would see increased demands from low-income persons and services would have to be provided without a federal subsidy. Furthermore, much of the federal funding cuts in medicaid were made by lowering the federal subsidy rate, rather than narrowing eligibility as in AFDC. States could not cut back medical care under the program without making difficult decisions on what services and recipients to eliminate from the program. These types of changes are bound to be controversial and thus are difficult to make quickly. In consequence, in nearly all states in the sample, spending on medicaid, rather than declining, increased appreciably from 1981 to 1983.

This is not to say that states passively accepted the lowered federal subsidy. The federal matching rate penalty provisions for medicaid were a major focus of attention in the sample states. Most sample states avoided the full effect of the fiscal penalties in 1982 by putting in place fraud control programs, hospital cost review programs, or holding down growth in total spending under the target rates.

The situation in medicaid was rapidly changing in 1983–84.[12] A number of sample states were in the process of developing plans to take advantage of the provisions of the 1981 act giving them more authority to cut program costs. Even at this early date, some patterns have emerged. Two general kinds of responses are found in the associates reports, one involving cost cutting and the other cost shifting, with some states adopting both. Many states acted to control costs in the following ways:

Cutting the cost of treatment. Some states redesigned their rate-setting procedures under the medicaid program. For example, they introduced competitive bidding or established new procedures to negotiate service agreements with providers.

[12] In addition to the changes discussed in the text, in mid-1984 Congress voted not to continue the federal matching rate penalties in fiscal year 1985.

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Encouraging the use of less expensive services to control rates of reimbursement. Examples are efforts to encourage people to use physicians rather than emergency rooms and the use of the option to provide home-and community-based care under waivers authorized by the 1981 act.

Despite the fiscal pressures on states created by the 1981 act and the recession, the associates report surprisingly few service cuts in medicaid. Most states responded to the federal changes by working to cut costs rather than services.

Some states chose to use the new flexibility in ways that actually increased medicaid spending. They shifted what were previously nonmedicaid costs into the federally-aided program. This was done by shifting state-financed services into medicaid (thereby getting a federal match for state funds); shifting services from a closed-ended block grant (such as the social services block grant) into medicaid; or starting up new services such as medicaid care for medically needy mothers and children. Overall, this cost shifting and the new services being adopted were modest during the study period. However, these developments indicate that the states see the new flexibility under medicaid as a way to *increase* federal costs as well as to *contain* them.

Summary

One of the clearest effects of the federal aid changes is on people rather than governments; fewer low income households are now able to combine public assistance and work. Since states and localities were unable or unwilling to make up for the federal cuts, income declines, at least in the short run, were the result. States did move, however, to protect levels of medical care under medicaid. Here, the political interests of providers, particularly involving public responsibility for uncompensated care, were important. Though slow economic growth and the 1982–83 recession were surely the biggest reasons for the observed increase in poverty during the period, the cuts in federal aid programs meant that income transfer programs lifted fewer low income families out of poverty.[13]

Operating Grants—Block Grants

In general, the effects of the cuts made in 1981 under the block grants have been less than expected in 1982. Funding for two programs—the small cities CDBG and the low-income energy assistance block grant—did not decline. Federal appropriations in the remaining programs dropped in 1982, but increased somewhat in 1983 (see Table 2). Most of the remaining block grants still have not operated over any length of time at the federal funding levels envisioned in the 1981 act. In fiscal year 1982 carryover funds in the pipeline, plus opportunities

[13] See Marilyn Moon and Isabel Sawhill, "Family Incomes, Gainers and Losers," in John L. Palmer and Isabel Sawhill, chap. 10.

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for states to shift federal aid funds between programs, as well as a small amount of state and local replacement funding out of own-source revenue enabled state and local officials to maintain existing service levels in many, but not all programs, despite the cuts in 1982 appropriations. In fiscal year 1983, new appropriations from the federal government coupled with somewhat more state and local replacement funding (especially in health and education) kept services from falling to the levels envisioned in the 1982 budget.

The sections that follow briefly describe special features of some of the block grants, beginning with those in which recent changes have been the greatest.

Community Services

The changes in the community services block grant which funds antipoverty programs probably were greater than in any other. The community action agencies aided under this program were created under Lyndon B. Johnson's 1965 Economic Opportunity Act. They have had tough sledding politically in recent years, and the recent changes were no exception. The percentage cut in 1982 in community service funding was the largest of any block grant (34 percent) and funding continued to decline in 1983 despite a supplemental appropriation under the emergency jobs bill. No state or local government in the sample replaced the federal cuts out of own-source revenues, although a few states transferred other federal funds temporarily to aid community action agencies.

The major institutional effect of the changes made in this program is the new role assigned to state governments for the financial management and operations of community services agencies. Prior to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, these agencies received financial assistance directly from the federal government and dealt primarily with federal officials. New state distribution decisions further reduced funding for some community action agencies in large cities. Many states in the study spread funding more widely across the state, pulling money out of the big city agencies that had done well under direct federal administration of the program. Several of the sample cities—Boston, Seattle, and Chicago—lost funds when the state decided to allocate funds based on the distribution of its poverty population.

Funding cuts have caused many community action agencies to adopt new service priorities. In general, there was a move away from long-term programs (community organizing, vocational counseling, individualized social services) in favor of direct employment search and training programs and emergency assistance.

Community Development

The community development block grant (CDBG) received a 6 percent cut in appropriations in 1982 ($220 million), but benefitted from a $1 billion increase in

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1983 appropriations with the Emergency Jobs Act of 1983. "Entitlement cities," those above 50,000 in population, received an additional $775.2 million out of the $1 billion, while spending in the small cities' portion of the program increased $222.8 million. The fiscal year 1982 cuts in the entitlement portion of the program generally were not replaced at the local level.

The changes in the small cities' portion of the program deserve special mention. The 1981 changes gave the small cities' portion of the program a larger share of CDBG funding—30 percent up from 25 percent. In addition, the state governors now have the option of taking over administration of the small cities' portion of the program from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). All states in the sample, except New York, began administering the small cities' program during the study period. The sample states received increases in funding in 1983 for the small cities' portion of the program ranging from 10 percent in Mississippi to 45 percent in Arizona.

Associates noted several differences under state administration of the small cities' program. Governors were the principal actors shaping the new state programs. The states put their mark on the block grant program by identifying the types of projects to be funded and setting up the procedures to be used to distribute the funds. Economic development and public works projects were favored over the housing and neighborhood rehabilitation programs supported by HUD. Most of the states in the sample distributed CDBG-small cities' funds on a competitive basis. Funds tended to be spread more widely, with more cities getting smaller and shorter grants.

Health

The three new health block grants—alcohol, drug abuse, and mental health; maternal and child health; preventive health—all experienced large cuts in appropriations (about 25 percent) in 1982. In the first and largest two, carryover funding from previous categorical grants delayed the full service impacts of the cuts; emergency jobs act funds increased appropriations somewhat in 1983. Many associates reported that the full service effects of the 1982 cuts still had not been felt in mid-1984.

The alcohol, drug abuse, and mental health block grant and the maternal and child health block grant have also done relatively well in securing state and local replacement funding. The politics of these programs help to explain this result. These two block grants address easily dramatized problems of clear and long-standing public concern. Associates in about half the states reported some state or local replacement of these cuts. The contrast with preventive health is clear: in that program only three states out of the fourteen showed any replacement funding. Advocates of these services, which address less immediate and more abstract needs, were unable to build political support for increased funding.

In the other block grant programs affected by the 1981 reconcilation act, the

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changes in program structure were less striking, even though the money issues—the amount and distribution—may have been larger.

Social Services

Although the 1982 funding cut in this program was the largest in absolute amount among the block grants, the administrative changes were relatively minor. In 1981 the states were already administering the predecessor program which operated much like a block grant. The 1982 cut in funding was partially restored for 1983 in most states by the 1983 jobs bill.

Officials in most states in the study were partially able to protect service levels by shifting other federal funds (especially the low income energy assistance block grant) to finance social services; shifting some social service costs to medicaid or AFDC; and securing state or local replacement funding for the more popular social service activities. Half the states in the sample at least partially replaced federal aid cuts from their own funds. Replacement was somewhat more common in 1983 than in 1982.

Education

Funding for programs merged into the education block grant had begun to drop before 1982 as federal desegregation aid declined. This desegregation aid had provided large grants to selected cities. The overall percentage of decline in 1982 was less than for other block grants, but large cities previously receiving desegregation aid or other large project grants did experience a large percentage decline. Education block grant funds are typically a small part of local school district revenues. Furthermore, in many states in the sample, state aid for education was larger and steadily rising for reasons completely unrelated to federal aid cuts, for example, to meet increased payroll costs or initiate new programs. Except for jurisdictions losing desegregation funds or large grants for special projects, most school districts were not affected greatly by this change.

The main issue for the states was how to allocate the funds previously distributed through twenty-nine categorical grant programs, some of which went to states and some to local school districts. States were required to distribute funds by a formula but could choose how much weight to put on factors such as enrollment and disadvantaged high-cost students. In most states in the study, state officials chose to spread these funds across many more school districts, with large urban school districts losing federal funds and many suburban and rural school districts getting increases. The combination of federal aid cuts and the new state distribution formulas for the block grant appears to have reduced the geographic and social targeting of federal aid to education.

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Summary

The pattern of available funding for most block grants reflects what might be described as a plateau effect during the study period. In general, the combination of carryover funds, federal restorations of funding in 1983, federal and state funds shifted from other programs, and some state and local replacement funding through mid-1984 prevented the large decline in services that operation at the 1982 appropriation levels would require. The replacement of cuts under the block grants was greatest in programs that historically have been areas of state and local program activity, for example, education, health, and some social services. Programs outside the usual state/local sphere of operations—the community services antipoverty program is the best example among the block grants—fared poorly in battles for replacement funding.

Some of the biggest program effects during 1981–83, especially in large cities, occurred because of state government grant allocation decisions rather than the federal aid cuts. In some programs—community services and education are examples—large cities suffered more than their share of funding cuts in the states in the sample.

In states with extensive, state-financed health and social programs, the federal cuts seemed to be of less consequence than in smaller, more conservative or poorer states. In California and New York, for example, program priorities and administrative systems were already established and state officials responded to the federal aid changes in ways that reflected their preexisting policies for the state financed programs. When state and local spending in federally-aided program areas is small and federal aid is relatively more important, politicans were more likely to battle for control of the new block grants. When other funds and programs were important as well, adjustments were made within the framework of larger preexisting state-financed programs.

Other Operating Grants

The CETA program was the big loser under Reagan. The public service job component was eliminated in 1981, funding for training was cut, and finally the program disappeared in 1983 to be replaced by JTPA. Almost all the sample states experienced a decline in training funds with the transition from CETA to JTPA. However, since JTPA funds are heavily concentrated on training, with a limit on the proportion going to stipends to participants and administration, the number of training slots was not severely curtailed in most jurisdictions. The biggest impact was on the low income beneficiaries of the program who no longer had public service employment or received stipends during training. In those few instances where state officials did increase state funding for training (California and New Jersey were examples) they were careful to distinguish their initiatives from the unpopular CETA program. No local government in the study replaced the training cuts.

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The nature and pace of administrative change varies widely from state to state. Associates in a few sample states (Oklahoma is an example) reported that the state administration has not yet put its own stamp on the program. But others report that governors saw the program as a chance to combine training with state economic development initiatives. The speed and completeness of the transition from CETA to JTPA in the first year of the new program depended to a high degree on the governor's interest in the program. Changes at the local level have been, in some respects, slower in coming. Many associates reported that as of 1983 the local service delivery areas looked much like the old CETA prime sponsor areas and former CETA administrators have moved over to the new agency to run JTPA. The main structural change as of mid-1984 was the noticeable decline in the role of nonprofit community-based organizations, due in large part to the elimination of the CETA public service employment program in 1982.

There have also been important changes in program substance. JTPA's emphasis on private-sector placement—a heavily weighted factor in program evaluation—resulted in a preference for short-term, on-the-job training as opposed to classroom training. Associates reported that this emphasis on placement, at least in the short run, has resulted in "creaming"—choosing participants based on an assessment of how well they will do after training. In this case, the institutional changes seem to have lagged, rather than led, the program changes.

Summary

Since the mid-1960s, the federal government has tried to change the mix of public services offered at the state and local level by subsidizing the operation of new kinds of programs. Two important examples were community action and employment and training programs. Neither of these experiments, grafted onto the local political structure, seems to have taken root. When federal funding declined, the programs were cut back. State and local governments felt no obligation to continue these "federal" programs.

Federally aided programs in service areas traditionally of concern to state and local government fared better. Health and education programs benefitted from increased state and local spending and efforts of officials to maintain services in the face of federal cuts. Social services, a less important state function in most jurisdictions, still fared much better than community services or job training programs. Those programs most clearly intended to be redistributive fared the worst.

The increased state role in these program areas is important. State officials now have a much greater say in how federal aid is distributed within their states and what services are supported. Even in these initial years, a pattern has emerged. Federal aid is distributed more evenly across the state—less concen-

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trated on distressed central cities—and supports more services for middle and upper income households.

Capital Programs

The major federal capital grants to states and localities are for transportation (highways and mass transit), the environment (the largest being wastewater treatment facilities), and housing. These programs were less affected by cuts in funding during the first Reagan term than other programs. Assistance for new construction of housing is an important exception. Even before the end of fiscal year 1982, Congress began to restore funding cuts in many of these capital grant programs. The programs were politically important—organized interest groups lobbied in their behalf—and public works projects are a usual part of antirecession programs. Since many of these programs were also politically important at the state and local level, officials frequently developed alternate funding sources for projects serving a large portion of the population. Transportation and wastewater treatment are the best examples. The result, an ironic one, was that some jurisdictions even used federal aid cuts that never materialized as a justification for spending increases. The net effect of the Reagan federal aid retrenchment in these instances was an increase in public spending.

Highway Aid

Federal highway aid programs received the largest percentage and dollar increases of all grant-in-aid programs in 1983 under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA) and the Emergency Jobs Act. In 1983 most of the states in the sample exceeded their 1982 apportionments by 30 to 70 percent. In many sample states these increases coincided with increases in state spending. One reason was the need to meet federal matching requirements and be able to draw the full share of federal aid funds. Other factors were backlogs in construction or maintenance, repair needs and a growing interest in many states in infrastructure improvements as a means of promoting economic development.

Mass Transit Grants

The federal programs to provide aid for local mass transit systems include both capital construction grants and operating subsidies. Federal spending for local mass transit systems has increased somewhat under Reagan because of increases with the STAA of 1982. The Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) also sought to change the structure and distributional effect of these programs by moving away from discretionary capital grants to formula allocations.

The big story in mass transit funding concerned federal operating assistance,

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which President Reagan tried unsuccessfully to end early in his administration. Between fiscal years 1981 and 1982 the transit agencies in the field sample received reductions in federal operating subsidies that ranged from 5 to 13 percent. Cutbacks in fiscal year 1983 were between 11 and 19 percent. Overall, federal operating assistance remained at the same level for fiscal year 1984 as in 1983; and the STAA projects continued operating subsidies through 1986. Beginning in 1984, transit agencies also could use funds from the new transit block grant program—a part of the STAA—to finance operations.

The field associates reported that in many instances reductions in federal operating subsidies were replaced at the state or local level. Some replacement came through increased appropriations in existing state programs; some through regional agreements between governments in the service area to pick up more of the deficit. Others raised fares. Again, the federal aid cuts were not the only factor leading to increased demand for mass transit funds; in some cases new wage agreements and escalating operating costs were more important. Often federal aid was a small part of total revenue.

Wastewater Treatment Construction Grants

Environmental grants have not fared as well as transportation grants during the Reagan administration. The biggest environmental grant is for wastewater treatment facility construction. The sample states typically received a 5 to 15 percent reduction in their 1982 allotments compared to 1981 funding. This 1981 level had in many cases already been cut because of federal budget rescissions. Though caution must be exercised in interpreting yearly changes in these facility grants because one large project can make such a big difference in the total, current funding represents a large decline from the peak years of this program in the 1970s.

The most dramatic response to the federal changes among the sites in the sample came in Orlando, Florida, where city and county officials raised user fees sharply, anticipating that expansions of the system would receive little federal support. More typical were efforts in other states to rearrange funding priorities, to eliminate some projects, to find new revenue sources for funding local projects, and to use unobligated fund balances to cope with waning federal aid and delays in federal funding.

Housing

Federal aid for assisted housing provides funds for many different housing programs, some of which have seen major changes during the Reagan years.[14] The

[14] See Raymond J. Struyk, Neil Mayer, and John Tuccillo, *Federal Housing Policy at President Reagan's Midterm* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1983).

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state and local response to these changes is in sharp contrast to the response to changes in other infrastructure programs serving a wider portion of the population.

There were two major categories of assisted housing programs in operation during the period of the study. One was the traditional low rent public housing program created by the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. It was the primary vehicle for federal low income housing assistance until the expansion of leased housing program under section 8, beginning in 1974. Section 8 had two components: existing housing, where assistance is tied to the individual or household; and new or substantially rehabilitated housing, where assistance is tied to the unit.

Since 1982, the Reagan administration has shifted federal assistance toward existing units. Funding for new construction was virtually eliminated. For the existing housing stock, both public and private, the Reagan years brought fewer changes. Though Reagan tried to cut public housing operating subsidies to low levels, Congress resisted. Associates report few instances of increased state spending on assisted housing, especially housing for low income families, and no local government replacement.

Most associates reported that housing authorities initially expected large, immediate cutbacks in the early years of the Reagan administration. In practice, the greatest immediate effect was uncertainty and delay in allocations as Congress and the president debated housing policy. The clearest effect has been a change in perception: local authorities now view future federal assistance as uncertain and many have scaled back proposed initiatives or sought alternate funding, usually with little success. Residents of assisted housing felt a more immediate effect of the Reagan changes: their rental contribution was raised from a maximum of 25 percent of their income to 30 percent.

Summary

The effects of changes made in these programs has been less than in the other categories. The cuts that stuck have delayed effects and some funding was even increased. States and, in some cases, local governments in the sample increased spending on those capital programs providing basic services to the general population or began to design new funding arrangements. The program most clearly serving the low income population and most clearly identified as a "federal" program, assisted family housing, has fared the worst. There have been large cuts and little replacement.

Not Really the Trials of Job

We began this article with a reference to state and local government officials facing the Job-like problem of the withdrawal of good fortune from Washington.

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We have suggested, however, that their situation was by no means so grave because the federal aid cuts in Reagan's first term were not as big as many observers were led to believe and, second, because state and local officials had been very cautious in the past about their use of federal grants. In particular, they have been hesitant to build them into their program bases.

We observe a tendency on the part of state and local officials to regard many federally aided programs as "*their*" (federal) programs, not to be absorbed into a jurisdiction's fiscal base *except under special conditions.* It now remains to talk about the reasons for these *exceptions.* What are the circumstances in which substitution and replacement are likely to occur? Which states and localities are likely to "take over" federal programs and purposes and identify with them so thoroughly that they cannot easily reduce them when federal aid is reduced? We offer a few generalizations about the conditions under which federal aid replacement is most likely to occur based on our study of the Reagan cuts that did get made and that did stick.

We found that replacement was highest when two conditions applied: the ideology of the community was "liberal" or pro-spending; and the fiscal condition of the jurisdiction was strong enough to enable it to replace federal cuts. Timing and business cycle conditions are important in this context. In the case of the 1981 cuts, carryover funding and supplemental appropriations delayed the effects of many cuts, especially in operating grants, until state and local finances began to recover from the severe recession.

Among different federal aid programs, we found that when these two conditions applied (sufficient fiscal capacity and a pro-spending ideology), the federally aided programs most likely to benefit by replacement were those in areas of traditional or longstanding state and local government activity that had a politically strong constituency and/or provider group. Health programs did better in these terms than other programs for the poor. Capital programs that aid middle income taxpayers, having both a long history and strong constituency, did the best of all in these terms.

In our research we have emphasized that federal aid changes have several major types of effects—fiscal, programmatic, and institutional. Institutional effects are often overlooked. In Reagan's case, although his "swap and turnback" proposals of 1982 were not adopted, the cumulative effects of the changes that occurred in his first term already appear to be very significant. Most important in these terms was the tendency of state governments to play a larger role as the federal government pulled back.[15] Decisions about strategies to "cope" with federal aid cuts were often made at the state level, and local governments often turned to their state government to deal with problems and needs in the areas

[15] See Richard P. Nathan and Fred C. Doolittle, "The Untold Story of Reagan's New Federalism," *The Public Interest* (Fall 1984).

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in which the federal government was pulling back. There was, as a general rule, more replacement at the state level than at the local level. Finally, state governments in many cases in our sample states made structural changes in response to federal policy shifts—as in the case of block grants, medicaid, and JTPA—that increased their role in major program areas.

In our earlier research on new federal aid programs we found a strong tendency for recipient governments to resist using federal aid as a substitute for their own funds. The current study is different in two ways: it involves a wider range of programs and it examines responses to cuts in funding. For the programs most identified as "federal," we found the flipside of low substitution—low replacement. The response to cuts in other programs varies, reflecting differing state and local conditions, practices, and attitudes. These differences reenforce a basic methodological point: it is important to disaggregate—both geographically and by program—in studying and explaining the different effects of changes in federal aid programs.

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The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence

ROBERT POWELL

In the continuing debate about strategic issues, the vocabulary and theoretical concepts of strategic nuclear deterrence theory are now widely used to support inconsistent conclusions. Will deploying the MX missile enhance strategic nuclear deterrence or make it more difficult? Does the existence of mutually invulnerable strategic forces reduce the likelihood of major war, or does the strategic stalemate make conventional or limited nuclear war more likely? To the extent that contradictory conclusions are claimed to follow from a theory of strategic nuclear deterrence, these inconsistencies suggest a fundamental weakness in the theory or that those using the theory do not fully appreciate it and its limits. In either case, a reconsideration of the theoretical foundations of strategic nuclear deterrence may help to elucidate this debate.

I shall examine these foundations by asking the most basic questions of nuclear deterrence theory. What, precisely, is being threatened in a nuclear threat? Are there different types of nuclear threats? If so, do they rest on different sets of assumptions or do they work in different ways? Nuclear threats seem closely related to escalation, but are there different types of escalatory processes? If so, in what ways do they differ? These are fundamental questions about the foundations of strategic nuclear deterrence theory.

This analysis will attempt to answer these questions by describing two types of strategic nuclear threats. In the first type, a state raises the risk of an uncontrolled, explosive escalation to general nuclear war by engaging in what Thomas

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Schelling has called threats that leave something to chance.[1] That is, a state threatens to act in such a way that neither the threatening state nor the threatened state can control the outcome. In this type of threat, escalation to general nuclear war results from both sides losing collective control of events. Crises become a competition in demonstrating resolve which is defined as a willingness to run grave risks of an explosive escalation to general nuclear war. In the second type of nuclear threat, the states do not lose collective control. Rather, a state threatens to attack another state in a limited way in an attempt to communicate to the other state the value that the threatening state places on what is at stake in the crisis. Escalation results when a state, while fully in control of its actions, decides that what is at stake is sufficiently important to outweigh the danger that an adversary will not submit after suffering a limited attack but will, while fully in control of its own actions, reply in kind. Crises associated with the second type of threat also are a competition in demonstrating resolve, but the resolve a state is trying to convey is a willingness to inflict and endure future destruction.

The first section of this article identifies two general theories of strategic nuclear deterrence by describing the different sets of assumptions on which these theories rest. Because of the different underlying sets of assumptions, the nature of the nuclear threats inherent in each of these theories differs. The first section also attempts to characterize the nature of each of these threats. Implicit in these two types of threats are different escalatory processes that are examined and related to the two theories of nuclear deterrence in the second section. The elaboration of these two theories and of the escalatory processes implicit in them provides a basis for the third part. Conclusions about the likelihood of war are often claimed to follow from these theories. Such claims thus transform these theories into theories of the causes of war. This analysis suggests these theories of the causes of war are severely limited, for hidden in them is a fundamental assumption about international politics.

The Nature of Nuclear Threats

Since the end of World War II, two general theories of strategic nuclear deterrence have been developed. They rest on distinctly different sets of assumptions that give very different answers to the question of precisely what is being threatened in a nuclear threat. Notwithstanding this important difference, the distinctions between these two theories are rarely noted. Indeed, these two theories are often mixed together under the rubric of strategic nuclear deterrence theory.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s the United States became increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet massive retaliation. A question arose that would echo throughout future debates about nuclear strategy. Could the threat of a massive retaliation ever be credible when carrying it out would result in a devastating

[1] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), 187-203.

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counterretaliation? Could, in short, a threat of mutual suicide ever be credible? The particular policy problem was the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee to Western Europe embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The policy debate focused on questions of the control of nuclear weapons and the meaning and application of the doctrine of flexible response.[2] The theoretical problem was to find a way to threaten to do the incredible credibly.

One of the two theories of strategic nuclear deterrence attempted to describe how the threat of a massive unrestricted nuclear attack might be made credible. This theory rested on three assumptions. First, a general nuclear war would devastate both sides. But, second, the theory took "for granted the importance of pre-emption, of being the one to initiate general war if general war occurs."[3] These two assumptions seem to imply that, although devastating to both sides, something of social value might escape destruction. For example, by striking first, one side might be able to preserve an important part of its population and industrial base. If there were no significant prospect of protecting something of value by being the first to launch an attack, then it is difficult to attach any meaning to the importance and advantage of being first. The incredibility of threatening mutual suicide was in part resolved by assuming that for one side it might not be suicide. Nevertheless, the cost of prevailing still seemed so great as to leave the threat of launching a general nuclear war less than credible. A third assumption would be needed to solve the problem of making the threat of an unrestricted nuclear attack credible. It was "assumed that each side is not only pre-occupied with the possibility of a pre-emptive attack but is aware of the other's pre-occupation with it."[4] The latter two assumptions created a strong incentive to initiate a massive first strike. Since being the first to attack carried some meaningful advantage and since each state feared the other would attempt to capture this advantage, each state seemed likely to try to be first. With the mobilization crisis preceding World War I adopted as the appropriate analogy, escalation to general nuclear war was expected to be very rapid as one or both sides succumbed to the pressure to launch a massive pre-emptive nuclear attack.

Thomas Schelling recognized that this fear of an explosive escalation to general nuclear war provided a means of resolving the problem of credibility. Deterrence could be based on the fear of such an explosive escalation, on the fear of "things getting out of hand."[5] It was unnecessary to rely on an apparently incredible explicit threat to initiate a general nuclear war deliberately. Rather, a

[2] Several authors address these questions. Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (London: Macmillan, 1981), 225–329, offers a recent summary and an extensive bibliography.

[3] Thomas Schelling, "Nuclear Strategy in Europe," *World Politics* (April 1962): 428. For similar comments see Bernard Brodie, *Escalation and the Nuclear Option* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), 25; Glenn Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), 104–10.

[4] Schelling, "Nuclear Strategy in Euorpe," 421.

[5] Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), 97.

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state could threaten to take steps that would increase the likelihood of such a war. A state could make threats that left something to chance. The solution to the problem of credibility, then, was to create an array of limited options each of which could serve to raise the risk of an explosive escalation to general nuclear war. No single option would of itself mean such a war, only a somewhat greater danger of it. The threat to exercise these options would be much more credible than the threat to launch a massive retaliation intentionally.

> A response that carries some risk of war can be plausible, even reasonable at a time when a final, ultimate decision to have a general war would be implausible or unreasonable.[6]

This emphasis on the risk of a very rapid, explosive escalation tends to obscure the more general nature of a threat of a massive unrestricted nuclear attack that leaves something to chance. The plausibility of an explosive escalation is only a particular example of a more general condition that is essential to a threat of such an attack that leaves something to chance—the existence of a situation in which the prospect of a state launching such an attack is credible. What is left to chance is the possibility of a state finding itself in a situation in which the prospect of its launching an unrestricted nuclear attack is credible. If there were no situation in which such an attack was credible then, by definition, there is no chance of a state finding itself in such a situation. Accordingly, the threat of an attack arising from a threat that leaves something to chance would be incredible, because there would be nothing to be left to chance.

The three assumptions of this theory combine to create a particular situation in which the prospect of a massive nuclear attack is credible. They make possible a condition in which each state fears that the other is about to launch an attack and so is likely to initiate its own in an attempt to pre-empt the other. Given the existence of such a situation, the exercise of a limited option increases the risk that a state will find itself in that situation. Although nuclear deterrence still rests in particular on the fear of an explosive escalation, strategic nuclear deterrence in this theory rests more generally on the assumption of the existence of a situation in which the prospect of a state initiating a massive unrestricted attack is credible.

In this theory, limited options exercised before general war begins are used to manipulate the risk of escalation to general war. Accordingly, these options are not to be judged primarily by their effects on the battlefield of a limited war, but by their effects on the risk of general war. The array of limited options, each of which carries a different risk of escalation, constitutes a spectrum of risk. During a crisis, each side can attempt to demonstrate the strength of its resolve by accepting the greater risk of general war that escalating another step generates. In this way, crises become a competition in risk-taking.[7]

[6] Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 98; for a similar comment see Brodie, *Escalation and the Nuclear Option*, 28–9.

[7] Schelling, "Nuclear Strategy in Europe," 421–8.

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As strategic forces became less and less vulnerable to attack, a new assumption and the theoretical consequences of making it became increasingly important: at least two states simultaneously have invulnerable strategic forces capable of destroying a potential adversary's society.[8] The assumption of mutually invulnerable strategic forces undercuts the logic of the theory of nuclear deterrence based on a spectrum of risk by invalidating the second assumption of this theory and thereby casting doubt on any implications derived from it. With these forces, it is, by definition, no longer important to be the state to strike first, and if this is the case, there is no obvious reason why both sides would be preoccupied with pre-emption. It is no longer necessary to launch a massive nuclear attack because one might be on the way. Mutually invulnerable strategic forces meant that a state could be the second to strike and not suffer any meaningful disadvantage. A state could wait until it was very confident that it had actually suffered such an attack before retaliating with its own.[9] Assuming the existence of these forces seemed to deny the existence of a situation in which the prospect of a state deliberately initiating a massive nuclear first strike was credible. It also reduced the likelihood of an escalation to general nuclear war. Schelling, although still emphasizing a rapid, explosive escalation, described the issue clearly.

> If strategic forces were not very vulnerable or dependent on warning or quick response for their own protection, were capable of controlled reaction, and had the means of communication and the doctrine that would make this possible, and if the other side were aware that this was the situation on the other side, the urge to pre-empt would be greatly reduced. The possibility of war by accident, by false alarm, by some unauthorized action or communication failure would be much reduced. Most of the possibilities of inadvertent or unpremeditated war are functions of haste. Slow down the responses; reduce each side's expectation that the other would be motivated to attack; design better and more flexible control over forces; and reduce the dependence on fallible warning systems—and the likelihood of general war is reduced, and so is the expectation of it. The tendency of local war, even local nuclear war, would be reduced . . . .[10]

[8] The condition that "at least two states simultaneously have invulnerable strategic forces capable of destroying a potential adversary's society" will be abbreviated as "the existence of mutually invulnerable strategic forces." The word "mutually" is used to emphasize that at least two invulnerable strategic forces exist simultaneously. The abbreviation also implicitly assumes that these forces can destroy an opponent. Describing this condition as "mutually assured destruction" would be more natural. This phrase, however, has come to connote more than merely a technological state of affairs. It now represents a particular doctrine about the type of targets to be attacked and how to attack them.

[9] Although the strategic forces of each side may be invulnerable, their command, control, and communication systems are not. See Desmond Ball, "Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?" *Adelphi Papers*, no. 169 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). If these systems are so vulnerable that a state could protect a significant part of its society by destroying the command and control systems of an adversary in a first strike, then it would be important to be the first to strike, and deterrence would tend to rest on a spectrum of risk.

[10] Schelling, "Nuclear Strategy in Europe," 428; see Brodie, *Escalation and the Nuclear Option*, 63–4.

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Indeed, even limited strategic exchanges might not trigger a massive unrestricted nuclear attack.[11]

In summary, the assumption of mutually invulnerable strategic forces implied that being the first to launch an unrestricted nuclear attack no longer offered the possibility of physically protecting one's own society. Implicit in this assumption, moreover, was the notion that a state could ride out any attack and then assess what sort of attack had been suffered. This seemed to render it very unlikely that a state could incorrectly conclude that it had suffered an unrestricted nuclear attack.[12] Thus, this assumption eliminated the one situation in which it might be said to be rational to launch a massive society-destroying attack. The threat of such an attack that leaves something to chance could no longer appeal to the possibility of a state finding itself in a situation in which the prospect of it rationally deciding to launch such an attack was credible. What now had to be left to chance in these threats was the possibility of a state launching such an attack accidentally or irrationally. The threat of an attack that leaves something to chance would be credible to the extent that the prospect of an accident or an irrational act was credible. Somewhat paradoxically, nuclear deterrence, which had often been criticized for assuming rationality, actually presupposed irrationality.[13]

The possibility of an accident or of a lapse of rationality in an era of mutually invulnerable strategic forces provided an unsatisfactory foundation for nuclear deterrence. The challenge was to construct a theory of strategic nuclear deterrence in which mutually invulnerable strategic forces were assumed to exist and that did not ultimately rely on a threat of a massive unrestricted nuclear attack. To achieve this, the new theory would begin by assuming away the possibility of such an attack.[14]

The solution was to be found in defining a new role for limited options. In the first theory of strategic nuclear deterrence, limited options could be used to raise the risk of general nuclear war, creating a spectrum of risk. But if the risk of such an attack were assumed away, the spectrum of risk also disappeared. One could not manipulate the risk of an attack through the exercise of limited op-

[11] Klaus Knorr, "Limited Strategic War," in Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read, eds., *Limited Strategic War* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962), 11–14.

[12] At the heart of the concern in the United States about the vulnerability of its Minuteman missiles is the assumption that the president could distinguish between an unrestricted attack and one limited to these missiles.

[13] Patrick Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis,* (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage Publications, 1977), 77–124, also notices this seeming paradox and tries to escape it by fashioning a theory of "sensible" deterrence. He assumes that officials and governments are "sometimes and in some ways conscious and rational, yet take into account the fact certain forces work to make their behavior unconscious and irrational" (p. 102). His escape is a failure: he too presupposes irrationality. For an early warning that this paradox was inescapable, see Glenn Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense*, 25.

[14] Historically, these two forms of strategic nuclear deterrence theory developed contemporaneously and were not tied closely to the technical capabilities postulated. These theories, moreover, are buried in policy debates about doctrines of limited strategic war.

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tions because the risk of such an attack arising from each and every one of these options was assumed to be zero. Of course, the limited options themselves continued to exist and could be used to inflict varying degrees of destruction on an enemy.

The set of limited options now constituted a spectrum of violence that offered the means through which each side could bring varying degrees of coercive pressure to bear on the other side.[15] But exerting coercive pressure through a spectrum of violence was to prove a much more subtle theoretical problem than exerting coercive pressure through a spectrum of risk. In the theory based on a spectrum of risk, the exercise of a limited option of itself increased the risk of general nuclear war and thus directly demonstrated one's willingness to accept greater risks. Moreover, by actually increasing the danger of escalation to general nuclear war, the exercise of a limited option also increased the coercive pressure on an adversary directly. An increase in risk can be undone by its reduction. Because an adversary dislikes this risk, its reduction is a direct reward for resolving the dispute. In this way a greater risk of general nuclear war is a greater incentive to come to terms. Increasing the risk increases the incentive to come to terms and thereby directly increases the coercive pressure. With the risk of an unrestricted nuclear attack assumed away, the exercise of limited option can only increase the coercive pressure on an adversary indirectly, for coercive pressure does not arise directly from the destruction wrought by the exercised options. This cannot be undone by coming to terms. The destruction itself provides no incentive. Whatever coercive pressure the spectrum of violence creates arises only through an increase in the credibility of the threat of future destruction. "The hurting does no good directly; it can only work indirectly. Coercion depends more on the threat of what is yet to come than on the damage already done."[16] By exercising an option in a spectrum of violence, each side attempts to demonstrate the strength of its resolve or, in other words, its willingness to endure more future destruction to achieve its goals than its opponent is willing to endure.

Using a spectrum of violence coercively could be more difficult than using a spectrum of risk coercively for another reason. If the danger of an explosive escalation to general nuclear war is great, then limited options, although not in themselves very destructive, might significantly increase the risk of such a war and thereby provide an adequate deterrent. But it seems unlikely that limited options that are not very destructive would significantly increase the credibility of a threat to exercise very destructive options. Increasing this credibility may necessitate exercising some rather destructive options. Although this destruction in-

[15] Even mutually invulnerable strategic forces capable of destroying only cities and soft military targets could constitute a spectrum of violence; if necessary, cities could be destroyed one at a time. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense*, 47, also uses the phrase "spectrum of violence" but in a different context and without distinguishing between a spectrum of risk and of violence.

[16] Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 172. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense*, 71, offers a similar comment.

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directly increases the coercive pressure on an adversary, it directly increases the cost of coming to terms. The investment in prevailing in the crisis is greater, because it now includes the destruction already suffered. These two factors oppose each other: the greater coercive pressure encourages an opponent to come to terms and the greater cost of doing so discourages it. Which factor will dominate is uncertain. "A war of endurance might bleed both sides to death."[17] More certain is that to the extent that the limited options in a spectrum of violence may be significantly more destructive than in a spectrum of risk, then dissuasion in a theory based on a spectrum of violence is likely to be more difficult than in a theory based on a spectrum of risk.

In a theory of nuclear deterrence based on a spectrum of violence, the problem of the inherent incredibility of a threat of an unrestricted nuclear attack is solved or rather avoided by never resorting to such a threat. A threat of mutual suicide is never made. Instead, the threat is to extract from an adversary a toll in destruction sufficient to outweigh any potential gains and, implicitly, a willingness to endure the destruction caused by an opponent's retaliation. This threat, if made in the context of the theory based on a spectrum of risk, reduces to a threat that leaves something to chance, because any attempt to extract such a toll is expected to provoke a massive nuclear attack and general war. But in the context of the theory in which the risk of such an attack is assumed away, the spectrum of violence makes it possible to attempt to collect this toll. Moreover, should this threat initially prove insufficiently credible, then the spectrum of violence could provide the means of making the willingness to extract this toll increasingly credible by collecting it a little at a time.

The most important difference between these two theories is that one of them assumes mutually invulnerable strategic forces. Without this assumption the array of limited options constitutes a spectrum of risk in which each option carries a different risk of escalation to general war. With this assumption, the array of limited options constitutes a spectrum of violence.

Two important implications follow from this difference. The first is that if mutually invulnerable strategic forces are assumed to exist, then dissuading an enemy from attacking must depend on deterrence. This reliance, moreover, is not a matter of doctrinal choice. Even if a state develops an extensive array of limited options that can deny an enemy its battlefield goal, this state still cannot escape an ultimate dependence on deterrence. In the presence of mutually invulnerable strategic forces, it simply is not possible to fight a war in the classical sense in which Karl von Clausewitz understood the word "fight."[18] No state can defend

[17] Schelling, "Nuclear Strategy in Europe," 429.

[18] An important element to Clausewitz's understanding of the nature of war is that one side, while being able to defend itself, should be able to render the other defenseless. See Karl von Clausewitz, in Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., *On War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 75–123, esp. 77. Mutually invulnerable strategic forces make this impossible and break the causal chain underlying Clausewitz's notion of war.

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its society by physically destroying another's strategic forces. During a confrontation, force cannot physically decide the matter. If one side is to lose, it must agree to do so; and it must agree to do so while possessing the ability to destroy the other state. This is deterrence.[19]

This implication may seem somewhat surprising. In the theory based on a spectrum of violence, the risk of an unrestricted nuclear attack is assumed away. Limited options do not raise the risk of such an attack; they destroy. They may be used to destroy some of an enemy's forces and deny it its goal. Nevertheless, asserting that it is the physical destruction of some of its forces that denies an enemy its goal is fundamentally to misunderstand the role of limited options in a spectrum of violence.[20] In the theory based on this spectrum, states always retain the ability to destroy each other. What they threaten, then, is ultimately to extract from an adversary a toll in destruction sufficient to outweigh any potential gains. Limited options are used in an attempt to make this threat more credible; they are not used just to destroy the other's forces. This is not to say that limited options that destroy an enemy's forces may not help dissuade an enemy from continuing to pursue its goals. If the exercise of limited option helps, it does so primarily by affecting an enemy's judgment of the other's resolve or, in other words, the other's willingness to inflict and endure future destruction. It does not help primarily by destroying some of an enemy's ability to continue to pursue its goal.

The second implication that follows from the different assumptions of these theories is related to their applicability. Even if mutually invulnerable strategic forces are assumed to exist, strategic nuclear deterrence could be based on the threat of an unrestricted nuclear attack and a spectrum of risk. But implicit in this is a reliance on the credibility of this attack resulting from an accident or an irrational act. Policy makers may deem this prospect sufficiently credible to make it the foundation of deterrence. But in deciding what constitues an adequate foundation, they should be aware of the assumptions often left implicit in these theories.

Control and Uncertainty

Uncertainty and the struggle to control it are most acute during a crisis, and nuclear deterrence theory has generally addressed these issues in the context of crisis. Schelling states:

[19] Robert L. Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," *Political Science Quarterly* (Winter 1979-80): 626-33, makes a similar point.

[20] Notwithstanding this fundamental misunderstanding, this assertion underlies much of current American nuclear strategy. For a discussion of this assertion and its relation to American nuclear strategy, see Robert L. Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). An early example of this misunderstanding is to be found in Knorr, "Limited Strategic War," 6-11.

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> The essence of the crisis is its unpredictability. The "crisis" that is confidently believed to involve no danger of things getting out of hand is no crisis . . . It is the essence of crisis that the participants are not fully in control of events . . . .[21]

That "the participants are not fully in control of events" is fundamental to much of strategic nuclear deterrence theory. This phrase, however, has two very distinct interpretations that are fundamental to nuclear deterrence theory and closely related to the distinction between the spectrum of risk and the spectrum of violence. Nevertheless, the distinction between these two interpretations is rarely made, and these interpretations are often confused.

The first interpretation of the phrase "the participants are not fully in control of events" is what Bernard Brodie seems to have in mind when he attempts to assess the probability of "uncontrolled escalation."[22] It is the interpretation implied by descriptions such as things may "get out of control," or "getting out of hand," or "the risks of escalation could be kept limited and controlled."[23] The first interpretation is that control is something which can be lost. Escalation during a crisis results from something beyond the physical or psychological control of any of the participants, from an accident or an irrational act.

A threat of a massive unrestricted nuclear attack that leaves something to chance and this interpretation of events that are not fully under control are closely related. If the existence of mutually invulnerable strategic forces is assumed, then the credibility of a threat that leaves something to chance depends on the likelihood of an accident of an irrational act. The credibility of this threat depends on the likelihood of a loss of control that triggers an explosive escalation to general nuclear war. But this suggests control is something that can be lost. The first interpretation of events not being fully under control thus seems implicit in a threat that leaves something to chance.

To focus attention on the type of accident implicit in this threat, assume momentarily that it is irrational knowingly to be the first state to launch an unrestricted nuclear attack. Also assume that states act rationally. Given these two stipulations, such an attack can arise only through an accident. How could such an attack come about under these stipulations? There are two answers to this question, and they describe the very narrow definition of an accident that is implicit in a threat that leaves something to chance.

The first answer is that such an attack could come about if it could be initiated without those responsible for ordering it actually doing so. Presupposing rational decisions and that it is never rational to be the first to launch an unrestricted nuclear attack, such an attack would never be initiated intentionally. Nevertheless, this attack could still result if those responsible for ordering it do not have to order it for such an attack to be made. If a technical failure or accident can initiate attack, such an attack remains a possibility. To the extent that

[21] Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 97.

[22] Brodie, *Escalation and the Nuclear Option*, 113–34.

[23] Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," 620; Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 97.

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the threat of an attack that leaves something to chance relies on the chance of an accident, and not in part on a subsequent decision, then it must rely on the chance of an accident as defined in this very narrow sense.

In the second answer, a decision to launch an attack is made. Under these stipulations, this can happen only if an accident puts a state in the one situation in which it might be said to be rational to initiate an attack of this type. This is the situation in which a state believes that it has already suffered such an attack and that its society has been destroyed.[24] Because of an accident, a state believes not only that a massive nuclear attack has been launched against it, but also that it has ridden out the attack and that, after assessing the damage, its society has been destroyed.

All of this is not to say that accidents more broadly defined would not greatly increase the tension of a crisis and make decisions to escalate more likely. Indeed, more broadly defined accidents may make the irrational decision to launch an unrestricted nuclear attack more likely. But to the extent that the threat of an attack that leaves something to chance relies on the chance of a accident, and not an irrational act, then the credibility of this threat rests on more than the likelihood of the occurrence of some serious accident. The credibility depends on the likelihood of the occurrence of an accident defined in this very narrow sense.

The threat that leaves something to chance also relies on a particular irrational act. As suggested above, the credibility of a threat of an unrestricted nuclear attack that leaves something to chance derives from the existence of a situation in which the prospect of a state initiating such an attack is credible. If for the moment we discount the possibility of an accident as defined above and continue to stipulate the irrationality of launching such an attack, then the credibility of a threat that leaves something to chance depends on the likelihood of an irrational act. But the plausibility of this threat is not to be found in the fact that some irrational act is likely to occur. Rather, the credibility is in the likelihood of a particular irrational act—the launching of an unrestricted nuclear attack. A state may believe that many irrational acts are likely to occur in the fog of war and crisis. But unless this state also believes that the particular irrational act of initiating a massive nuclear strike is likely to occur, then this state will not find the threat of such an attack credible. The implausibility of this particular act implies that there is nothing to be left to chance. Thus, the threat of such an attack that leaves something to chance depends on both a very narrow definition of an accident and on a particular act of irrationality.

From the postulates of the theory based on a spectrum of risk, we have derived

[24] Even the rationality, although probably not the credibility, of initiating such an attack in this situation is problematic. See, for example, Robert L. Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," *World Politics* (January 1979) and Stephen Maxwell's discussion of the rationality of the irrational in "Rationality in Deterrence," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 50 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968).

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the special definition of an accident and the particularity of the irrational act implicit in a threat of an unrestricted nuclear attack that leaves something to chance. The probability of the occurrence of this type of accident or irrational act is of great importance to the foundations of strategic nuclear deterrence: the smaller the probability, the more deterrence relies on a spectrum of violence and the less it relies on a spectrum of risk. We cannot, however, derive this probability from the postulates discussed above. The magnitude of this probability is beyond the pale of postulate.[25]

Turning to the second interpretation of the phrase "the participants are not fully in control of events," recall that the first interpretation was that control is something which can be lost. The participants on both sides of a crisis, when taken as a group, initially control events. What is at risk is the occurrence of something beyond the physical or psychological control of any member of this group. The second interpretation also begins by assuming that states, when taken as a group, control events. But when taken as separate states, no state is fully in control of events, because no state controls the actions and reactions of the other states. No state ever has control and, therefore, cannot lose it. What is at risk under this interpretation is that an adversary will react in a way that deepens the crisis, a reaction over which this adversary has control. This is the risk at the heart of threats based on a spectrum of violence.

The second interpretation and the distinction between the two interpretations seem obvious. But the obvious is often neglected, which leads to confused analyses of the role of uncertainty and escalation in strategic nuclear deterrence theory. Schelling, for example, offers a modified game of chess as an analogy to the role of uncertainty in nuclear deterrence and to the danger that "the thing will blow up for reasons not fully under control."[26] To the three possible results of a standard game of chess—win, lose, or draw—Schelling adds a fourth—disaster. Disaster is analogous to general nuclear war and, in the terms of the modified game, is a penalty imposed on both players that leaves each worse off than if he had simply lost. Disaster may be imposed if a queen and knight of opposite color have crossed the center line. When this happens:

> The referee rolls a die. If an ace comes up the game is over and both sides are scored with a disaster, but if any other number appears play goes on. If after the next move the queen and knight are still across the center line the dice are rolled again, and so on.[27]

Schelling claims too much when he states that this modified game of chess offers a good analogy to the role of uncertainty in nuclear deterrence. This analogy of the role of uncertainty in a threat of an unrestricted nuclear attack leaves something to chance. What is at risk with the roll of the dice is disaster,

[25] For an empirically based discussion of the likelihood of conventional war by accident, see Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 127–45.

[26] Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 104.

[27] Ibid., 102.

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the analogy to general nuclear war. This analogy, moreover, relies on the first interpretation of events not being fully under control. For with a queen and knight of opposite color across the center line, the two players lose collective control of events. Their fate passes to the dice.

As an analogy to the threat that leaves something to chance, it has a strength and a weakness. The strength is that it is possible to generate the risk without having to capture a piece. This is quite analogous to the observation that if the danger of an explosive escalation is great, then limited options, although not in themselves very destructive, might significantly increase the risk of general nuclear war. The weakness is in the simplicity of the mechanism that generates the risk. The threat of a massive nuclear attack that leaves something to chance depends on the credibility of the occurrence of a very narrowly defined accident or of a very particular irrational act. The simplicity of the mechanism in the analogy obscures the narrowness and the particularity of the accident and irrational act inherent in the actual threat.

The standard game of chess offers a better analogy to the second interpretation of events not being fully under control. Uncertainty also exists in this game; it is the uncertainty surrounding an opponent's future moves that makes it a game. But this is the uncertainty associated with the second interpretation: it arises from each player's inability to fully control events, in this case an opponent's future moves. In a game of chess, the two players never lose collective control. Yet, neither player as an individual is ever in control of events. This is the essence of the second interpretation.

The second interpretation leads to a description of escalation that differs greatly from the description of an uncontrolled escalation associated with the first interpretation. Superficially, every escalation is uncontrolled under the second interpretation, for no state ever fully controls the reactions of other states. More significantly, until now we have considered a society-destroying nuclear attack coming about only through a massive unrestricted nuclear attack. Given the assumption of mutually invulnerable strategic forces, moreover, such an attack would result from an accident or an irrational act. But a similar amount of damage might be done in another way by carrying out threats based on a spectrum of violence. This way would not require an accident, an irrational act, or even a misjudgment.

Suppose a state is in the midst of a crisis and finds its position deteriorating. If it is to escalate rationally, what decision must it make? The answer to this question will suggest that although accident, irrationality, or misjudgment may be sufficient conditions for escalation to occur, they are not necessary conditions. Escalation may be the result of the interaction of decisions that, given the goals of the states and the conflict of interest underlying the crisis, are completely rational. The answer helps to identify a type of escalation for which rationality is a sufficient condition.

What must a state judge if it is to decide to escalate rationally? It must judge that escalating another step may convince its adversary to submit and that, given

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the likelihood of this prospect, this submission is worth the cost in diplomatic or physical damages expected to be paid if this adversary does not submit. This judgment would take into account what is perceived to be at stake and the likelihood that the adversary will react by escalating. This judgment would also consider the chances of further escalation resulting from an accident or an irrational act. But what is important about this judgment is that if the stakes are sufficiently great, then it may be rational to accept the risks of an adversary's escalatory reaction or of the occurrence of an accident or an irrational act. If such a judgment is made, then escalation will have occurred not because of, but in spite of, the possibility of an accident or an irrational act.

Of course, events are not fully under a state's control, and its adversary, considering the new situation, may react by escalating. The crisis may now be much worse. But is it worse because a state misjudged its adversary's reaction? In at least one important sense the answer is no. Suppose that the state believed that the most likely reaction of its adversary would be to escalate. But also suppose that this state believed that the present situation was untenable and that the stakes were sufficient to warrant gambling on the smaller chance that the adversary would not escalate. If after this state escalates, and its adversary also escalates, then the adversary would have done what the state thought most likely. The judgment about the most likely response was correct; nevertheless, the crisis is worse. Escalation would have occurred in a way that did not require misjudgment.

Thus it seems that a state may decide to escalate another step in a way that does not require accident, irrationality, or misjudgment. But suppose the crisis escalated to catastrophic levels of destruction that far exceeded the value of what initially was at stake. Since no state prefers this outcome to submission, would not this outcome constitute evidence of misjudgment somewhere in the process? Again the answer in at least one important sense is no. This outcome would be evidence of misjudment only if during the crisis a state had to make a single choice between this outcome and submission. But crises confront states with a series of decisions, each of which is a choice between submission and the prospect of suffering future destruction. Each decision to escalate may be rational given the likelihood that an adversary will submit and given what is at stake. Moreover, this likelihood and these stakes must be evaluated at the time each of these decisions is made. If the likelihood or the stakes change during the crisis, then a series of individually rational decisions may lead to an outcome that no state would prefer to submission if this preference could be expressed in a single choice. Even escalation to catastrophic levels of damage that far exceed the value of what initially was at stake does not require misjudgment, accident, or irrationality.[28]

[28] Jervis notes that this process and the second interpretation of events not being fully under control resemble the tyranny of small decisions. See Alfred Kahn, "The Tyranny of Small Decisions," in Bruce Russett, ed., *Economic Theories of International Politics* (Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1968), 522–37.

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Two examples help to elucidate and emphasize the distinction between the escalatory processes associated with the two interpretations of events that are not fully under control. The first example suggests some of the paradoxes that may arise if the distinction between these two interpretations is maintained. The second example suggests how escalation may result from the interaction of rational decisions if the underlying stakes are sufficiently great.

Of the Sarajevo crisis preceding World War I, the historian F. H. Hinsley writes that if historians had gone as far as the evidence was trying to take them

> . . . they would have recognised that the dice had been set rolling for all the Powers well before Russia mobilised—and not by any of the Powers but by a Balkan assassination. They would have seen that what makes some governments appear more responsible than others, or some governments more responsible at some stages and other governments more responsible at others, is not the fact that some governments were more instrumental than others in affecting the course of events. It is the fact that the position of the different governments varied with the course of events over which they had lost control. They would have recognised that, although it is theoretically possible to say that war would have been avoided if this or that government had acted otherwise, it was not possible for them to have acted otherwise. All the evidence goes to show that the beginning of the crisis which has been studied so largely with a view to discovering and distributing human responsibility, was one of those moments in history when events passed beyond men's control.[29]

According to Hinsley, after Sarajevo men lost control of events and this resulted in war. But when considering the causes of World War II, he writes, "A war is always an alternative to some other course and is known to be so."[30] Juxtaposed, these comments form a paradox: how is it possible for one not to have control over war or peace and at the same time claim that war is always an alternative to some other course? If an alternative to war is to have any meaning, then it must be possible to decide not to have a war. But if one can decide not to have a war, then one has control over war or peace.

To resolve this paradox note that in his analysis of the Saravejo crisis Hinsley has failed to distinguish between the two interpretations of events not fully under control. The Balkan assassination setting the dice rolling is an example of the first interpretation: it was an event beyond the control of any Great Power. In this sense the states lost control. But this did not lead directly to the Great War. States reacted to events and made decisions. The war, in Hinsley's account, was the result of the interaction of these reactions and decisions. It resulted from events not being fully under control in the second interpretation: no state could control the reactions of the other states. When Hinsley describes this interaction as "one of those moments in history when events passed beyond men's control," he is confusing these two interpretations.

[29] F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace,* paperback ed. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 296.

[30] Ibid., 331.

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Having distinguished between these two interpretations, the paradox can be resolved. "A war is always an alternative to some other course," because a state retains the option of submission. But in certain circumstances, submission may not seem to be the best decision. Under the second interpretation, rational actors may be said not to have control over war or peace if they are in a situation in which the interaction of their rational decisions leads to war. The path along which an interaction of rational decisions may lead to war is the essence of the escalatory process associated with the second interpretation. It is this process that underlies Hinsley's comment:

> . . . although it is theoretically possible to say that war would have been avoided if this or that government had acted otherwise, it was not practicably possible for them to have acted otherwise.

Although any state could have avoided war by submission, each state perceived it to be in its best interest to take the next step down the path to war in the hope that another would submit first.

The second example is yet another reconsideration of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. When United States intelligence revealed that the Soviet Union was installing ballistic missiles in Cuba, President John F. Kennedy had several alternatives. Among them were doing nothing, blockading Cuba, and launching a military attack against the island to destroy the missiles. Thoughout the crisis, the president and his advisers attempted to foresee possible Soviet reactions to various potential American actions. Eventually the president decided to impose a blockade, and by most accounts this seems to have been a rational decision. In terms of the escalatory process associated with the second interpretation, Kennedy judged the stakes too high to do nothing, but not sufficiently great to attack Cuba as the first step. He believed that attacking Cuba as a first step carried with it too great a danger of providing a Soviet military response.

The Soviets did not react militarily to the blockade. But suppose that they had judged their stakes sufficiently high and had responded militarily. Unless rationality is to be an attribute of the consequences of a decision rather than of the decision itself, Kennedy's decision to impose the blockade would still have been just as rational. Because the United States could not control the Soviet reaction, the crisis would have escalated to a military confrontation through the interaction of rational decisions.

One might assert that this escalation would have been the result, if not of an irrational act, then certainly of a miscalculation or misjudgment. But even this assertion is problematic. Kennedy believed that boarding a Soviet vessel would provoke a Soviet military response.

> This is why he [President Kennedy] was so reluctant to stop and search a Russian ship; this is why he was so opposed to attacking the missile sites. The Russians, he felt, would have to react militarily to such actions on our part.[31]

[31] Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days* (London: Pan, 1969), 122.

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Yet the United States judged the stakes sufficiently high to board a Soviet vessel even if it meant confronting a Soviet submarine first.

> It was now a few minutes before 10 o'clock. Secretary McNamara announced that two Russian ships, the *Gagarin* and *Komiles*, were within a few miles of our quarantine barrier. . . . Then came the disturbing Navy report that a Russian submarine had moved into position between the two ships.
>
> It had originally been planned to have a cruiser make the first interception, but, because of increased danger, it was decided in the past few hours to send in an aircraft carrier, supported by helicopters, carrying antisubmarine equipment, hovering overhead. The carrier *Essex* was to signal the submarine by sonar to surface and identity itself. If it refused, said Secretary McNamara, depth charges with a small explosive would be used until the submarine surfaced . . . We had come to the time of final decision . . . President Kennedy had initiated the course of events, but he no longer had control over them.[32]

Fortunately, the Soviet ships stopped before they reached the quarantine line. Nevertheless, these two quotations imply that Kennedy expected the confrontation between American forces and Soviet vessels to provoke a Soviet military response. Yet, he accepted this danger: the *Essex* was ordered to stop and search the Soviet ships. If the Soviet ships had not stopped of their own accord, and had been searched by American forces, and this, in turn, did provoke a Soviet military reaction, then Kennedy would not have miscalculated or misjudged the Soviet reply. The Soviets would have reacted in the way that he had judged most likely. This suggests that although a Soviet military response was deemed most likely, the stakes appeared sufficiently great to warrant hazarding the risk of searching a Soviet ship. Had the Soviets reacted militarily, this escalation would not have been the result of misjudgment or miscalculation.

This examination of the escalatory process associated with the second interpretation of events not being fully under control has attempted to show that accident, irrationality, or misjudgment are not necessary conditions for escalation to result. This is not to say that the possibility of accident, irrationality, or misjudgment plays no role in this escalatory process. Escalation occurs in spite of, and not because of, this possibility.

This section has described two different escalatory processes associated with two distinct interpretations of events not being fully under control. In both processes, a state during a crisis is risking the occurrence of events over which it has no control. Thus it might seem appropriate to characterize crises in both interpretations as a competition in risk taking and a contest of resolve. But such a characterization begs important questions. A crisis is a contest of the resolve to do what? And, a crisis is a competition in what types of risk? In the theory based on a spectrum of risk, crises are a competition in demonstrating the resolve to run grave risks of an explosive escalation to general nuclear war. The

[32] Ibid., 70–73.

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uncertainty of a crisis is primarily about each side's willingness to accept the risk of suffering an unrestricted nuclear attack. In the theory based on a spectrum of violence, crises are a competition in demonstrating the resolve to suffer future destruction. Here the uncertainty is about the value each side attaches to the possible outcomes of the crisis, that is, each side's willingness to inflict and endure future destruction.[33] What is at risk is that the stakes may be sufficiently great or through escalation become sufficiently great that both sides, while in control of their own actions, begin to destroy each other. Failing to distinguish between these two types of risk and resolve obscures fundamental differences in the nature and dynamics of strategic nuclear deterrence inherent in each of these theories.

The analysis of the second interpretation underscores the importance of the stakes of a crisis to the escalatory process. Although perhaps less obviously so, these stakes are just as important to the escalatory process associated with the first interpretation, for it is what is perceived to be at stake that motivates a state to accept any risk of an explosive escalation to general nuclear war. The greater a state perceives its stakes in a crisis to be, the more likely it seems that the state will judge escalation to be in its best interest should it find its position deteriorating. In particular, the more a state perceives its initial stakes to be compared to those of its adversary, the more likely it seems that the state will escalate and the further escalation may go before the initial stakes no longer seem to warrant continued escalation. If, however, the escalation has already reached a point where the state now perceives much more to be at stake than was initially, then the escalation may continue. The greater the initial stakes, therefore, the more likely an escalation to the level of nuclear exchanges. How a state comes to perceive the initial stakes seems to be essential to nuclear deterrence. Strategic nuclear deterrence theory, however, has generally failed to address this issue. The theory takes the initial stakes in a crisis as given.[34] This is a significant limitation.

Strategic Nuclear Deterrence as A Theory of the Causes of War

Strategic nuclear deterrence theory has become more than a theory about nuclear threats. It has become a theory of the causes of war. This transformation is most evident when deterrence theory is claimed to imply that the existence of mutually invulnerable strategic forces significantly affects the likelihood of major war between the superpowers. This claim generally takes one of two in-

[33] Maxwell, "Rationality and Deterrence," recognizes this source of uncertainty in a harsh critique of Schelling's *Arms and Influence*.

[34] In a review of deterrence theory and an analysis of the importance of commitment and interest, Jervis observes that deterrence theory is "begging the question of how it [intrinsic interest in an issue] is established. See also his discussion of the apolitical nature of deterrence theory in "Deterrence Theory Revisited," 314–7 and 323–4. For similar comments, see Brodie, *War and Politics* (London: Cassell, 1974), 378–81.

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consistent forms. The first is that major war is significantly less likely because a state is always vulnerable to an annihilating enemy attack. The second is that large conventional war or even limited nuclear war is more likely because of the strategic nuclear stalemate.[35] The derivation of such conclusions about the likelihood of major war requires some theory about the causes of war. A claim that a change in this or that factor makes war more or less likely requires as a prerequisite the belief that this or that factor is causally related to the occurrence of war. In this way, claiming to derive from deterrence theory conclusions about the likelihood of major war transforms it into a theory of the causes of major war.

Taking the initial stakes of a crisis as given, however, significantly limits the usefulness of strategic nuclear deterrence theory as a theory of the causes of great war. The limitation is that by taking the initial stakes for granted one is also implicitly making a fundamental assumption about international politics. One must assume that the important determinants of the likelihood of a given crisis escalating to a major war are to be found in the states acting in the crisis.

At first this assumption may not seem like an assumption at all. If the important determinants of the likelihood of a given crisis escalating to major war are not to be found in the states acting in the crisis, then where else could they be? They may be found in the crisis itself. The likelihood of a crisis escalating to major war may have less to do with the limits of states and more to do with the situations that states face. The primary causes of great war may be found in what Kenneth Waltz has called the third image of international relations.[36]

Considering the logic of the third image in some detail shows how taking the initial stakes for granted implicitly locates the causes of major war in the states acting in the crisis. Waltz expounds this logic through an examination of Jean Rousseau's analysis of the stag hunt. Five hungry men, each of whose hunger can be satisfied by a fifth part of a stag, agree to hunt one of the beasts. During the hunt a hare that would satisfy one hunter's hunger hops within reach of one hunter. If he grabs it, he will be satisfying his own short-run interest. But his action will also permit the stag to escape, thus sacrificing the interests of his fellow hunters. The dilemma confronting the hunter is that even though his long-run self-interest may lie in the continued cooperation of the stag hunt, without some assurance of continued cooperation—something which is lacking in a state of nature—not only his short-run but even his long-run interest may lie in snatching the hare while it is still within reach. Of taking the hare, Rousseau, in Waltz's

[35] It would be consistent to claim that the prospect of an unrestricted nuclear attack is less likely and that the prospect of conventional or limited nuclear war is more likely. This is the stability-instability paradox discussed by Snyder, "The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror," in Paul Seabury, *Balance of Power* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing, 1965), 196–201, and by Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*. But Brodie, for example, claims that "the strategic nuclear forces of each of the superpowers *do* inhibit the other from *any* kind of warlike action against it." See Brodie, "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," *International Security* (Spring 1978): 76.

[36] Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 158–225.

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view, "has noticed that the difficulty is not only in the actors but also in the situations they face."[37]

In the search for third image causes, one does not look to the individual or to the state.[38] One does not seek to locate the causes of war in the cognitive limits of individuals or in the organizational and bureaucratic limits of states. Accidents, unintended consequences, and war may result from the interaction of actors limited in these ways.[39] Such causes, however, are in the first and second images.[40] In the search for third image causes, one looks to the conflicts of interest inherent in the situations that states face. This is exemplified by the stag hunt. The dilemma does not arise because the actors do not appreciate their situation. The hunter tempted by the hare understands his two options. He can grab it. Or, he can let it go and risk that a fellow hunter will grab it should the hare jump within reach of him. Nor does the dilemma arise because the hunter doubts his own ability to take the hare. The dilemma is not created by the limited intellectual or physical abilities of the actors to appreciate their situations and act on this appreciation. Given the values of the actors, the source of the dilemma lies in the fundamental conflict of interest underlying the crisis—the opportunity afforded by a hare hopping within reach.

This fundamental conflict of interest motivates states to calculate what acts seem to serve their interests best.

> Given imperfect states [i.e. states with different interests] in a condition of anarchy, crises will arise, a fact that in the third image is assumed rather than explained. With this as a starting point, it is possible to describe almost abstractly the kinds of calculations that as a logical minimum each state, under the pressure of its security interests, must make.[41]

The escalatory process associated with the second interpretation of events not being fully under control suggests how such calculations may lead to a decision to escalate. This process requires neither accident nor irrationality. Even the limited rationality of misjudging an adversary's most likely reaction is not required. The sources of escalation in this process are not to be found in the first and second images. The primary danger of escalation in this process does not lie in the limited ability of states to appreciate fully the risks of escalation and act in accordance with this appreciation. The danger is rather that the initial stakes of the crisis are so great for both sides that, even if these states perceive the risks of escalation to major war to be high, they will judge the stakes suffi-

[37] Ibid., 167–71.

[38] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 18.

[39] Jervis, "Systems Theories and Diplomatic History," in Paul Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy* (New York: Free Press, 1979), 212–19, suggests that unintended consequences are a major characteristic of outcomes resulting from third image causes. Although unintended consequences may result from third image causes, they may also be due to first and second image causes.

[40] See Waltz, *Man, the State and War* for a discussion of the first and second images.

[41] Ibid., 220.

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ciently important to hazard the risks. Escalation in the process associated with the second interpretation of events not being fully under control requires two conditions. The first is a severe conflict of interest underlying the initial stakes of the crisis motivating the states to hazard great risks of major war. The second condition is inherent in the anarchy of international politics: the inability of one state to control the actions and reactions of other states. These two conditions do not describe the states acting in the crisis. They describe the situations the states face.

The preceding discussion of the logic underlying the third image defines the extremes of locating the important determinants of the likelihood of major war in the states acting in the crisis and of locating them in the crisis itself. The question to ask of a theory, however, is not one of extremes but one of emphasis. Does the theory emphasize the states acting in the crisis or the crisis itself as the locus of the determinants of the likelihood of major war? We may now state more carefully the fundamental assumption about international politics that is implicit in the two theories of strategic nuclear deterrence when they are considered as theories of the causes of major war. These theories emphasize the states acting in a crisis.

The emphasis of these theories on the states acting in a crisis will become more apparent by considering how varying causes located in the different images affect the likelihood of major war. When confronted with a crisis, "each state pursues its own interests, however defined, in ways it judges best."[42] This is an implication of the third image. But whether or not a crisis results in escalation and war depends on both the conflict of interest underlying the crises and the nature of the states acting in the crisis. If one theoretically held the conflict of interest underlying a crisis fixed but varied the nature of the states acting in this crisis, then this may affect the outcome of the crisis. If the states confronting a given crisis are more pacific or more fearful of the devastation war will bring than are other states confronting a hypothetically equivalent crisis in which the underlying conflict of interest is the same, then the outcomes of these hypothetically equivalent crises may differ. Although the underlying conflict of interest—the opportunity to take the hare—is the same, a more trusting hunter may not grab it whereas a less trusting hunter may. The different outcomes would be explained by differences in the actors, whether they are more or less trusting, and not by differences in the situations they face. To the extent that the outcomes of hypothetically equivalent crises differ, these differences are due to causes located in the first and second images.[43] But the outcomes of crises may vary for other reasons. One could also theoretically hold the nature of the actors acting in the crisis fixed but vary the conflict of interest underlying the crisis. The outcomes of these crises may differ. Given the values that the states hold, the stakes may be too small to warrant running the risks of escalation. Or, they may be so high

[42] Ibid., 238.
[43] Ibid., 230–38.

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that states with the same values are willing to hazard great risks. The stakes may be so high that the interaction of each state's attempt to pursue "its own interests, however defined, in ways that it judges best" leads to escalation and war. Varying the conflicts of interest underlying crises in which hypothetically equivalent states find themselves may result in different outcomes. If they do, the causes of these differences are to be found in the third image.

The implication of taking the initial stakes for granted is now clear. Deterrence theory takes these stakes for granted by holding the fundamental conflict of interest underlying a crisis fixed. Yet conclusions about significant changes in the likelihood of major war are claimed to follow from this theory. Accordingly, the causes of these changes are not to be found in variations in the underlying conflict of interest, for this was theoretically held constant. The causes of these changes in the likelihood of a crisis escalating to major war are to be found in the states acting in the crisis. In this way, strategic nuclear deterrence theory emphasizes the states acting in the crisis over the crisis itself as the locus of the important determinants of the likelihood of major war.

Thus, nuclear deterrence theory implicitly assumes that a better explanation of the likelihood of major war is to be found by examining the actions of states rather that by examining the situations in which states act. A reductive approach to explaining the outcome of a crisis is assumed to provide a better explanation than a more systemic approach that focuses on how states stand in relation to each other as described by the underlying conflict of interest.[44] This may be so. But regardless of the usefulness of this assumption in accounting for the presence or absence of major war, this is an assumption of a theory of international politics. It is not an assumption of the theories of strategic nuclear deterrence described above. Conclusions that mutually invulnerable strategic forces significantly affect the likelihood of major war do not follow from the assumptions of these theories. Sustaining conclusions of this type requires an additional assumption, an assumption of a much more general theory of international politics. To claim that such conclusions follow from the theory of strategic nuclear deterrence is to claim too much for these theories.*

[44] For a discussion of reductive and systemic approaches to theories of international politics, see Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1–78.

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Military Force in the Foreign Policy of the Eisenhower Presidency

RICHARD M. SAUNDERS

Politicians, scholars, and much of the American public see the use of military force in international politics as an extremely complex and controversial issue. There are very few who hold with Karl von Clausewitz that force is only one more component of an "admixture of means" that the prudent statesman is justified in using to safeguard national interests. More prevalent is the view that force is an instrument to be used only in the most extreme circumstances and that its use in situations short of struggles for national survival brings forth serious moral questions. Samuel P. Huntington points out a strong undercurrent in the American political culture that fundamentally opposes government power and the concentration of authority. "This leads," he argues, "to efforts to minimize and restrict the resources of power (such as arms), to restrict the effectiveness of the specialized bureaucratic hierarchies, and to limit the authority of the executive in the conduct of foreign policy."[1]

American unease about force as a foreign policy instrument has been particularly evident since the mid-1960s. War in Vietnam and Cambodia, the temporary demise of the Cold War world view, the excesses of the imperial presidency, and events in Iran, Lebanon, Grenada, and elsewhere have led to continual debate over the efficacy of force and to reassessments of presidential powers and decision-making processes. The War Powers Resolution, passed by Congress in 1973 to limit the president's ability to employ military forces in hostile environ-

[1] Samuel P. Huntington, "American Ideals Versus American Institutions," *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring 1982): 16.

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ments independent of Congressional approval, was one of the key outcomes of this debate. Much of the controversy surrounding the reinstitution of draft registration, U.S. military involvement in Lebanon, and current security policy in Central America stems from a continuing desire on the part of a significant portion of the American polity to limit the exercise of power. In contrast to these concerns, President Carter created the Rapid Deployment Force, Ronald Reagan campaigned in 1980 on a theme of greater U.S. assertiveness in foreign policy, senior Reagan administration officials recently have called for more forthright use of U.S. forces as instruments of policy, and many throughout the country applauded the Grenada invasion as a long overdue assertion of American might.

Given the continuing debate over the use of force in foreign policy, it is useful to examine how past presidential administrations have dealt with this issue. The presidency is the proper focal point for such analysis. Popular attention, constitutional mandate, and political exigencies require that decisions about the use of military force be made primarily in the White House.

The presidency of Dwight David Eisenhower provides particularly interesting lessons about the use of force. Unlike the situation faced by current presidents, Eisenhower served in a time of high confidence in the power and the worthiness of American foreign policy aims. The strategic balance was decidedly tipped in America's favor and the Cold War painted the East-West conflict in sharp, ideological terms. The doubts and criticisms brought out by Vietnam were many years in the future and the country was being led by a president of unparalleled popularity. Given such an environment, one might anticipate that Eisenhower, the former general, would assign a very high priority to the role of force as an instrument of foreign policy. Nevertheless, the Eisenhower years actually provide examples of prudent and restrained presidential decision making about whether and how to use military power to achieve national goals. In Korea, Indochina, Suez, Quemoy and Matsu, and Lebanon, Eisenhower faced provocations, crises, and energetic demands from Congress and his own advisers to use force. In most cases, however, he overcame these pressures and selected a less violent alternative.

The conventional history of the Eisenhower period explains this pattern of decisions by arguing that he was an indecisive leader inclined by his personality always to settle for the option of doing nothing. This article draws a different conclusion. It argues that Eisenhower's general reluctance to use force as a foreign policy instrument resulted not from inertia but from a particular set of political beliefs, an understanding of the broader implications of the use of force, and a high level of skill at managing his advisory structure.[2] Thus, failure to use

[2] The theme of this article is largely based on recent scholarly work reassessing the Eisenhower presidency. A few of the more important works of this sort include: Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1982); Douglas Kinnard, *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management: A Study in Defense Politics* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1977); Robert A. Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).

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force in crisis was not a sign of ineffective leadership but was the result of conscious policy choices that grew out of the president's own opinions about how and when force ought to be used in international relations. Given the experiences of the past two decades, the making of such choices deserves careful consideration.

Research for the article is based on memoirs of the period, newly published works assessing Eisenhower's performance, and declassified administration documents. While the record is far from complete—the decisions that led to some of the significant covert operations of the period, for example, are still very unclear—sufficient new information is available to form a fairly accurate picture of Eisenhower's beliefs about the role of force in foreign policy. Attention will first be given to the influence of Eisenhower's world view and political opinions. This will be followed by an examination of his understanding of the political and technical aspects of force as an instrument of policy. A final section will then discuss some of the organizational and procedural facets of White House decision making that influenced the consideration of military options.

Eisenhower's World View

In the most general terms, Eisenhower saw himself as a man of peace and sincerely believed that the employment of military force should play a relatively minor role in the implementation of U.S. foreign policy. This belief grew out of an intellectual framework that combined conservative political attitudes, an internationalist world view, extensive military experience, and an appreciation for the war weariness caused by the Korean fighting. Eisenhower placed foreign policy and the maintenance of world peace first in his order of political priorities. It is important to remember that his pledge to go to Korea and end the war had been an important factor in his election. Thus he was extremely reluctant to take actions that might lead to further conflicts. This concern was particularly apparent when he considered using U.S. forces in Asia. He stated early in his administration that he could see no greater tragedy than for the U.S. to become involved in a land war in the Far East and pledged that every step he took would attempt to make certain that such a war did not happen.[3]

In addition to his immediate concern for ending the Korean War, Eisenhower had decided to run for president because he believed that he was the only one who could maintain the national consensus on foreign policy which had been established during World War II but was being threatened in the early 1950s by Korea and McCarthyism. He also felt that he could safeguard peace and security by bringing to the office a combination of conservatism and internationalism

[3] U.S. Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: Part II: U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Vietminh War, 1950–1954* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), 229.

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and by integrating diplomatic, political, and military decision making more skillfully than had previous administrations.[4]

In Eisenhower's view, economic concerns had to be addressed on an equal footing with other security issues if the nation was to remain strong enough to take care of its interests. He was very concerned with inflation and felt that defense spending was unproductive economically. Too much government spending would weaken the economy and could pose a serious danger to national security. As he wrote in his diary in 1949, we "must hold our position of [military] strength without bankrupting ourselves."[5] He restated this idea in a note written to his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, several years later in which he said that a prosperous America was essential to the execution of an intelligent foreign policy.[6]

His views on the importance of the economy in maintaining national security worked against too heavy a reliance on purely military aspects of power. The administration's conventional and nuclear military strategy was driven, in part, by desires to reduce costs. Similar concerns reinforced the president's reluctance to intervene abroad with conventional forces by heightening his awareness of the potential economic costs of such a move.

Eisenhower's conservative economic views contrasted with an internationalist perspective on U.S. foreign relations. As Robert A. Divine pointed out, "He shared the Eastern establishment's foreign policy view that American security rested on a stable and friendly Europe, and had little patience for those Republicans who were oriented towards Asia."[7] His world view had been deeply affected by World War II. Not only did he agree with the fundamental strategic decision of the war that Europe was the premier theater but he also shunned any return to patterns of appeasement and isolationism. Instead, he sought a collective approach to security which spread the responsibility and the costs of defense among the Western allies—an arrangement that demanded American participation and leadership rather than retrenchment.

Eisenhower's internationalist world view and his commitment to collective security caused him to place most crises and confrontations into a global perspective. When faced with a regional crisis, he carefully weighed the effects that an expansion of the scope of the confrontation through the use of Western military force would have on the East-West balance and on the relations among the allies. For example, Eisenhower's concern for European fears about the danger of a military confrontation between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China contributed to his decision to pursue a moderate and purposefully

[4] Greenstein, 47; David B. Capitanchik, *The Eisenhower Presidency and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), 16.

[5] Greenstein, 48.

[6] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, 16 November 1953, The Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kan.

[7] Divine, 10.

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vague path in his definition of the extent of the American commitment to defend the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. In early 1955, an invasion of these islands by the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) seemed imminent, and Eisenhower received much pressure from Chinese Nationalist President Chaing Kai-shek, conservative Republicans, and some of his own advisers to take a strong position threatening the use of U.S. military forces against any PRC move. Nevertheless, as he wrote in a letter to General Alfred Gruenther in February, Eisenhower recognized that the Europeans perceived an American tendency towards recklessness and immaturity in foreign affairs and that a flat commitment by the United States to defend the islands against any Chinese attack would hurt U.S. standing among its allies. While he felt that a military show of force in the region was necessary to deter the Chinese and was relatively free of major risks because of his assessment that the Soviets would not intervene, the exact U.S. position had to be carefully drawn so as not to appear reckless.[8]

A similar theme appears in a 1955 letter to Winston Churchill. Eisenhower began by noting an earlier letter from Churchill which had described fears among members of the British government that America, through impulsiveness or lack of perspective, might be drawn into a Chinese war. He then went on to say that his most recent message to Congress on the security of Formosa should reassure the British "as to our basic attitudes and sober approach to critical problems."[9]

Eisenhower's view of the role of force in foreign policy was also influenced by a deep concern for world opinion, by a desire to place U.S. actions within the context of international law, and by a high regard for the benefits of quiet diplomacy. These concerns run throughout his writings and actions in foreign affairs and sometimes came into conflict with his desires to preserve allied unity. This can easily be seen in the Suez crisis of 1956, which developed when Great Britain and France, along with Israel, invaded Egypt in response to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal and other perceived threats against their interests.

As the crisis developed, Eisenhower worried a great deal about the larger implications of the French and British moves against Egypt. While he was no supporter of Nasser, he felt that any allied military action would increase the possibility of active Soviet involvement in the region. He told British Prime Minister Anthony Eden in September 1956 that he feared that "the use of force would vastly increase the area of jeopardy."[10] At another point in the crisis, Eisenhower warned Eden directly not to use force, saying that " . . . to resort to military action when the world believes there are other means available for resolving the

[8] Eisenhower, Letter to General Alfred M. Gruenther, 1 February 1955, Reproduced in the *Declassified Document Reference System*, Research Publications, Inc. Woodbridge, Conn., (1978), 436A. (Hereafter cited as DDRS.)

[9] Eisenhower, Letter to Sir Winston Churchill, 25 January 1955, DDRS (1979), 105D.

[10] Divine, 82-83.

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dispute would set in motion forces that could lead, in the years to come, to the most distressing results." Throughout the crisis Eisenhower favored gradual diplomacy over confrontation. He wrote to Eden that Britain could best achieve its goals by using less bellicose means such as proposing an international commission to run the canal, applying economic pressures against Egypt, exploiting Arab rivalries, and diverting oil routes. Force, he argued, would merely give Nasser the drama he craved.[11]

Eisenhower's interpretations of international law and the importance of previous declarations were also important in his decision making during the Suez crisis. According to his memoirs and the minutes of White House meetings, Eisenhower believed that French and British actions in the Suez affair were outside the normal boundaries of international law and that the United States was committed to oppose their moves because of its participation in the 1950 Tripartite Declaration Regarding Security in the Near East. The declaration affirmed American, British, and French support for the status quo in the region at the conclusion of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and committed each power to action to prevent the violation of frontiers or armistice lines by any of the local states.[12] At a meeting on 29 October 1956 the president stated that he interpreted this agreement to mean that the United States must support the victim of aggression in the Middle East which, in this case, was Egypt.[13] At a later meeting that same day and in conversations on the 30th, he continued to argue that the United States was bound by its word and that failure to honor it would seriously damage American prestige.[14] Because of these convictions, he violently opposed the British and French threats of intervention, even though he felt that the allies had legitimate claims in Suez. As a result, his first goal during the early part of the crisis was to find ways to persuade them not to intervene.

Eisenhower's stand on the 1950 agreement was at odds with his desires to support unity among the western allies—a conflict which posed particularly vexing problems because of the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary. His firm opposition to the intervention in Suez in the early part of the crisis caused a good deal of tension within his administration and left him open to charges in the last days of the 1956 presidential campaign that he was endangering the alliance at a critical moment in the East-West struggle. Eisenhower was acutely aware of this conflict in his views and modified his position as the Suez crisis developed and it became apparent that there was little he could do to prevent British and French

[11] Eisenhower, Letter to Anthony Eden, 8 September 1956, DDRS (1981), 385A.

[12] Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956–1961* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), 73.

[13] Memorandum of Conference with the President, 29 October 1956, 7:15 P.M., DDRS (1978), 449D. The text of the Tripartite Agreement is contained in U.S. Department of State, "Tripartite Declaration Regarding Security in the Near East," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 22 (5 June 1950), 886.

[14] Memorandum of Conference with the President, 29 October 1956, 8:15 P.M., DDRS (1978), 450A, and Record of Telephone Calls of the President, 30 October 1956, DDRS (1978), 210B.

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intervention. The focus of the White House meetings soon shifted to how best to end the crisis with as little damage as possible to allied unity and to U.S. relations with the Arab countries. On November 1, after British and French troops had begun landing in Egypt, Eisenhower told Dulles that he thought the Tripartite Declaration may have been overtaken by events and that the first objective now was to obtain a cease-fire.[15] At about the same time, he worked on a draft letter to Anthony Eden expressing disappointment that the troops had landed and calling on the British to refrain from moving into populated areas. In this way, he hoped to prevent intensification of the conflict so that withdrawal would be easier once a cease-fire had been concluded.[16]

The extent of the conflict of aims within the administration is best illustrated, however, by a telephone call placed at the height of the crisis by Robert Amory, the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to Chester Cooper, a senior agency official in London. Amory voiced extreme frustration with the lack of British compliance with the current cease-fire coupled with their apparent unwillingness to take decisive military action. He told Cooper to pass on to his British counterparts that the United States would back up further military actions, so long as the British moved fast. "What we can't stand," he said, "is their goddamn hesitation while Hungary is burning!"[17] There is no indication that authorization for this message came from the White House. Nevertheless, the fact that such a call could be made by a senior official points out the problems faced by the administration in trying to enforce the 1950 agreement while attempting to manage a serious European crisis and maintain a unified front against the Soviet Union.

A similar range of concerns is evident in Eisenhower's handling of the Indochina crisis in 1954. Early in the crisis Eisenhower decided that certain conditions had to be met before he would allow U.S. intervention. The conditions included legal sanction for the intervention under international law and a favorable climate of free world opinion. He wrote that the legality of American intervention could only be based on formal requests for assistance from the French and, more important, from the local governments involved. Allied approval of the intervention would best be expressed by commitments on the part of other nations to send troops of their own.[18]

The 1954 crisis also showed Eisenhower's reluctance to commit U.S. forces in situations where they might be seen as supporting colonialism. He was fundamentally opposed to tying U.S. resources and prestige to armed attempts on the part of the old colonial powers to retain their overseas possessions. His atti-

[15] Record of Telephone Calls of the President, 1 November 1956, DDRS (1982), 386 B.

[16] Eisenhower, Draft Letter to Anthony Eden, 5 November 1956, DDRS (1978), 313C. Marginal notes indicate that the letter had been overtaken by events and should not be sent.

[17] Chester L. Cooper, *The Lion's Last Roar: Suez, 1956* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1978), 181–182.

[18] Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), 340.

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tude towards what he often called "Victorian" ideas of colonialism may have had their genesis during his service in the Philippines between the wars. In any event, he had little sympathy for European leaders' concerns for the preservation of prestige and status through empire and felt that the U.S. should be identified in the eyes of the world with the process of decolonization. In the debate over sending U.S. forces to Indochina in 1954, Eisenhower insisted that if American help was to be justified, there must be some aim to French strategy other than the maintenance of the colonial status quo. "The United States," he said, "is not going to be a part of any war that has as its only purpose the reestablishment of colonial power over Indochina."[19]

Finally, Eisenhower's assessment of the psychological and moral bases of internal conflict bolstered his reluctance to become directly involved in Southeast Asia. He said in a 1954 letter that

> . . . any nation that intervenes in a civil war can scarcely expect to win unless the side in whose favor it intervenes possesses a high morale based upon a war purpose or cause in which it believes. The French [in Indochina] have used weasel words in promising independence and through this one reason as much as anything else have suffered reverses that have been really inexcusable.[20]

While Eisenhower had many reservations about the use of force, he did believe that there were some situations in which the stakes were high enough to justify the commitment of U.S. forces overseas. In his view, the most certain justification for the use of force existed when an armed response was required to safeguard the fundamental balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the strategic level, he believed that it was absolutely necessary for the United States to remain strong in the nuclear forces that were the foundation of the East-West balance. He also felt that a U.S.-Soviet confrontation should be risked with conventional forces if important U.S. interests were at stake. For example, during the Suez crisis Eisenhower rejected the possibility of any sort of Soviet participation and stated that he would use force to prevent Soviet military intervention in the region.[21] During a conference in his office in 1959, Eisenhower discussed the possibility of the Soviet Union trying to install missiles in Cuba and posed a similar course of action. He declared that if such missiles were put in place "we would feel that we would have to intervene, militarily if necessary."[22]

Eisenhower was also willing to use force as a complement to diplomatic moves. The threat of expanded military action accompanied his attempts to

[19] Eisenhower, Transcript of Interview for the John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, Firestone Library, Princeton University (28 July 1964), 26.

[20] Eisenhower, Letter to Captain Everett (Swede) Hazlett, 27 April 1954, The Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Presidential Library.

[21] Charles C. Alexander, *Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), 177.

[22] Memorandum of Conference with the President, 17 June 1959, DDRS (1981), 125C.

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achieve progress in the Korean truce talks. In considering his options, he rejected General Douglas MacArthur's recommendation for a sharply expanded war and did not heed others' suggestions to threaten the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China publicly with the use of nuclear weapons if progress was not made at the peace table. He did, however, inform Russia and China through diplomatic channels that the U.S. was ready to "move decisively without inhibition in our use of weapons" unless satisfactory progress was seen. In mid-May of 1953 when the talks stalled, Eisenhower authorized United Nations (U.N.) forces to increase military pressure in the conflict. He gave orders to General Mark Clark, the U.N. commander, to break off the talks and widen the war if China became intransigent. Atomic weapons were moved to Okinawa.[23]

Eisenhower's decision to send troops to Lebanon in 1958 is an example of his willingness to intervene in an internal conflict under certain circumstances. Unlike Indochina four years before, the situation in Lebanon was not complicated by allied colonial aims or by a lack of perceived legal basis for action. When the Lebanese president, fearing a coup, asked for U.S. help, Eisenhower was immediately ready to act. At a White House meeting on July 14, he rejected Dulles's attempts to explain alternative courses of action and concentrated on the details of implementing a military option. Eisenhower's decision seemed to be guided by a belief that the recent coup in Iraq had been Communist inspired and had greatly expanded Soviet opportunities in the region. The coup, coming only two years after Egypt's shift towards the Soviet bloc, caused Eisenhower to fear that unrest in Lebanon could only lead to further Communist gains.[24] This perspective, when coupled with the request for aid by an independent head of state and the fact that U.S. forces were being sent to maintain order rather than to engage in combat, made the sending of troops a much more attractive option. Even so, Eisenhower still put limits on the territory that the American units could occupy and the type of operations they could conduct.

Eisenhower was also willing to use covert operations as an instrument for combating Communism. The tone and content of a letter written in 1954 to Lieutenant General James Doolittle, who was to be the new head of a panel of consultants on CIA covert activities, illustrate Eisenhower's belief that covert operations should be an integral part of foreign policy implementation. He wrote that the purpose of Doolittle's panel was to make recommendations on how to improve the conduct of covert activities. No request was made for the panel to explore the legal or moral issues raised by such operations. Instead, the president concluded that the goal of the panel was to "insure that the United States Government develops an appropriate mechanism for carrying out its over-all intelligence responsibilities and the related covert operations . . . [T]hese operations are essential to our national security in these days when international Communism is aggressively pressing its world-wide subversive program."[25]

[23] Divine, 29–30.

[24] Ibid., 99–100.

[25] Eisenhower, Letter to Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle, 26 July 1954, DDRS (1977), 349E.

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Covert operations were used in Iran and Guatemala in the face of what the administration perceived to be clear instances of Communist subversion. While the amount of attention that Eisenhower gives in his memoirs to Iran and the threat to the Shah's reign posed by Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh indicates that he felt that the issue was extremely important to American interests, he says virtually nothing about direct U.S. participation.[26] It is apparent, however, that Eisenhower was convinced that Mossadegh, if not a Communist himself, was following a path that would lead to a Communist takeover in Teheran. Based on this assessment, he authorized the implementation of a CIA operation that had been developed by Kermit Roosevelt and presented in detail to John Foster Dulles and other senior State Department officials.[27] The operation, many feel, was the instrument that deposed Mossadegh and reinstated the Shah.

The reasons for the use of covert actions in Guatemala were similar. Eisenhower was convinced that the government had turned Communist and that the threat of the consolidation of such a regime in Central America justified U.S. action. He had previously authorized contingency planning by the CIA and authorized the implementation of the agency's proposals after a shipment of arms from Eastern Europe had arrived in Guatemala. The president later told General Andrew J. Goodpaster that he and the National Security Council (NSC) had "gone quite deeply into the Guatemala situation," and that the decision to act had been made at the highest level.[28]

The President as Military Expert

Eisenhower's extensive direct experience in the complex realities of force as an instrument of policy had a significant influence on his decision making. His appreciation for the operational and technical side of military proposals gave him the confidence to analyze critically both the general military strategy of the period and the specific operational proposals presented to him by his foreign policy and defense advisers. Not only did the weaknesses that he ascertained in proposals to use force often contribute to his rejection of specific military options, but his great familiarity with defense issues led to his identification of flaws in proposals to implement contemporary strategic doctrine.

Eisenhower's uncertainty about the implications of the dominant strategic posture of his administration illustrates this last point. The aim of this doctrine, called the "New Look," was for the United States to base its military posture on the ability "to inflict massive retaliatory damage" on the enemy with strategic nuclear forces.[29] The strategy itself was the result of conflicting aims within the ad-

[26] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 159–166.

[27] Stephen E. Ambrose, *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981), 199–202.

[28] General Andrew J. Goodpaster, as quoted by Ambrose, 230.

[29] *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967*, B5.

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ministration. On the one hand, there were those who felt that the Democrats had been "soft" on Communism and that the new administration needed a strategy that would make a more forthright stand against aggression. At the same time, others saw a need to reduce the commitments required by containment and argued that the U.S. could not possibly afford to try and stop all Communist advances everywhere by conventional forces. The conflicting aims, along with Eisenhower's economic views and his overriding desire to avoid a repetition of war in Asia, brought about a strategy that relied on relatively cheap nuclear forces to deter Russian and Chinese aggression and avoid the use of American ground forces wherever possible.[30]

But the publication of the New Look did not mean that the president had absolute faith in the efficacy of massive retaliation. In a letter to Winston Churchill written in 1955, Eisenhower said that the main weakness of the massive retaliation doctrine was its limited ability to defend against low level threats. The enemy, he said, "knows that there is a great level of fruitful opportunity open to him lying between the excitation of a global war on the one hand and the passive acceptance of the status quo on the other."[31] He saw the need for the careful definition of when the U.S. should "react explosively" in the face of a foreign challenge and for the effective communication to the enemy of American intentions. He ended the letter with a discussion of the need for local deterrents to make up for the limitations inherent in applying massive retaliation to regional challenges.

His expressed views on the nature of nuclear war also indicate that he was probably reluctant to put complete faith in the New Look. He believed that the new weaponry had changed the fundamental nature of war and that there could be no winner in a nuclear conflict. In 1958 he wrote that the threat of extermination left the U.S. and the USSR no alternative to finding some future accommodation.[32] Two years earlier, Eisenhower had recorded a similar view in his diary after signing a NSC report which called for the full integration of nuclear weapons into U.S. military operations in the event of a general war. He noted that even a month's warning could not prevent significant levels of damage in the U.S. and that the only way to prevent catastrophic casualties was to strike first. He rejected such an option, however, both because it was against national traditions and because it would require the secret approval of Congress, which would probably be impossible to obtain.[33]

He also saw limitations to the New Look's vision of conventional operations. Strong advocates of the policy, such as Admiral Arthur Radford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), argued that air and naval power could replace

[30] Melvin Gurtov, *The First Vietnam Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 53–54.

[31] Eisenhower, Letter to Winston Churchill, 25 January 1955, DDRS (1979), 105D.

[32] Greenstein, 48.

[33] Donald Neff, *Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East* (New York: Linden Press, 1981), 228.

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ground forces by providing a less costly means of achieving success in limited war situations. The president seemed to believe, however, that air and sea power were of limited effectiveness and that their use should not be contemplated without due consideration of the possibility of failure and the subsequent need to commit ground forces.

Such a view was a principal determinant of Eisenhower's decision not to use American forces to help raise the Vietminh siege of the French base at Dienbienphu in 1954. Radford and others proposed to use American airpower to attack the Vietminh troops around the French garrison with either nuclear or conventional weapons and argued that such attacks would be enough to break the siege and to turn the course of the battle. General Matthew Ridgway, the Chief of Staff of the Army, dissented. He felt that air power could not be successful alone and that if the U.S. committed itself through the use of air attacks, ground forces would soon have to be sent to protect the necessary bases and to ensure success in the field. To underscore his view, he directed his staff to determine the size of the troop commitment necessary to assure achievement of American aims. The resulting study held that success would be unlikely unless at least 500,000 troops were committed.

Eisenhower found these points persuasive. Indeed, Ridgway's arguments probably served to confirm the views on the efficacy of air attacks that Eisenhower had held all along. The president rejected the Radford proposal, deciding that air power could not effectively substitute for ground forces in this particular situation and that the level of U.S. interests in the region was such that the likely cost of intervention overwhelmed the benefits to be achieved.[34]

His reluctance to use airpower by itself at Dienbienphu was reinforced by a general lack of enthusiasm about any plan that called for employing force in an incremental manner. Eisenhower clearly felt that if the employment of force was justified, the force used had to be decisive. He feared that the airstrikes proposed by his advisers would lead to a state of "double jeopardy" in which the United States, having committed an act of war, would have irrevocably staked its prestige on the outcome of a military action that had little chance of success. He had no intention of using U.S. forces in limited action when the force employed would probably not decide the issue.[35] Later that same year, Eisenhower showed similar thinking when he told his close friend and associate, General Walter Bedell Smith, that he did not want to use American units to help defend the islands of Quemoy and Matsu unless he was convinced that there was a very high probability of immediate success and little likelihood of having to commit more forces later. Once again he was afraid of involving U.S. prestige in the crisis to the de-

[34] Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York: Curtis Publishing Company, 1956), 275–277; David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1973), 137–138.

[35] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 341.

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gree that the use of troops would entail without the certainty that success would follow.[36]

Eisenhower's management of the Offshore Islands crisis also illustrates his attention to and comfort with the technical details of military proposals. In early 1955 he analyzed a JCS proposal to reinforce the Tachen Islands, which are two hundred miles from Formosa and which were seemingly being threatened by China as a preliminary step to an invasion across the Formosa Straits. The proposal to reinforce rather than to evacuate was based on an estimate that evacuation of the islands would be prohibitively difficult. Records of the meeting show that Eisenhower brought up details concerning the advantage of the defense in amphibious operations, the problems of ammunition resupply, and the danger of blocking the islands' principal port. Based on these points, the president concluded that the withdrawal of Chinese Nationalist forces would not be as difficult as his advisers had claimed. He subsequently rejected the JCS proposal.[37]

Decision-Making Procedures and Organization

Eisenhower often reinforced his position vis à vis those pushing the military option by imposing political and procedural conditions that had to be met before he would agree to send troops. When taken in perspective these conditions illustrate Eisenhower's attitude about the nature of presidential power, the role of the president in making the decision to deploy military forces, and the need for broad support if the decision to use force is to be politically viable.

The most important prerequisite that Eisenhower placed on the use of force was the requirement for congressional and popular support. Eisenhower believed that the approval of Congress was absolutely necessary at the outset of a conflict if the executive was to maintain the political power he needed to reach his goals. Eisenhower understood the practical limitations of presidential power and based his leadership style on seeking cooperation with the legislative branch. As he said in a letter to a close associate, true leadership did not involve attempting to dominate other political actors. Instead, as president he had to work to secure the willing cooperation of Congress as well as senior members of his own administration. He believed that he could best lead the country not by creating the appearance of dominance and presidential influence but by building an executive-legislative team that would maintain the unity necessary to solve national problems.[38]

There was also an important constitutional component to Eisenhower's desire to keep Congress involved. He believed that preservation of the balance of power

[36] Bennett C. Rushkoff, "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955," *Political Science Quarterly* (Fall 1981): 467.

[37] Rushkoff, 471.

[38] Eisenhower, Letter to Emmet Hughes, 10 December 1953, The Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Presidential Library.

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within the federal government was of utmost importance and took elaborate measures to ensure the cooperation of Congress in foreign policy matters. He held that Congress must grant prior authorization before troops could be sent into combat, other than in the most exceptional of circumstances. "Part of my fundamental concept of the Presidency," he said in his memoirs, "is that we have a constitutional government, and that only when there is a sudden unforseen emergency should the President put us into war without Congressional action."[39]

Eisenhower's insistance that Congress underwrite any foreign intervention save in the most extreme of situations is evident in his handling of the French requests for U.S. intervention in Indochina in 1954. At a key meeting called to discuss proposed actions, he alluded directly to the circumstances surrounding the start of the Korean conflict and said that he had no intention of involving the United States in more Asian ground fighting without a congressional declaration of war.[40] He demanded that Radford and Dulles meet with the congressional leadership to discuss the proposed intervention. When they were unable to persuade Lyndon Johnson, then the Democratic leader in the Senate, and the others to support the plan to conduct limited air raids, Eisenhower's own doubts about the military option were reaffirmed and little chance remained of its being accepted.

Eisenhower's desire to gain congressional approval for military actions was also evident when he considered situations in which he strongly favored the use of force. This point was illustrated at a White House conference held in mid-1954 to discuss the response the U.S. should make if China intervened militarily in Indochina while the Geneva talks were going on. Minutes of the meeting show that Eisenhower favored U.S. military action, including air attacks against the Chinese homeland, in retaliation for aggression by the People's Republic. He did not feel that he could take such an action, however, without the support of a congressional resolution. Recognizing that congressional and public opinion did not favor the use of U.S. forces against the Chinese at that time, he told his advisers that "the question at issue was not one of logic, but of how to bring along the American people into a realization of the danger to U.S. security in an open, unprovoked Chinese Communist attack."[41] Clearly, in the president's mind, the building of public and congressional support for an action had to precede its execution, even though he believed in the correctness of his own position.

Second only to Eisenhower's recognition of the need for congressional mandates was his belief in the need for allied support of military action. His continual calls for demonstrations of collective security and united strength had their foundation in his military background as well as in his political and economic outlook. His military reputation was based on his ability to secure allied cooperation, and it is not surprising that he would seek to continue such cooper-

[39] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 345.

[40] Divine, 44.

[41] Memorandum of Conference with the President, 2 June 1954, DDRS (1981), 261A.

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ation once he was in the White House. Also, he saw collective security arrangements as a way to cut costs and to ensure popular support both at home and abroad for military moves. He felt that the U.S. could not afford to stand alone in the face of global communist threats. Indeed, allied help had to be sought in meeting each individual challenge for, as he said to White House chief of staff Sherman Adams early in his first term, "if you go it alone in one place, you have to go it alone everywhere. No single nation can live alone in the world."[42]

This attitude shows up throughout his time in office. One of his main worries in considering the use of atomic weapons to break the stalemate in Korea was the rift that such an attack might cause between the U.S. and its European partners. In Indochina two years later, support from the British was set as a second major precondition to his approval of American intervention. Later, on the eve of John F. Kennedy's inaugural, he advised the president-elect that unilateral U.S. action in Laos would be unwise, despite the fact that he felt that the loss of Laos to communist forces would lead to the loss of all of Indochina.[43] Even the Suez crisis failed to shake Eisenhower's fundamental faith in allied unity. As the initial phases of the crisis passed, he devoted much attention to ensuring that no permanent damage to allied relations was done.

Eisenhower's management of his staff procedures and his methods of controlling the decision-making process also influenced how proposals to use military forces were acted upon. The procedures helped ensure that a level of calmness and rationality was brought to crisis management and that calls to commit forces overseas were decided upon only after considering the widest possible range of information and opinions. He worked to ensure that he received an unbiased and unfiltered flow of information, that the options presented to him had been adequately studied, that no relevant options were overlooked, and that the flexibility he needed to face changing situations was protected. His relative success at attaining these goals was a result of his extensive military experience as both a senior commander and a staff officer. This experience taught him to regard organization as an instrument and not an end in itself; he valued order only insofar as it supported his ability to react to world events.

At the heart of Eisenhower's technique for managing his staff support was the belief that building teamwork through prior planning and staff work was the necessary foundation for effective crisis management. He directed his staff to engage in continuous planning and regarded the work as far more than just a "paper drill." Instead, the planning and the complex staff arrangements, as well as the accompanying meetings, were a way for his advisers to become accustomed to working together on a daily basis so that they would develop into

[42] Divine, 28.

[43] Robert S. McNamara, Memorandum to the President: Re: Briefing of President Elect Kennedy by President Eisenhower, 19 January 1961, dated 24 January 1961, DDRS (1978), 355A.

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a team that could react to crisis situations and provide him with reasonable solutions to unforseen developments even while working under extreme pressure.[44]

One of the principal advantages of the president's emphasis on continuous policy planning and frequent cabinet and National Security Council meetings was that he could draw on small parts of the staff structure during a crisis and still find the expertise and breadth of perspective that he needed. As Douglas Kinnard has pointed out, the "real decisions were in the Oval Room, with a small, select group" chosen to meet the needs of the situation being faced.[45] Kinnard's work extensively documents this aspect of the Eisenhower leadership style and only one example need be cited here. During a meeting in August 1956 about the increase of tension over the status of the Suez Canal, Dulles and Eisenhower explicitly agreed that the crisis they saw coming could not be handled by the full National Security Council apparatus both because of the likelihood that events would move extremely rapidly and because of the need to retain flexibility. Instead, American policy would be set on a day-to-day basis by the president with the support of a few key advisers. The NSC would be used in general assessments of the crisis and in the attempt to keep the administration within the broad guidelines of American policy.[46]

Eisenhower's practice of drawing on parts of his staff structure for support would not have been successful if he had not been skilled at ensuring that he received the range of advice he needed to make adequate decisions. In times of tension the president often found himself faced with forceful arguments from his closest advisers, from members of Congress, and from the leaders of allied nations advocating the use of force. In the face of these calls for action, Eisenhower sought out as wide a range of advice as possible. He consciously avoided overreliance on those advisers who were advocating the most aggressive options and often looked to the doubters and dissenters.

Once again the crisis in Indochina in 1954 provides an example of this sort of behavior. The telling argument in opposition to the plan for U.S. air intervention came from Ridgway and directly contradicted the arguments being put forth by Dulles and Radford. In considering Ridgway's advice, Eisenhower went outside the normal paths of his advisory structure. He showed he was willing to seek out and consider the points on which the Chiefs disagreed. A similar sensitivity for the opinions of individual members of the JCS can be seen in Eisenhower's decision to send Dulles to Taiwan soon after the start of the Communist Chinese bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu. The official JCS opinion was to allow Chiang Kai-shek to bomb mainland China and to defend Quemoy with American forces if it was attacked. Again, the sole dissenter was Ridgway who argued

[44] Eisenhower, Letter to Emmet Hughes, 10 December 1953; Letter to Edgar N. Eisenhower, 8 November 1954, The Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Presidential Library.

[45] Kinnard, 16.

[46] Memorandum for Record: Conversation Monday, 6 August 1956 in the President's Office, Re: Egypt-Suez, DDRS (1981), 255A.

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that such an action would bring a full scale war with China. Eisenhower rejected the JCS advice, sided with Ridgway, and directed that Dulles attempt to restrain Chiang.[47]

Eisenhower was also acutely aware of the danger that his own staff might screen the flow of information coming to his office. His awareness of this sort of staff behavior dated at least from the early months of World War II. Writing in his memoirs about the allied defeat at Kasserine, Tunisia, he declared that "staffs were too prone to take one isolated piece of intelligence in which they implicitly believed and to shut their eyes to any contrary possibility."[48] He worked hard to counter this same tendency while in the White House. We have already seen that the president was not reluctant to seek the advice of persons in the administration who were outside the normal circle of advisers or who dissented from the majority position. He also sought advice and counsel from a wide circle of friends and associates outside of government. More important, he insisted that his staff present all sides of an issue to him. As noted by one staff member who worked very close to the president, no one who knew him and how he worked would dare try to impede the free flow of information.[49]

He also realized that controlling the flow of statements and policy pronouncements coming out of the White House could be as important in times of crisis as managing his information sources. His public statements were often instruments which he had carefully designed to influence domestic and foreign perceptions about his intentions and to maintain his freedom of action. Nowhere was this effort more apparent than in his behavior during the Offshore Islands crisis when he articulated a deliberately ambiguous position in an attempt to make up for the weaknesses of the massive retaliation doctrine and to avoid inflaming European fears over American impetuousness. As one author has noted, "instead of relying on the certainty of nuclear retaliation to frighten America's opponents, as his critics complained, Ike preferred to keep the Communists guessing."[50] He refused to state what the U.S. would do in the face of a Chinese attack. Indeed, he told his aides shortly before a press conference that if the question of Formosan security came up, he intended to give an answer that no one could understand.[51] Later, during the Suez crisis, Dulles warned the president that ambiguity posed dangers. Nevertheless, Eisenhower concluded that public uncertainty as to the nature of American intentions was tolerable to a certain degree because of the need to safeguard flexibility.

Finally, Eisenhower's own leadership affected crisis decision making in a way that made it more likely that rational, moderate decisions were reached. He placed a great deal of importance on the ability to make calm decisions even

[47] Divine, 56–57.

[48] Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1948) 165.

[49] Lieutenant General Andrew J., Goodpaster, interview with the author, 31 March 1978, West Point, New York.

[50] Divine, 65.

[51] Goodpaster interview.

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when faced with the most extreme circumstances. As he wrote to a very close friend:

> This business of making decisions for America brings me strange experiences. I recall almost daily an observation attributed to Napoleon that went something like this: 'The genius in war is a man that can do the *average* thing when everyone else is growing hysterical or panicky in the excitement of the moment.' . . . the struggle [in presidential decision making] is to apply common sense—to reach the average solution.[52]

Proper staff support was necessary to reach this common sense solution, but just as important was the demeanor of the leader. Eisenhower's calmness in crises is well known. His behavior gave confidence to others and helped create a climate in which careful decisions could be made. In particular, his calmness prevented the domination of the decision-making process by emotion and forced the saber rattlers to argue their positions in an environment that favored the consideration of all options and contingencies.

Shortcomings in the Decision-Making Process

While this examination has been favorable in its assessment of Eisenhower's handling of military force as a foreign policy instrument, it must be noted that problems did exist in the administration's conduct of foreign affairs. A staunch, anticommunist perspective pervaded the advice of many of the key participants in the foreign policy decision-making process. Dulles and Eisenhower constantly had to deal with the bellicose positions of certain conservative members of Congress, such as Senator William Knowland. The resulting ideological content of the policy debate often obscured other considerations. There were problems of policy consistency as well as failures to think through options that were espoused once force was rejected. Finally, some today would argue that Eisenhower's administration was too willing to resort to covert actions and that the skills at managing the military component of foreign policy were not matched by an equal level of performance in other areas.

At times, the focus on anticommunism confused assessments of regional situations. Perhaps the decision making surrounding the sending of troops to Lebanon is the most striking example. Eisenhower and Dulles viewed Nasser, the coup in Iraq, and the danger of a coup in Lebanon almost completely in terms of the global communist threat and largely ignored the development of Arab nationalism. They were justified in identifying vital American interests in the region. Nevertheless, they tended to attribute the troubles they were facing to the wrong causes, and, as a result, may have sought the wrong remedies.[53]

The potential for contradiction among the many factors that Eisenhower habitually weighed in considering the use of force led to problems of consistency

[52] Eisenhower, Letter to Captain Hazlett, 21 July 1953.
[53] Divine, 104.

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in the policy decisions he reached. He refused to intervene in Indochina in 1954 at least partially because the British refused to support the action. In Suez, in 1956, the usual emphasis on allied cooperation was overwhelmed temporarily by other considerations which led to his refusal to support French and British military moves even though they argued that they were acting to defend their vital interests. The goal of united action and the president's reluctance to support ventures he believed were designed to preserve colonialism were often incompatible, as were allied desires to maintain foreign influence and Eisenhower's conception of international law.

While the president was willing to reject the use of American forces to defend the French position in Indochina and the Nationalist Chinese on Quemoy and Matsu, these decisions were coupled with other nonmilitary moves that had unanticipated results. The 1954 defense treaty made by the administration with Taiwan has tied U.S. relations with that country in ways that are still felt today. The decision to give U.S. military aid to the government in South Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva talks had even more serious long-term results. The president was justifiably reluctant to link American prestige to an unstable regime or a questionable cause through the commitment of troops. Nonetheless, he may have underestimated the degree to which American prestige would become involved by the giving of other types of aid. The reasons for these actions may have been a fundamental reluctance to abandon any region to communism. The result was the continuation of an American presence that tied American interests to Indochina almost as surely as would have the use of troops.

Many of the constraints that bound the president in considering the overt use of force did not seem to apply with equal weight when covert operations were being contemplated. Eisenhower believed that covert operations were justifiable instruments in cases where communist subversion posed a clear threat to a strategically important country. Little attempt was made to seek congressional advice or to assay public opinion in these cases. This behavior can partially be explained by the need for security. An equally important explanation, however, can probably be found in an attitude that intelligence operations were fundamentally different from overt uses of force and that they should, therefore, be handled under a different set of rules and constraints. Thus, Eisenhower was willing to use covert means to interfere in the internal politics of Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954 while keeping his actions largely secret from the Congress and from most of his own administration.

The operations conducted by the Eisenhower administration were relatively small in their commitment of resources. Also, since they were covert, they did not risk American prestige in the same way that overt military interventions would. These factors, along with the tremendous pressures of the time to prevent communist takeovers, could justify the management of covert operations as a strictly executive branch function. To a large extent, Eisenhower's covert operations achieved their goals and, considering prevailing attitudes, were justified as necessary supports for the national interest. Nevertheless, contemporary critics

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can argue that the operations were improper infringements in the internal affairs of foreign nations, that they underwrote the power of leaders whose actions would later seriously damage American interests, and that they set precedents for later, less justifiable acts.

Conclusions

Eisenhower's extreme care in using military force as a foreign policy instrument puts him at odds with the conventional assessments of his presidency. Eisenhower did not advocate a rigid policy of brinksmanship under the New Look's doctrine of massive retaliation. Instead, he saw limits to the applicability of nuclear deterrence in many situations. He would not accept proposals that argued that force was an easy or cheap option and he dug into the technical details of such arguments to undermine them. Similarly, he felt that the use of military force irrevocably placed the prestige of the United States in jeopardy and that overwhelming power was necessary if force was to be used at all. Thus he believed that incremental uses of force were unlikely to be effective for both political and military reasons.

Does this mean that the New Look was meaningless and that military action was not a viable option for the general-turned-president? Probably not. Eisenhower's placement of military force on the menu of foreign policy options represented a sincere attempt to lower the costs of containment and to avoid the start of new conflicts. Eisenhower realized, however, that the new doctrine did not simplify the decisions about where, when, and how the U.S. would act to protect its interests. For him, such decisions were the most serious that a president could make. A major accomplishment of his presidency was that he was able to make these decisions in a way that avoided war while still protecting American interests and constitutional procedures.*

* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not those of the Military Academy or the Department of the Army.

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U.S. Decision Making in the Jordan Crisis: Correcting the Record

ADAM M. GARFINKLE

The Jordan Crisis of September 1970 is one of the most frequently mentioned, but least studied, episodes in the recent history of United States Middle East policy. The crisis has become a minor "condensation symbol," not unlike better known incidents such as "Munich" and "Prague Spring."[1] While "Munich" stands for the tragedy of appeasement and "Prague Spring" for the fleeting exception of political reform in Eastern Europe that proves the rule of Soviet repression, the "Jordan Crisis" has come to represent the supposedly positive value of close U.S.-Israeli political and military coordination in the face of Soviet-Arab ties and Soviet ambitions in the Middle East.

Most important international crises are ultimately raised from their historical contexts and simplified into lessons or illustrations of one kind or another. But the Jordan Crisis is unusual because it was seen as quintessentially lesson-bearing from the very beginning—indeed, even before it was over. This was a consequence of three factors: first, the Jordan Crisis was the climactic, largely unexpected, dénouement of the Nixon administration's first major foreign policy

[1] Over the past decade I have noted over forty such offhand references to the Jordan Crisis in English-language literature. The term "condensation symbol" is Doris Graber's. See *Verbal Behavior and Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976), 289–321. Graber's definition is: "Condensation symbols are verbal stimuli which carry little independent information, but which activate a wide variety of similar perceptions and connotations in the listener" (p. 318). The creation and use of such symbols seems to be one way that people "learn from history," for better or worse. For one discussion, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 217–287.

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crisis known as the War of Attrition, which witnessed the introduction of Soviet combat pilots into Egypt.[2] It was, therefore, the object of intense scrutiny as a defining precedent for the U.S. approach to subsequent crises in this and other areas. Second, the crisis was seen by principal U.S. decision makers at the time to be above all else part of a superpower psychodrama in which success at the careful orchestration of words and deeds would cast a long light or shadow over the credibility of U.S. power and the success of its diplomacy. Third, certain of these decision makers actively interpreted the crisis as it was happening for the effect it would have both on the Soviet Union's assessment of U.S. resolve and diplomatic skill and in settling a divisive debate within the government over U.S. Middle East policy.

The argument in which the Jordan Crisis was crafted as evidence for one school and against another revolved around two basic questions. Is the pursuit of U.S. interests in the Middle East best served by pragmatic accommodation with the Soviet Union in the region or by the maximum feasible exclusion of Soviet influence? Depending on the answer, to what extent is the close U.S. relationship with Israel a strategic asset or liability? At that time, the happy ending to the crisis from the American point of view vindicated those within the Nixon administration who argued for the exclusion of the Soviets from the area, in part by denying their clients any benefit from Soviet military aid, and those who saw closer U.S.-Israeli ties as a major asset in this endeavor.[3]

These were not new questions in 1969–70, having previously arisen in different historical contexts: in 1947–48 over the partition of Palestine and the birth of the state of Israel; in 1955–56 with the Egyptian-Czech arms deal and the Suez Crisis; and in other less dramatic episodes as well. These are also contemporary questions that rent the Reagan administration throughout 1981 and 1982, particularly after the Israeli attack on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon in June 1982. The persistence of these issues helps explain why the Jordan Crisis has remained such a lively symbol in academic discourse and policy debates.

Another reason for the popularity of the "Jordan Crisis" as a symbol is its apparent simplicity when seen distortedly in retrospect; lessons seem to leap out at the observer without the usual ambiguities and contradictions.[4] The United

[2] It is true that the U.S. incursion into Cambodia preceded the Jordan Crisis by roughly five months, but the Cambodian invasion touched off more of a domestic than a foreign policy crisis and, unlike the Jordan Crisis, it was planned.

[3] For an example in microcosm of this debate, see the views of Curtis F. Jones and Harvey J. Feldman, "Does a Conspiracy Prevent Us from Pursuing Our Real Mideast Interests?" *Washington Post*, 27 February 1983. For an account of the debate at the time, see Joseph Kraft, "Those Arabists in the State Department," *New York Times Magazine*, 7 November 1971.

[4] Simplicity is a great asset in the construction of evocative political metaphors. For a psychologically oriented discussion, see John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), 101–103; see also Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David Apter, ed. *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: The Free Press, 1968).

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States and Israel acted together decisively, a second U.S. ally, Jordan, was saved, Soviet clients were forced to retreat, their sponsor was dealt a diplomatic setback, and a wider conflict was averted. What could be simpler than that?

The frequency with which the Jordan Crisis has been cited as evidence that Israel is a strategic asset to the United States has given rise, not surprisingly, to efforts to debunk this particular "meaning" of the crisis by reinterpreting or revising the facts. This revisionism is, without exception, simply incorrect in its portrayal of the collision of U.S. and Israeli motives and interests at the time.[5] Ironically, what may be called the majority interpretation rests on an almost universally accepted account of the key points of U.S.-Israeli coordination that is wrong, too.

The truth about the Jordan Crisis is more subtle, more elusive, and more interesting than the contending images that have arisen. This essay aims to correct the historical record and to suggest the origins of the error. No pretense is given that a proper version of events will influence the contest of metaphors over the Jordan Crisis. Dispassionate analysis and the evocative images of political advocacy rarely have much to say to each other.[6]

Reviewing the Record

The first order of business in evaluating the historical record is to identify and review it. Published accounts of the Jordan Crisis that claim to be original research are few, and those that investigate U.S. decision making in any detail are fewer still. The composite account of the crisis that we have today derives from one seminal newspaper account,[7] half a dozen treatments by scholars and journalists — none longer than article length[8] — and three memoirs, one of which is all but useless.[9] The most interesting memoir is then National Security Adviser

[5] For one example see Michael Hudson, "The U.S. Decline in the Middle East: Can It Be Stopped?," *Orbis* 26 (Spring 1982): 21–22. See also notes 23 and 47 below.

[6] See Geertz; Adam M. Garfinkle, *Encounter*, November 1980, 90–91.

[7] Benjamin Welles, "U.S.-Israeli Military Action on Jordan Was Envisioned," *New York Times*, 8 October 1970.

[8] The relevant literature is as follows: Henry Brandon, *The Retreat of American Power* (New York: Doubleday, 1972); Henry Brandon and David Schoenbaum, "Jordan: The Forgotten Crisis," *Foreign Policy*, 10 (Spring 1973); Bernard and Marvin Kalb, *Kissinger* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974); William B. Quandt's chapter on the Jordan Crisis in his book, *Decade of Decisions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Tad Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years* (New York: Vintage Press, 1978); Alan Dowty, "The U.S. and the Syria-Jordan Confrontation of 1970," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 3 (Winter-Spring 1978); Nadav Safran, *Israel: The Embattled Ally* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), 454–455; and Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, "Crisis Management by Military Cooperation with a Small Ally: American-Israeli Cooperation in the Syrian-Jordanian Crisis, September 1970," *Cooperation and Conflict* 17 (1982): 151–62.

[9] Nixon's memoirs on this topic are brief and unexceptional. See Richard Nixon, *RN: Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978). Henry Kissinger's memoirs are fascinating

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Henry Kissinger's, which was written after all of the major nonparticipant research on the crisis was published. Kissinger's version differs from the accepted account in subtle but important ways, although he did much to shape that account in his role as White House "backgrounder" at the time.

What is the story that has been told?

Among the changes that resulted from the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war was the transformation of the Palestinian national movement. From the upheavals of 1947–49 to the eve of the 1967 war, the Palestinian movement had been reduced to a pawn in the Pan-Arabist garbed, but basically competitive, parochial policies of the Arab countries.[10] After the Arab armies' humiliating defeat in 1967, the only military force in the Arab world not humiliated by failure was a small group of Palestinian guerrilla fighters (Fedayeen), supported mainly by Syria, which opposed the Egyptian-sponsored PLO and its subservience to the Arab governments. By 1970 this new Palestinian force had seized control of the organizational corpse of the PLO and established a state-within-a-state in Jordan. They did this by taking advantage of the influx of a quarter million new Palestinian refugees into Jordan on top of Jordan's longstanding Palestinian demographics and the vacillation of Hashemite authority in the face of PLO challenge. In February and June 1970, the Fedayeen found themselves locked in violent confrontation with Hashemite authorities; both times King Hussein backed down. The June disturbances were quite serious and for the first time Jordan's problems were the subject of a Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) meeting.[11]

In the meantime, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser commenced in March 1969 a War of Attrition against Israel designed primarily to raise Israeli costs of maintaining a line of defense on the east bank of the Suez Canal. In response to Egyptian military pressure, Israel conducted commando and deep penetration air raids into Egypt. By April 1970 the war had escalated to the point that Egypt was forced to call upon its Soviet patron to help it fend off Israeli attacks. The Soviets responded by introducing and manning a sophisticated air defense system in Egypt. Soviet pilots also flew combat missions for Egypt against the Israeli air force.

This news greatly disturbed the Nixon White House. The president had en-

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indeed. See his *White House Years*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), 594–631. Itzhak Rabin's memoirs appear in two versions, Hebrew and English. The Hebrew version comes in two volumes and is complete while the English edition is highly condensed and, in places, translated strangely. See Itzhak Rabin, *Pinkas Sheroot* (Tel-Aviv: Ma'ariv Books, 1979), 311–315; and *The Rabin Memoirs* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), 187–189.

[10] For background see Barry Rubin, *The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981).

[11] See Tad Szulc, "Nixon Directs Efforts to Free American Hostages in Amman," *New York Times*, 12 June 1970. For a description of the WSAG and how it functioned see Wilfrid Kohl, "The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System and U.S.-European Relations: Patterns of Policy Making," *World Politics* 28 (October 1975).

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trusted the problems of the Middle East to the State Department while he and Kissinger attended to more pressing and portentous matters: Vietnam and the Sino-American breakthrough. The State Department's policy foundered badly. The Rogers Plan of December 1969, a comprehensive U.S. suggestion for an Arab-Israeli settlement, had attracted no support in the region and had left in its wake a deterioration of U.S.-Israeli ties and closer Soviet-Egyptian relations. While the State Department occupied itself with such other ongoing negotiating efforts as the ill-fated mission of U.N. envoy Gunnar Jarring and the U.S.-Soviet-British-French Four Power Talks and conjured politically impossible proposals on mutual U.S.-Soviet arms limitations in the region, the War of Attrition—and active Soviet participation in it—intensified. The bold Soviet move into Egypt changed the stakes of the conflict as far as Nixon was concerned, and encouraged him and his national security staff to pay closer attention to events and to how the State Department was handling them.

The introduction of SAM-3 missiles and Soviet combat pilots into Egypt, in combination with Soviet diplomatic recalcitrance in other areas of U.S.-Soviet relations, including Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), led Nixon to conclude that the Kremlin was testing him, probing for an opening and an advantage to see how far the new administration could be pushed before it would respond. Nixon saw in Soviet behavior a tactic similar to that which led Nikita Khrushchev to bully John F. Kennedy in Vienna in 1961 and subsequently led to crises over Berlin and Cuba. Nixon was determined to signal the Soviets that he would stand firm. He believed deeply that Moscow would interpret conciliation and compromise from a new administration not as pragmatism but as weakness. Since the main new area for testing U.S. resolve was the Middle East, a new image for U.S. policy in the region would have to be constructed. The State Department's approach was too soft, too region-centered, and thus inappropriate to the larger challenge. If the United States failed to face down the Russians in the Middle East, Moscow would perhaps draw dangerous, globe-spanning conclusions.

By early September 1970, on the eve of the Jordan Crisis, the Nixon White House viewed the Middle East situation in geopolitical terms that far transcended the region. Far more than U.S. interests were at stake in the Middle East; the pillars of the new American foreign policy—"linkage" and the Nixon Doctrine of U.S. reliance on regional allies and proxies armed and supported by the United States—were at risk.[12] The Jordan Crisis became a test case for the new U.S. strategy as a whole, and it was managed and subsequently interpreted to provide the "right" answers to the main questions: Could "linkage" of arms control and trade restrain Soviet adventurism in the world's peripheries? Could the Nixon Doctrine be counted upon to prevent local defeats and minimize the potential for direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation?

[12] On the linkage policy, see James Chace, *A World Elsewhere: The New American Foreign Policy* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), and my review of it in *Orbis* 17 (Winter 1974).

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The process of the White House's supplanting the State Department in decision making about the Middle East did not happen all at once. As national security adviser, Kissinger had disagreed with the State Department's approach from the start, but Nixon had instructed him to concentrate on other matters. It was not until the Middle East situation percolated to the top that Nixon set Kissinger to work on it. Nixon's fears were kindled in April, but it was not until after the August cease-fire to the War of Attrition, arranged by Secretary of State William P. Rogers with the president's blessing,[13] that the White House began to dominate U.S. Middle East policy on a day-to-day basis. This was because the cease-fire was violated immediately and massively by the Egyptians, and while the State Department tried to ignore the violations and belittle Israel's concerns, Nixon was convinced that the Soviets were complicit in them.[14] Kissinger strongly supported the president's view.

The cease-fire violations confirmed Nixon's earlier suspicions about Soviet policy, reinforced his critical view of the State Department's approach, secured Kissinger's influence over U.S. Middle East policy, and buttressed Nixon's belief that Moscow had to be actively disabused of its intent to trample U.S. interests in the region. The Jordan Crisis provided the United States with the first opportunity after the cease-fire violations to show its resolve. While one consequence of the cease-fire—the violations—was taken as a challenge to the United States, a second spin-off—civil war in Jordan—provided the chance to respond.

The Rogers cease-fire of 7 August had included Jordan as well as Israel and Egypt among its list of adherents. Both the United States and Jordan looked forward to the peace talks that were to follow the cessation of hostilities. Washington believed Jordan should be part of any settlement, as dictated by U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, and the Jordanians, for their part, sought the maximum benefit from U.S. diplomacy by casting their lot with Egypt, by far the strongest and most important of the Arab belligerents. Jordan was obligated under the terms of the cease-fire to police its border with Israel against Fedayeen infiltration. Hussein's agreement to this condition, Nasser's "betrayal" of the Palestinian cause in pursuing a political settlement with Israel, and the Fedayeen's own hubris led to new uprisings against the Jordanian authorities. While the main PLO faction, Yasir Arafat's al-Fatah, desired something short of civil war, the smaller splinter organizations of the PLO, particularly George Habash's Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), sought civil war. Not only would civil war bring an end to the "reactionary" Hashemite monarchy—and of this they were supremely confident—but it would also vault the PFLP to the head of the Palestinian revolution. Habash had often referred

[13] Despite Nixon's concern with the deterioration of the U.S. image in the Middle East, he feared a wider conflict that carried the risk of U.S.-Soviet fighting at a time when U.S. forces were committed in Vietnam. Moreover, Israel favored the cease-fire.

[14] In this case, the evidence is that Nixon was correct. See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Red Star Over the Nile* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 124–26.

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to the PFLP as the bolshevik faction of the PLO, and now the time had come to seize the revolution. With Jordan in revolutionary hands and with Syria and Iraqi support, Nasser would have no choice but to return Egypt to the battle. The PFLP commenced its scheme by hijacking four international airline flights to Jordan on 6 and 7 September 1970.

After this new and embarrassing indignity, Hussein finally resolved to break the back of the Fedayeen in Jordan. On 16 September, Hussein formed a military government and the next morning unleashed his Bedouin-led forces on the PLO. The United States applauded this move, which it had been urging upon the king even before the hijackings. The initial American contribution to the Jordanian effort against the PLO was a series of steadily escalating military signals (especially U.S. naval forces' movement toward the area) aimed at a variety of targets: the PFLP, the Soviet Union and its regional clients (especially Syria and Iraq), and by way of reassurance, Jordan and Israel. Nixon delivered a tough law-and-order speech on 16 September in which he denounced the Palestinian guerrillas and warned against Syrian and Iraqi intervention. On 17 September, Nixon reinforced the message in two interviews he gave in Chicago. He said that the United States "was prepared to intervene directly in the Jordanian war should Syria or Iraq enter the conflict and tip the military balance against forces loyal to the government."[15] He also hinted that it might not be such a bad thing if the Soviets thought him capable of reckless and unpredictable actions. In the meantime, in the White House, the WSAG, under Kissinger's leadership, was sending confidential, sharply worded statements to the Soviet government and directing the movement of U.S. military forces around the globe.

For about two days everything seemed to be going well from the U.S. perspective. The PLO was losing ground in Amman and had been expelled entirely from the southern part of Jordan.[16] The PFLP had taken Nixon's warnings seriously; they released most of the airplane passengers, moved the rest, and blew up the airplanes on 12 September lest they create a convenient target for a rescue operation. Soviet statements had been uncharacteristically meek, and the Syrians and the Iraqis had done nothing but talk. This, together with Nixon's decision on 1 September to approve a major weapons sale to Israel that had been held up for months at the State Department's behest, played well in the U.S. less than two months before the 1970 mid-term elections. Up to this point Nixon and Kissinger believed their policies to have been successful. Despite sharp warnings from the Defense Department about how limited and inadequate U.S. interventionary capabilities were in the eastern Mediterranean because of deployments in Southeast Asia, the White House relied heavily on military signals and warnings with

[15] *Chicago Sun-Times*, 17 September 1970 and Hedrick Smith, "Soviet Cautions in Jordan Crisis, U.S. Weights Role," *New York Times*, 19 September 1970. Nixon's interest in using these interviews to signal the Russians is unmistakable. Nixon later congratulated Peter Lisagor, the journalist who wrote the *Sun-Times* story, even though he had broken the ground rules concerning direct quotation. See Brandon and Schoenbaum, 164; Quandt, 114; and Kalb and Kalb, 198.

[16] See Neville Brown, "Jordanian Civil War," *Military Review* 51 (September 1971).

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military implications. The White House thought the possibility of an actual U.S. intervention in Jordan was very remote; the stronger the diplomatic posture, the more remote it would be.

On the evening of 18 September, everything changed. Small contingents of Syrian armored divisions crossed into Jordan, followed by a massive Syrian invasion the next morning. Syrian armor, masquerading as Palestinian-directed divisions of the Palestine Liberation Army, progressed rapidly and ominously, forcing Jordanian units into disorganized retreat. In their wake, the PLO established "liberated" provinces of Jordan.

When news of the Syrian intervention reached Washington, the president's first reaction was to suspect the Soviets of having instigated it. First the Soviets had gotten the Egyptians to violate the cease-fire and now they were using the Syrians to wreck it altogether. The Syrian invasion bolstered the president's and Kissinger's theory that the Soviets were testing the mettle of the United States. Recent reports that the Soviets were constructing a submarine base at Cienfuegos, Cuba—with all the dark connotations that Soviet activity in Cuba conveyed—did nothing to disabuse them of this theory. The Soviets were stonewalling the SALT and Berlin negotiations, complicating North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) relations and the administration's relations with Congress, and now they were attacking the U.S. position in the Middle East. In the American view, this invasion transformed matters from a local crisis with special international implications into an international U.S.-Soviet crisis with a regional dimension.

Some WSAG principals remained unconvinced that the Russians were behind the Syrian invasion, but the President's theory held sway. At the very least everyone agreed the Soviets must have had some foreknowledge and that they failed to prevent the Syrian intervention even while Moscow was claiming it was exercising restraint. For the president only the finest of lines existed between abetting and not preventing the Syrian invasion. Nixon saw the strong hint of Soviet complicity as an opportunity to get tough with the Soviets. If it were true that the Soviets were trying to restrain the Syrians, then a tough policy could only increase Soviet pressure on Damascus, increase the Syrian assessment of the probability of U.S. intervention, and thus have a deterrent effect. If it were not true—and Nixon firmly believed this—then it was now time to show the Soviets that they could not run over U.S. interests without also running risks. Nixon aimed at getting the Russians to put pressure on Syria to withdraw their army from Jordan.

As the Jordanian situation on the battlefield worsened, on 19 September King Hussein, through his Premier Zaid Rifai, asked U.S. Ambassador L. Dean Brown to relay a request for help. Hussein did not seek Israeli assistance, but rather a U.S. or a joint U.S.-British effort. His position was fragile, and becoming desperate. It was clear as later became evident that he would accept help in the pinch even from Israel. As the possibility of a Jordanian military defeat at the hands of the Syrians loomed before Hussein, American assurances be-

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came very important. Assurances were forthcoming, but they were frighteningly vague. Hussein tried to pin the Americans down, for time was of the essence. It is less than fifty miles from the Syrian border to Amman and mainly downhill; from Irbid in northern Jordan a rapid Syrian attack could reach the outskirts of the capital within twenty-four hours. Hussein never did get the Americans to tell him exactly what they planned to do to save him if it came down to an intervention. The reason was simple: until late in the evening of 21 September, if then, there was no plan.

The Syrian attack meant that the WSAG might be forced to make some quick decisions about whether or not to honor its assurances to Hussein, and if so, how to do so before it was too late. On 19 September the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) prepared a memorandum for the president outlining the forces on hand. It was disturbing. The Pentagon's counsel to the WSAG had been pessimistic all along. As early as 4 September, when the JCS met to discuss the military implications of the Egyptian cease-fire violations, things looked bad in part because U.S. allies in Europe were proving uncooperative. The British wanted no part of an operation to help Hussein. The Italians restricted use of their bases to NATO-related matters. Spain refused to provide a staging ground as it had in 1958 for the British. There was no arrangement with Greece, and the French were "neutral." The Turks specified that the C-130s based at Incirlik were available for "humanitarian purposes only." In particular, the absence of overflight rights across southern Europe to the Middle East meant that U.S. forces in Germany would have to fly north over the North Sea, down the English Channel, through the Straits of Gibraltar and then all the way across the Mediterranean; but there were not enough tanker aircraft to permit such operations. Only seagoing Marine and naval forces were usable in a Middle East contingency situation, and U.S. forces on hand were inadequate to deal with the Soviet squadron in a conventional confrontation without a massive U.S. redeployment from Southeast Asia.[17]

The movement of U.S. naval forces toward the area, ordered after the hijackings earlier in September, had been helpful both diplomatically and militarily. But in the latter respect it was inadequate for two reasons: the Soviet response, which had been unprecedented, and the lack of time. As early as 9 September, when the *Independence* was ordered into the eastern Mediterranean, it was trailed conspicuously by a Petya Class-2 Soviet escort.[18] When the *Saratoga* and the *Kennedy* later arrived in the area, Soviet tactics went well beyond those used previously. Instead of assigning one "tattletale" (monitoring ship) to each U.S. task force, the Soviets intermingled their ships with U.S. ships. More specifically, a small Soviet gun destroyer or frigate would remain in visual contact with a U.S. carrier, while a Soviet destroyer or cruiser equipped with surface-to-

[17] See Elmo Zumwalt, *On Watch: A Memoir* (New York: Quadrangle, 1976).

[18] Interviews with Defense Department officials and staff members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, D.C., 1978–79.

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surface missiles would sail within firing range of the carrier. The ship-to-ship missile-equipped (SSM) ships generally had as an escort another Soviet ship with surface-to-air missiles to provide cover against attack aircraft based on the U.S. carrier. This triple combination of a "tattletale," an SSM-fitted ship, and a SAM escort is known as a surface action group. Admiral Isaac Kidd, Jr., commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, wrote that ". . . there were some forty ships standing-to in what resembled an international boat show."[19] While the Soviets issued no provocative signals, this configuration gave U.S. commanders pause. It also forced the fleet to consider its own defense as it had not been required to do in the past.

The U.S. Navy adopted the technique of trailing the trailer to "prevent them from preventing us from launching our planes" by knocking out cruise missiles before they took off.[20] But the need to keep planes on the carriers for fleet defense substantially reduced the number of sorties the naval air force could manage. There was also another problem. The eastern Mediterranean is one of the most heavily trafficked commercial airways in the world. To be certain that the blips on the radar were not Soviet aircraft, it was necessary to intercept and identify nearly everything in the sky. This took a heavy toll of planes, fuel, maintenance hours, man-hours, and planning flexibility.[21]

The problem of timing was illustrated vividly by the JCS memorandum to the WSAG of 19 September. That memorandum indicated that those forces that could reach the battlefield in time were insufficient to do the job, and those forces that were adequate were days away. In particular, both the *Kennedy* and the *Guam*, with its 2,814 Marines, were too far away to be of use.[22]

The president and Kissinger now knew for certain that if the Syrians intended to rush toward Amman to topple Hussein, the United States could not count on being able to stop them with the forces on hand. Were the Soviets, through Syria, calling the U.S. bluff? Now that the United States had played the brinksman and elevated the crisis by putting its prestige on the line, could Washington back down? It was at this point that a standing Israeli offer to coordinate policy attracted serious attention.

For their part, the Israelis were not prepared to watch Hussein fall to the PLO, which would probably turn around and invite Russians to Amman. Israel had helped rescue Hussein before and had contingency plans to do so again if necessary. But Israel did not wish to act independently in Jordan unless it was absolutely necessary.[23] One of Israel's major policy goals at the time was to repair

[19] Admiral Isaac Kidd, Jr., "View From the Bridge of the Sixth Fleet Flagship," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 92 (February 1972): 27; and author's interview with Admiral Kidd in Pittsburgh, Pa., March 1982.

[20] Zumwalt, 301.

[21] Interview with Admiral Kidd.

[22] The memorandum is replicated in part in Zumwalt, 229.

[23] The Kalbs reported erroneously that the Israelis did not wish U.S. intervention along with their own. See Kalb and Kalb, 206.

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badly strained relations with the United States, and there were good reasons why a joint intervention was more to Israel's liking. First, the use of U.S. forces might have the effect of paralyzing or reducing both Arab resistance and the Soviet inclination to interdict Israeli forces. It would leave no doubt about the power of the intervention and the dangers of trying to oppose it. Second, U.S. intervention would provide a sort of tripwire, making it more likely that Washington would come to Israel's aid if it got into trouble. Third, a joint intervention could be played well to Israel's benefit in Washington. As it turned out, the United States became reluctant about using U.S. forces, believing that in the long run it might do more to hurt Hussein than to help him.

The offer of Israeli coordination was an outgrowth of close consultations that had been going on ever since the hijackings and longstanding U.S.-Israeli intelligence contacts. Until the WSAG began to appreciate just how serious the Syrians might be, however, Israeli offers seemed irrelevant to most and impurely motivated to some.

After a series of pressurized WSAG meetings on 20 September and other smaller meetings that evening involving Nixon, Kissinger, Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, and Kissinger's military aide, Alexander M. Haig, a decision was taken to contact the Israelis and tell them of Hussein's anxious and remarkable plea for help. Kissinger reached Israeli Ambassador Itzhak Rabin by phone in New York that evening, informed him of Hussein's request, and asked if Israel could provide near real-time (lagging behind events by hours instead of days) intelligence for the United States. In the conversation Rabin got the impression that Kissinger was trying to get the answer to a question without having to ask it, and so Rabin asked Kissinger whether the United States was endorsing an Israeli air strike into Jordan if the intelligence warranted one. Or was he merely playing postman? Rabin also asked what the U.S. attitude would be if the Egyptians or the Soviets tried to interfere. Kissinger told Rabin that only the president could answer such questions. After conversing with Nixon and Sisco in the White House bowling alley, Kissinger called Rabin back and told him that the U.S. would "look favorably upon an Israeli air attack," make good any material losses, and "do our utmost to prevent Soviet interference."[24] Rabin told Kissinger that he would fly back to Washington immediately and that Prime Minister Golda Meir, who was with him in New York, would leave for Israel to direct operations from that end.

Early next morning, 21 September, the Israelis told the United States that air strikes alone would not be enough—ground attacks might be required as well. Rabin asked Kissinger what the U.S. attitude would be in that case, and Kissinger again brought the question to the president. Nixon decided not to convene the National Security Council (NSC) or the WSAG to discuss the matter; he told Kissinger to tell Rabin "go." But Kissinger delayed an immediate answer and a while later convinced the president to put the matter before the WSAG. The main

[24] Kissinger, 623 and Rabin, *Pinkas Sheroot*, 312.

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order of business, naturally, concerned the American attitude to an Israeli ground operation and, as Nixon had anticipated, his advisers were not of a single mind.[25]

The Errors

The scholarly literature makes a number of crucial mistakes in describing the events of 21 September. The evidence rests on three pillars: the retrospective evaluation of these scholarly works against a careful reading of Kissinger's and Rabin's memoirs, both of which appeared after the scholarly accounts were published; second, interviews and conversations I held with hitherto untapped sources;[26] and last but not least, by way of corroboration, the inherent logic of the circumstances.

The literature claims that on the morning of 21 September, after hearing the Israeli intelligence report, Nixon authorized Kissinger to work out with Rabin a joint U.S.-Israeli intervention in Jordan. The authorization was said to have been motivated partly by the U.S. desire to maintain as much control as possible over events, since it was obvious that Israel would intervene alone if need be. Israel already had prepared an intervention plan that called for air strikes combined with an armored invasion of Jordan to interdict Syrian forces near Irbid. On the 21st, it is said, as the situation on the ground changed, Hussein changed his mind a number of times about the sort of intervention he wanted, and the U.S. and Israel struggled to take Jordanian requests into consideration. That evening Hussein is said to have shifted positions again, requesting Israeli intervention by air against the Syrians in Jordan, but ground intervention only in Syria itself.

Whatever the accuracy of this particular account, Israel did review the possibility of undertaking ground action in Syria, and this raised a number of thorny problems. First, a ground strike into Syria alone might not be sufficient to stop Syrian armor already in Jordan. Second, the Israelis had staged a noisy, obvious, and ostentatious mobilization along the Golan Heights to achieve a maximum deterrent effect; this had been done independent of Washington. These troops and their officers were prepared to cross the border and turn south toward Irbid, not north toward Damascus. Changing orders and plans at the last minute was risky business. Third, after consulting with the Israeli cabinet, Rabin told Kis-

[25] Kissinger, 625.

[26] I refer here to conversations I had in 1979–80 with Alexander M. Haig, Senator Henry M. Jackson, and Joseph Sisco in particular. I also interviewed: Ambassador L. Dean Brown (U.S. Ambassador to Jordan at the time of the crisis); Robert Pranger (Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs); Samuel Hoskinson (NSC Staff); Harold B. Saunders (NSC Staff); Helmut Sonnenfeldt (NSC Staff); Admiral Isaac Kidd, Jr. (Commander, Sixth Fleet); Seymour Weiss (Office of Policy Planning, Department of State); and a number of Israeli and Jordanian officials that I am not at liberty to identify.

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singer that Israeli ground action into Syria carried with it a much greater risk of Egyptian and Soviet intervention against Israel. If Israel were to move into Syria, Israel wanted Nixon himself to provide ironclad, written guarantees of U.S. assistance in the event of such intervention.

Another matter also had to be dealt with. The Jordanians had strongly indicated their preference that an intervention to save the monarchy not be by Israel alone but that U.S. and British forces participate as well. For its own reasons Israel felt the same way. British intervention was always a very remote prospect. But it was the United States, once the prospects for intervention began to look real, that was reticent about using its own forces and sought to minimize its involvement in any joint plan. It was not that the Israelis were trying to maximize the U.S. participation; the question was, what exactly would the Americans do? William B. Quandt and Bernard and Marvin Kalb tell us that in the "contingency planning" it was clear that the United States "could not just be an onlooker," but they do not tell us what role the U.S. forces were to play. Other sources indicate that the U.S. role was limited to seizing the airport outside of Amman where there were no Syrians, no chance of running into any Russians, and where the U.S. nationals who had been hijacked earlier in the month might still be.[27]

According to the commonly accepted version of events, as plans were being worked out and refined by Kissinger and Rabin, Hussein issued a fresh appeal late the evening of the 21st, announcing that more Syrian troops were pouring across the border. For the umpteenth time Hussein tried unsuccessfully to get the United States to tell him exactly what it was doing to help him. Ambassador Brown, who was with Hussein in his bunker most of the time, got the impression that they were not being told all there was to know. What there was to know would not have pleased Hussein, and that concerned the Israeli plan to attack first from the air and, if that did not turn the tide, to invade Jordan on the ground. If that did not finish the job, Israel would invade Syria as a last resort. All the scholarly literature claims that upon hearing Hussein's final plea that evening, Nixon approved the Israeli plan and agreed to provide Israel an "umbrella" against a Soviet or an Egyptian attack if it came to that.[28]

Quandt's version of events does indicate—in a short explanatory footnote—that "Israel asked for clarification of the United States position on seven points. This was given orally. Both sides relied on these oral undertakings in planning their subsequent moves."[29] But Quandt clearly implies that the seven clarifications sought by Israel were promptly received and fully acceptable to Jerusalem and were part and parcel of the joint "plan." But what were these seven clarifications? Quandt does not tell us nor does any other scholar. From the context, however, certain inferences can be drawn about the content of U.S.-Israeli discus-

[27] The plan to seize the airport is mentioned in Welles and in Safran, 454.

[28] Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, 330, claims that the okay was given on the 22nd in the afternoon. This has got to be a mistake.

[29] Quandt, 117, fn. 21.

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sions; they do not lead to the conclusion that these points of clarification were as marginal as is implied in the literature.

Not more than fifteen hours elapsed between the supposed U.S. decision to work out a joint contingency plan with Israel and the plan's supposed approval.[30] Working out all the details of a joint plan to mutual satisfaction in such a short time, especially if it included an American umbrella against the Soviets, would have been quite a feat. Clearly, some of the seven clarifications Israel sought had to do in large part with the specifics of this "umbrella" and what sort of Soviet or Egyptian actions would trigger the umbrella's coming into force. Israel was concerned about a number of things; the JCS were not the only ones aware of how limited the U.S. intervention capability was. If the Pentagon was so reluctant to intervene against the Syrians for lack of adequate capability, how much more reluctant would they be to take on the Russians? If the United States pledged to take the airport near Amman, what residual forces did the United States have on hand to protect Israel? If both Israeli and U.S. paratroopers got into trouble, whom would the United States help first, and how?[31]

The truth is that the WSAG meeting on 21 September did not "authorize" the working out of a joint U.S.-Israeli contingency plan; rather, the crude semblance of such a plan evolved piecemeal as Kissinger and Rabin discussed the implications of an Israeli ground attack, especially one into Syria. Both sides believed that Egyptian intervention was more than just hypothetical, and Rabin demanded specific written assurances from the United States about what it would do in such an event. Coordination against Egypt was more important and more complicated than coordination against the Soviets, because the Israelis could not hope to engage the Russians as equals. But against Egypt, it was important to know who would do what, lest U.S. and Israeli forces get in each other's way. In these conversations, Kissinger evidently did provide some oral assurances. But in light of the military situation, he evaded others and was extremely reticent about putting anything in writing. Indeed, throughout most of the day Rabin tried to get the United States to specifically commit itself to both possible Egyptian and Soviet contingencies. Possibly he was aware that U.S. commitments might outlive the immediate crisis and serve as useful precedents later on.[32] Rabin refers to these protracted discussions not as "coordination" but as "negotiation."[33]

Insofar as Kissinger and Rabin reached an agreement on the 21st, it was in-

[30] The decision to work out a joint plan was made supposedly during a WSAG meeting that began at 8:30 a.m. on the 21st; approval was supposedly given around 10:00 p.m. that evening.

[31] In the scholarly literature the only account that is at all sensitive to these matters is Safran, probably because he is better hooked into Israeli sources than the rest.

[32] Kissinger was also aware of the precedential nature of U.S.-Israeli discussions. Indeed, after the crisis had abated, the United States sent Israel a note on 25 September stating, in part, that " . . . all aspects of the exchanges between us . . . are no longer applicable, and we understand that Israel agrees." See Kissinger, 631.

[33] Rabin, 313.

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complete from the Israeli point of view and altogether too loose. Quandt's assumption that U.S. assurances given orally sufficed to tie up the package as far as Israel was concerned is almost certainly in error. Washington was unwilling to be any more specific with Israel than it was in the constant but vague assurances it gave to Hussein. Thus, while Nixon did surely endorse Israeli air strikes into Jordan, he never "authorized" an Israeli ground attack of any kind—even though he would have done so had it not been for Kissinger's intercession on the morning of the 21st. Nor did Nixon ever pledge in unequivocal terms that the United States would protect the Israeli rear flank against possible Soviet or Egyptian intervention, as is universally claimed in the scholarly literature.

Even the event that supposedly triggered the "final decision" to approve the "plan" late on the 21st—Hussein's desperate eleventh hour plea—may never have occurred. Kissinger's account mentions nothing about a plea from Hussein on the evening of the 21st. Instead, Kissinger says that the NSC meeting of 6:00 P.M. "confined itself to factual briefings and concluded that no decision was needed until sometime the next day."[34] For the time being, wrote Kissinger, Israeli mobilization was all that was required to promote the aims of U.S. diplomacy. Alexander Haig, Kissinger's assistant for military affairs, remembers no such late plea from Hussein nor any specific pledge of a U.S. umbrella.[35] Furthermore, there is no indication in Kissinger's or Rabin's accounts that anything happened after that NSC meeting to force approval of any "plan." The United States was putting off all decisions as long as possible in the hope that none would have to be made. Kissinger says nothing about the United States having given Israel a green light anytime that evening, or later, with respect to a ground attack either into Jordan or Syria. As it turned out, Jordanian action on the 22nd made a final decision unnecessary.[36] Rabin's memoirs contain perhaps the most explicit denial of all. On a question of military supply aid, says Rabin, "they answer positively," but on the matter of an American umbrella, he says only that "they considered it with difficulty."[37]

Thus, while U.S. diplomacy attempted—and evidentally succeeded—to give an impression of maximum risk of U.S. intervention and maximum political control over U.S.-Israeli coordination during the latter stages of the crisis and thereafter, the reality was far less solid and far more dangerous. President Nixon never assured the Israelis of U.S. support specifically enough to suit them, partly because he believed that the Soviets were about to unleash Nasser at the Suez Canal

[34] Kissinger, 627.

[35] Interview with Alexander Haig, December 1979.

[36] Only Szulc claims that Hussein used his air force before U.S. assurances were conveyed to him on the 22nd, and in this he is evidently correct; at least Kissinger's account seems to corroborate it. (Kissinger, 628). It is, however, strikingly ironic that Szulc, whose main theme in *The Illusion of Peace*, vi, is that it "is an understatement to say that we were often as not fed mistruths and led astray" by Nixon and Kissinger, never suspected the truth about the Jordan Crisis. In a sense, he missed his own point.

[37] Rabin, 313. The Hebrew transliterates as "hit-khav-tu kash-ot."

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where his military situation had been much improved by the cease-fire violations. Nixon believed that Egypt would intervene if Israel moved into Syria and probably if Israel moved into Jordan.[38] The specter of U.S. troops fighting Egyptians was bad enough; the chance that the Soviets would wish to help the Egyptians or be forced to by the naval minuet was a risk not to be taken lightly.

This does not mean that had the Soviets or the Egyptians tried to prevent or defeat an Israeli move into Jordan or Syria that the United States would have done nothing. For one thing, the intertwining of U.S. and Soviet naval forces was so thorough that neither side could have engaged in combat or in active support of an ally without setting off a confrontation. In other words, the U.S. commitment to fight was intrinsic to the military situation as well as to the fabric of the crisis itself. This explains why, in the afterglow of "victory," there was joy in the White House but only sighs of relief at the Pentagon where the dangers of the military situation far outweighed the diplomatic psychodrama with the Soviets. Had Israel found it necessary to intervene on the ground, it is very likely that lacking a specific U.S. umbrella it would have done so only in Jordan, for this was less likely to serve as *casus belli* for the Egyptians or the Soviets. If the United States had been forced to come to Israel's aid, it might very well have turned into an ignoble episode in American military history.

As it turned out, of course, no U.S. or Israeli intervention was necessary. The string of U.S. assurances to Hussein and the curious absence of the Syrian air force emboldened Hussein to unleash his own small air force on the Syrian invaders. Neither Hussein nor the United States counted on the continued passivity of the Syrian air force. That is why Jordan waited so long before using its own air force. Dog fights between the Syrian air force, counting within it many dozen MIG-21 fighters, and Jordan's air force, which consisted of thirty-two British-made Hunter jet aircraft, would have been a disaster for Hussein.[39] To his delight Jordan's air force hurt the Syrians badly; they fled. By the end of the 22nd the most dangerous phase of the crisis was over. The Jordanians then defeated the PLO within a few weeks. Roughly a year later the Jordanian army expelled the remnant of the PLO from their refuge in the forests of Ajlun in a very bloody postscript to the civil war.

Why The Errors?

Why is it that every published nonparticipant account of the Jordan Crisis makes the error of claiming either explicitly or implicitly that Nixon approved the Israeli plan in its entirety, including the provision of an American umbrella for Israel, when he did not do so? In order to understand how honest and reputable people could have been collectively wrong, it is necessary to remember

[38] See Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace*, 328.

[39] See T. N. Dupuy and W. Blanchard, eds., *World Almanac of Military Power*, 2nd ed., (New York: R. R. Bowker Co., 1972), 174–6.

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that the primary aim of the president and Kissinger from the beginning of the crisis was to signal the Soviet Union of U.S. resolve and tenacity. This was necessary not only to patch the holes in U.S. Middle East policy, but to save the very foundations of the new U.S. diplomatic strategy. Therefore, when Kissinger, as anonymous administration 'backgrounder" for the crisis, gave interviews to journalists Benjamin Welles, Henry Brandon, and later the Kalbs, he appears to have deliberately "filled in the gaps" in U.S. decision making in order to drive home the intended message to the Soviets, if not also to other foreign and domestic audiences. In other words, the story of the resolute deal between Israel and the United States was, in the words of one WSAG principal, "apocryphal."[40] Anyone who has watched Kissinger's public career and read his memoirs with care understands his skill with the artful telling and retelling of complex truths and his propensity to use that skill. It seems that while Kissinger was willing to embellish the truth during the last stages of the crisis for good purposes, he was still too respectful of history to introduce unnecessary error into his memoirs nine years later. In his book *White House Years* Kissinger avoids mentioning the details of the supposed U.S.-Israeli arrangement. At the crucial stage in the narrative—the morning of September 21—Kissinger suddenly leaves off his hour-by-hour account with a curious disclaimer: "From here on an hour-by-hour account is no longer necessary, the main issues having become defined during the night's events."[41] Yet in the interviews he gave to Welles, Brandon, and the Kalbs in fall 1970, Kissinger bent over backwards to stress the events of this very period.

The administration's determination to orchestrate a tough, resolute image after the fact was evident in other actions as well. After the Syrians were beaten and in retreat Kissinger sought out the Soviet chargé d'affaires, Yuri Vorontsov, at a reception in, of all places, the Egyptian-interest section of the Indian embassy in Washington on the night of the 22 September 1970. His presence caused quite a stir. Kissinger pulled Vorontsov aside and gave him a tongue lashing, ending with the command: "Look, you and your client started it, and you have to end it."[42] On 26 September to make the point sharper still, Nixon flew to Rome and from there to the carrier *Saratoga* to emphasize the role of American military preparations in the crisis. He did all he could to convey the image of a triumphant commander-in-chief. The Soviets were reportedly annoyed by Nixon's diplomatic theater and, not surprisingly, made some naval "gestures" of their own after the danger of collision had passed in order to offset the impression being produced in Washington.[43]

The post hoc manipulation of the Jordan Crisis by Kissinger and Nixon was

[40] This was Robert Pranger's expression.

[41] Kissinger, 625.

[42] Kalb and Kalb, 207; Brandon and Schoenbaum, 168; and Brandon, 137.

[43] It is, evidently, Moscow's style to posture militarily only when it is riskless. See Francis Fukuyama, "Nuclear Shadowboxing: Soviet Intervention in the Middle East," *Orbis* 25 (Fall 1981): 579–605.

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deliberate, skillful, and, by the light of the time, justifiable. But it shows us that the accuracy of historical scholarship is a sometimes thing. Inaccuracy can be a relatively straightforward consequence of sloth and indolence but the network of peer criticism presumably catches such errors most of the time. More frequently errors arise from the deliberate efforts of "informants," to borrow a shared term-of-the-art from anthropology and criminology, to mislead researchers for various reasons. Or they arise from conscious or unconscious bias in the researcher himself. The chance that errors emanating from these sources can remain longstanding is greater, in the first instance, when the veracity of sources is difficult to verify or discredit because of the inherent scarcity of privileged knowledge from participants. In the second instance, the prospects of longstanding error are greatest when scholars working on a given subject are both few in number and in possession of a similar array of intellectual predilections. When these two conditions are simultaneously present there is a powerful possibility of longstanding error. Moreover, when scholars are reputable people in their respective fields, there is a tendency for inadvertent error to be compounded unknowingly in secondary and tertiary accounts and this makes correction all the more difficult.

In scholarly accounts of U.S. decision making in the Jordan Crisis, all of the dangerous conditions that predispose research to error were present. Key "informants" were few, being exclusively members of the WSAG, and most of them were not privy to the most intimate negotiations; crucial post hoc accounts of the crisis were deliberately misleading in important respects. Some informants were still fighting the bureaucratic scuffles of the past, some were protecting reputations, and others may have had an interest in historical revisionism for any number of reasons. The most interesting case of the latter, of course, is Kissinger's role as "backgrounder."

The scholars and journalists who wrote accounts at closest hand did share to a substantial degree similar predilections. They were all Americans, they were all familiar with the workings of government, and some served in government. None examined the Jordan Crisis in order to draw broad conclusions about U.S. society or capitalist economics. On the contrary, the main accounts of the crisis were directed toward far more modest objectives: the recording of a definitive history of the crisis for its own sake and for its biographical relevance about the decision makers, the examination of the decision-making routines in the crisis for what it could tell us about theories of crisis behavior, and especially, debating the efficacy of U.S. diplomatic tactics in the Middle East and the wisdom of the thinking reflected in them. While the authors of the main accounts may have differed over how best to achieve U.S. objectives in the area or the priority of those objectives, they shared to a considerable degree the general definition of U.S. interests and an awareness of the sorts of policy tools appropriate for advancing them. Taken together, the paucity and dissimulating character of key informants, combined with the relative homogeneity of outlook and intent of the researchers, is what apparently led to error.

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Conclusions: New Lessons?

Even though the president, Kissinger, most WSAG principals, and the JCS knew the crisis in truth was not all that it was made to be, most still believed that U.S. policy had been successful. Indeed, the post hoc interpretation of the crisis manufactured by Kissinger was believed responsible for that success at least in part. The United States had supposedly faced down the Russians and had shown that the U.S. preoccupation in Southeast Asia did not paralyze U.S. policy elsewhere. Hussein's throne had been saved, the "terrorists" defanged, the Syrians bloodied, and the Iraqis embarrassed by their own passivity. The Chinese—with whom the Nixon administration was trying to establish relations—were shown that the United States was an ally worth having.

On a different level, Nixon saw the Jordan Crisis as evidence that the Nixon Doctrine worked and that "linkage" policies designed to restrain Soviet policy could be made to work as long as U.S. strength and resolve remained untainted. When the Soviet position in Egypt deteriorated to the point of Soviet expulsion in the summer of 1972, Nixon and Kissinger took credit for it. On the one hand, they reasoned, the closeness of U.S.-Israeli relations warned Moscow that under no conditions would the Soviet Union be allowed to provide the Egyptians a war-winning military potential. On the other hand, the flowering of détente gave the Soviets something to lose if they tried. Anwar Sadat reasoned that the Soviets would not jeopardize their relations with the United States in order to prepare Egypt for a major war that it probably could not win. Besides, if the diplomatic path to peace was to be pursued, the closeness of U.S.-Israeli ties made it obvious that, as Sadat later put it, the United States held 99 percent of the cards. The Russians would not or could not help Egypt militarily, and their presence prevented Egypt from engaging U.S. diplomacy. So the Soviets were expelled.

These "lessons," however, did not correspond to reality. Washington had talked and signaled itself to the brink of war over Jordan despite cautious counsel from the Pentagon and wound up facing a military situation for which it was unprepared. The Vietnam War did limit what the United States could do elsewhere, in the Middle East and Europe. It was for this reason, in part, that America's European allies were reluctant to draw on local NATO stocks to help Hussein in his hour of need.

Hussein had been saved, but not necessarily by the United States. It was, after all, Hussein's own air force and army that dispatched the Syrians, and if the Syrian air force was deterred from the fight at all, it was more likely because of Israeli mobilization than because of the U.S. threat to intervene. Besides, the most probable explanation for the passivity of the Syrian air force had more to do with internal politics within the Syrian Ba'ath party at the time; it was so fractured that it would not be an exaggeration to say that a slow-motion coup d'etat was underway.[44] The forces that entered Jordan were commanded by Salah

[44] See Nikolas van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), chap. 5.

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Jadid; the commander of the air force was his rival, Hafez al-Assad. When Assad seized power in November, Jadid was the big loser.

This means, in turn, that even if U.S. policy convinced the Soviets to restrain the Syrians, that effort cannot have played a major role in what invading Syrian forces did or did not do, because these forces were not necessarily directed from Damascus. Moreover, if the Soviets tried to restrain the Syrians, as seems likely, they might have had good reasons of their own. It is doubtful that the Soviets would have behaved much differently had there been U.S. pressure or not. Since Moscow most likely viewed its interests in Jordan as marginal, the possibility that Washington might be serious about intervention constituted a huge risk compared to what was perceived to be at stake. David Schoenbaum's assertion that the United States was "lucky" in the Jordan Crisis because U.S. military resources were so meager misses the point.[45] The Soviets were no doubt aware of the limitations of U.S. military power locally, but it may be that precisely because military intervention would have been so risky that the U.S. diplomatic posture proved credible. That the United States would knowingly put more than prudent reliance on its military capabilities may have indicated to Moscow that the U.S. perceived vital interests to be at stake. In superpower bargaining over incidents like the Jordan Crisis, the balance of interests is often of greater importance than the balance of forces.[46]

Nixon's belief that the Soviets were looking for a way to unleash the Egyptian army at the canal with an improved military situation, though logical given certain premises, was thus in error. It was ironic that the first occasion since Nixon took office in which the tactical interests of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East were compatible became a latter-day cold war episode rather than an expression of the détente relationship that Nixon was trying to develop. In a sense, the United States was engaged in a psychodramatic monologue.

Most important of all, the United States and Israel coordinated their policies only at the last minute, and then did so unevenly, ambiguously, and conditionally. It was Israel that would have bailed out the United States if push had come to shove, and Israel would have acted unilaterally in any case had it been necessary. To the extent that the United States had an interest in coordination, it was to retain some degree of control over Israeli action, even as the WSAG expressed a reluctance to protect Israel or to commit its own forces to battle.[47] It was Israel

[45] Brandon and Schoenbaum, 170.

[46] This theme is ably discussed by Abraham S. Becker in Becker, Hansen, and Kerr, *The Economics and Politics of the Middle East* (New York: American Elsevier, 1975), 90–2.

[47] Schoenbaum, Hudson, and others have claimed that the United States acted in 1970 to preempt an Israeli preemption. This is false on at least two grounds. First, the argument asserts that it was Washington that insisted on coordinating actions, but the evidence shows unmistakably that this was an Israeli initiative. Israel was extremely sensitive at the time about the state of its relations with the United States, and was very cautious and deferential to the United States throughout the crisis. See

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that first suggested coordination, Israel that held the military ace-in-the-hole, Israel that probably insisted on direct U.S. involvement in any intervention, and Israel that had contingency plans and real-time intelligence available. Nixon wished for the United States to appear strong militarily and in command politically. Since the truth was quite the reverse, the image of the crisis that the president and Kissinger managed to construct was, in its own way, a diplomatic marvel. At least in September 1970 Israel was an asset to U.S. diplomacy not in the sense of an adjunct or a subordinate partner, but rather as a redeemer of folly. When it was all over, it was not U.S. inner circles that questioned the value of Israel as an ally, but Israeli inner circles that wondered about the trustworthiness and good judgment of the United States.

Finally, the Jordan Crisis led to a bureaucratic shift within the Nixon administration away from the State Department and Secretary Rogers to the White House and Secretary-to-be Kissinger. Israel's value as a strategic asset became axiomatic with this shift, and the United States subsequently refrained from pressing Israel on behalf of the Arab states aligned with the Soviet Union. But Sadat's expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt may have been more complex than the explanation adduced by Nixon and Kissinger. Sadat may have feared for his incumbency and his life as a result of Soviet-supported plotting. He may have expelled the Soviets in order to get from them by way of a price for reestablishing their foothold in Egypt the weapons he could not otherwise get. Perhaps expulsion in July 1972 was necessary in order to get the weapons to go to war in October 1973.[48]

Whatever the role of U.S. policy in Sadat's decision to expel the Russians, it is true that the sense of complacency in the United States and Israel that was shattered by the October War stemmed in part from the presumed "lessons" of the Jordan Crisis.[49] Perhaps the best lesson to be learned from all this is that to the extent that the lessons of history become reified, they become dangerous.

One lesson that scholars and practitioners alike can learn from the Jordan Crisis is that it is the superpowers that decide when regional crises escalate diplomatically to the level of U.S.-Soviet crises based on a reading of their broadly conceived interests. Since local actors are only occasionally sensitive to this mutual assessment, being more concerned with their own troubles, the widely held suspicion that any local crisis can touch off a superpower confrontation under the right conditions appears to be justified.

Kissinger, 626, 630. Second, the United States never did "act" if by act is meant the U.S. promise to protect the Israeli rear flank.

[48] According to Mohammed Haisan Heikal, Sadat's confidante at the time, détente convinced Sadat as much to go to war as it did to give the Soviets the boot. See Heikal, *Road to Ramadan* (London: Collins, 1975), 205–6.

[49] But to attribute the failings of U.S. policy between October 1970 and October 1973 and the October War itself directly to the Jordan Crisis, as Quandt seems to do (127), is to stretch the causal relationship a bit too far.

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Another lesson concerns the interplay of scholarship and praxis. It behooves the scholar to ask whether accounts of events that flow from sitting administrations can ever be taken at face value. There are diplomats who understand very well the utility of public diplomacy to manage impressions for diplomatic purposes, and there are others who seem not to understand very well at all. Unless scholars and journalists are sensitive to the occasional clever designs of diplomats, they risk not only doing imperfect scholarship but also being used unwittingly for ends not always as benign as those in the Jordan Crisis.

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Book Reviews

The New American Poverty *by Michael Harrington. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1984. 271 pp. $17.95.*

It is somehow an unfair task to write a review of this book. One should be able to read it as one would listen to a sermon—not with the duty to ascertain the accuracy of the data presented or the validity of the analysis, but for its moral uplift. For Michael Harrington is a compassionate man who reminds us, and we often need reminding, that there is no shortage of complacency in facing and dealing with the serious economic and social problems of our society.

The book covers a wide range of complicated issues from foreign competition and its impact on the smokestack industries, the increasing importance of the service sector and its impact on the wage structure, as well as the relocation of industry, immigration legal and illegal, poverty in the Third World, and other matters that have an impact on poverty in the United States. This broad canvas is filled with facts, assertions, anecdotes, arguments with other authors and analysts, and hopes and concerns. Too often it is marked by a simple dichotomy of villains and victims and a notable lack of interest in the secondary effects of the proposals made, such as inflation, incentives to work, or efficiency of production.

Harrington sees the grim prospect of increasing poverty everywhere: among the steel and auto workers who will not get their jobs back and will be forced into lower-paid employment or remain unemployed; among new workers who will find first jobs only in the service industries where wages are low; and among the homeless, a group already enlarged as a result of the deinstitutionalization of mental patients. A further increase can be expected from the rehabilitation and gentrification of low grade housing and among the blacks and Hispanics. This much we might anticipate. But he also sees it coming among two-parent families who now contribute proportionally few to the poverty group and among the aged where the poverty rate has been declining steadily for some years. (Harrington expresses concern over the future of Social Security.) One must question such a relentless search for signs of increasing poverty without any reference to how the economy might recover from technological and locational changes, and continue to grow, as it has so often in the past.

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It is perhaps in his discussion of trends in the economic situation of blacks that Harrington reveals the limitation of his analysis. He recognizes that the intact black family has done well during the last two decades and that the white/black income gap among such young families is almost closed; further, that it is the increase in the proportion of female-headed families in the black population that led to the deterioration of the white/black income ratio in the 1970s. But his response is to say "all that figure did was to ignore the reality of black family and occupational life" (p. 138). Harrington is not up-to-date; black leaders did largely ignore and sometimes even justify the deterioration in the black family for two decades, but that changed in 1983. Now black leaders have placed the issue of teenage pregnancy and the stability of black families high on their agenda, recognizing that the increase in female-headed families is a major threat to the future progress of the black community. One could also take Harrington to task for his murky analysis of the immigration problem which he attributes in large measure to the lack of enforcement of the minimum wage, a dubious proposition at best, but a curious one when combined with his justification of blacks refusing to take jobs paying only a minimum wage.

Whatever complaints one may have with *The New American Poverty*, Harrington does highlight a series of serious problems. What are his proposed solutions? He urges full employment, an achievement which he suggests would benefit all groups in the population except poor women whom he regards as a special case. It would reduce crime and violence, sexism and racism, and make the young, now cynics, turn into optimists. He does admit this would require radical change; for example, planning involving tax breaks for company investments that create jobs, penalties covering all social costs for companies that move to another geographic location, more foreign aid to raise the standard of living in Third World countries so that their poor will not wish to emigrate to the United States, and a redistribution of income and wealth, though how far he would go, he does not state. Harrington realizes some may regard this as socialism though he does not so regard it. And he is as little concerned with political acceptability as he is with costs or feasibility. It is a broad prescription and one should not quibble with details. We are all better at describing the problems than developing feasible solutions; Harrington is no exception.

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Contending with Kennan: Toward a Philosophy of American Power *by Barton Gellman. New York, Praeger, 1984. 172 pp. $21.95.*

For Kennan-watchers this book offers little that is new. Yet Gellman has given us a handsomely written, well-organized, interpretive summary of Kennan's major ideas. In a respectful but not worshipful style, Gellman attempts to refute the notion that there have been two Kennans: the Cold Warrior of containment and the present-day isolationist. For Gellman there is only one Kennan—a Kennan who has failed to address certain points

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or explain what he has meant. Kennan himself has always refused to offer a systematic explanation of his philosophy, so distrustful is he of universal doctrines and absolutes. Because he believes there is a Kennan system, Gellman puts one together, ever alert to the danger of constructing rather than reconstructing Kennan's core beliefs.

George F. Kennan has been as much concerned with America's use and misuse of power as with Soviet behavior. Thus Gellman devotes a good part of this book to Kennan's critique of American decision making, domestic society, and public opinion which, in Kennan's often cranky judgment, have produced disorder, inconsistency, globalism, and bellicosity. In turn these negative traits have spurred Soviet truculence. In Kennan's view the United States had been too soft toward the Soviets before 1946, and too simplistic and militaristic after 1948. The period 1946–1948, of course, was about the only time that Kennan enjoyed influence in the making of American diplomacy.

There is too little biography in this book. We find Kennan the elitist ill at ease with democracy and Kennan the impatient, sometimes preachy forecaster of doom, but not enough of Kennan the activist. Gellman argues that Kennan never had the "urge to be at the center of things" (p. 4). Yet his career suggests little absence of ambition after World War II; indeed, it might be argued that Kennan, in pursuit of influence, let Navy and then Defense Secretary James Forrestal and others in the Truman administration use him and his ideas for their hawkish purposes and that he was seduced by power. In 1946–1948, an insistent but unconvincing Gellman writes, Kennan never intended containment to mean a worldwide American responsibility or the exercise of military might. Kennan placed geographical limits because American power was limited. But there is also compelling evidence of Kennan's willingness to try military methods. And the question of limits and means is clouded because of Kennan's definition of the threat to be contained. If the threat was everywhere, as Kennan said it was, then the counterforce he advocated would necessarily have to be applied everywhere. True, Kennan did designate certain areas as vital to United States security: the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Japan, and the Philippines. But these areas make up a sizeable part of the globe. And more, vital areas such as these necessarily require protective outposts, lines of defense, and suppliers of raw materials beyond their shores; so-called peripheral areas are thus drawn into an integrated defensive network wherein distinctions between "peripheral" and "vital" become blurred.

So much of Kennan's thinking derives from his deep belief in order. Gellman's explication of this, his discussion of Kennan's confusing statements on morality, Kennan's indifference to the non-European world, and Kennan's pessimism about America's ability to handle its internal problems and to forge a coherent foreign policy are well worth reading. "Rome is burning. Kennan has less and less use for fiddles" (p. 154). Gellman concludes, moreover, that Kennan has abandoned his view that history could educate in favor of writing history as "escape" (p. 152), although the author might have done more to analyze Kennan's many historical works to determine if this questionable conclusion holds up.

In the end Gellman criticizes Kennan for offering scathing critiques but few recommendations for improvement. "A talent like Kennan's is wasted if it ceases—as, on the issue of American society, it pretty much has ceased—to give back in hope and suggestions for

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helpful change what it takes away in the finding of fault" (p. 156). Kennan's critics have chided him for being a simple naysayer on the nuclear arms race, lacking in pragmatic formulae for halting what Kennan has aptly called the "madness" of the nuclear build-up. Kennan has in fact presented plans for slowing the race. That he has not persuaded others stems as much from leaders who seem eager to demonstrate nuclear superiority as from Kennan's supposed weaknesses. Whatever his failings, Kennan has served as an educator on containment, disengagement, globalism, and more; he has asked us, implored us, to think about the relationship between power and commitments; he has been, as Gellman notes so well, a stimulating philosopher.

THOMAS G. PATERSON
University of Connecticut

Nuclear Forces in Europe: Enduring Dilemmas, Present Prospects *by Leon V. Sigal. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1984. 181 pp. Cloth, $22.95; paper, $8.95.*

There are few issues where the gulf between rationality and policy is as wide as in the question of nuclear weapons in Europe. Hundreds of books and articles have been written presenting well-reasoned analyses of these weapons and urging their removal from the continent. Even some military leaders have expressed doubts about the efficacy of these weapons and the wisdom of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) policy that builds the defense of Europe around the first use of such weapons. Yet for over thirty years the weapons have remained, constantly being modified and improved. Frequently their numbers have been increased and more recently some have been removed, but today, 6,000 tactical nuclear weapons sit in Europe defying any rational justification for their intended use. Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missles (GLCMs) are only the latest steps in the ongoing process of "beefing up" our nuclear capability and "demonstrating our resolve" to do something every sane person hopes we will not do. From their inception to the present day, tactical nuclear weapons in Europe have been a weapons system still waiting for a role.

This book is another solid, reasonable discussion of these weapons, free from either left or right wing hysteria. It makes a number of reasonable points, suggests some perfectly rational courses of actions, and will undoubtedly be ignored as most of the rest have been. Taking as his starting point the December 1979 NATO decision to deploy Pershing IIs and cruise missiles, while urging the United States to explore arms control agreements with the Soviet Union on intermediate and shorter range nuclear weapons, Sigal first explores the theoretical problems of deterrence and stability in the NATO setting. While the author thinks that nuclear artillery is a good example of a weapon that makes marginal contributions to nuclear deterrence at a considerable cost to stability, he could also have included Pershing II as a prime example more recently of precisely the same phenomenon. He then offers convincing criticisms of the principal military ra-

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tionales for the new weapons and points out the obvious destabilizing impact of Pershing II. The long fourth chapter taking up almost one third of the book describes the changing political situation in the various European countries from before the decision was made to 1983. He believes that the changing political setting, including the enormous growth of antinuclear and peace movements, may lead to increasing pressures to slow down or halt deployments and to resume negotiations.

The author saw some hope of modest gains at the now suspended Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks in Geneva that would reduce the number of Pershing IIs well below the level currently planned in exchange for a reduction in the number of SS-20s targeted on Western Europe. While hardly a radical solution, this step would enhance stability in Europe and perhaps lead to an environment more conducive than the present one to further negotiations. In addition, he urges the protection of the remaining intermediate range nuclear missiles to discourage Soviet preemption and a drastic reduction in short-range nuclear forces. His recommendations in regard to the latter are the only ones that differ radically from those of most other mainline thinkers who usually argue in terms of only limited changes in the prevailing business-as-usual orientation. Sigal suggests that NATO should unilaterally remove over 2,600 atomic weapons designed for use with artillery, air defense, and demolitions, since these weapons are counterproductive for NATO. The book closes with a sense of urgency since time is running out for both sides if they are to avoid the continual upward spiralling of still more arms racing or the even more frightening possibility of the actual employment of all these wondrous mechanisms of destruction.

PHILIP W. DYER
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The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation *by Stephen M. Meyer. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984. 229 pp. $20.00.*

Since India's 1974 nuclear detonation triggered renewed efforts to curb the spread of nuclear arms, the U.S. policy community has debated how and where to wage the fight. The Carter administration concentrated its efforts on curtailing the spread of installations able to produce nuclear weapons material. Reagan's policy, while also selectively opposing the development of such capabilities, has sought to reduce the motivations of would-be proliferators by encouraging the settlement of regional disputes in the Middle East and southern Africa and by providing U.S. military aid to Pakistan.

Stephen M. Meyer's careful dissection of the interplay of capability and motivation in the proliferation process, which contains some of the most lucid and insightful analysis of the problem to appear, should encourage greater intellectual discipline on both sides of this debate. Meyer reviews some dozen national decisions to produce nuclear explosives that have taken place since 1940 among the thirty-six nations that have gradually attained the essential technological and industrial capacity to consider building nuclear arms.

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From this data base of over 500 "nation-years" Meyer argues compellingly that decisions to develop nuclear arms are triggered by political and military concerns, not by the mere existence of a nuclear infrastructure, however advanced. The most powerful spurs to proliferation, he states, have been fear of a nuclear-armed rival or of one with overwhelming conventional forces; pretensions toward global or regional preeminence; and pariah status. These "propensities" towards nuclear arms have frequently been outweighed, Meyer shows, by "dissuasive" factors, in particular, alliance with a nuclear power, acceptance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (a sign of an underlying decision to reject nuclear arms), and fear of a preemptive strike. In effect, addressing motivations can reduce proliferation.

While not a spur to nuclear weapons acquisition, nuclear capability nonetheless remains important, Meyer stresses, because it is, of course, a necessary condition for proliferation. Moreover, as nations approach the point of being able to manufacture nuclear arms at will, he notes, the marginal costs of their doing so decreases and the opportunities for timely antiproliferation intervention are sharply reduced. This can significantly increase proliferation risks. Meyer's data also show that past nuclear infrastructure build-ups (for example, France's in the early 1950s and India's in the 1960s) have in fact sometimes paved the way for nuclear explosives programs or may (like Britain's in the late 1940s) reflect secret proliferation decisions already made. Thus the build-up of nuclear capabilities in countries of concern also demands attention.

In making these and a host of subsidiary generalizations, Meyer uses quantitative analyses of his historical data to considerable advantage. When he attempts to use his quantitative tools to make more specific points, however, such as ranking the relative importance of particular motive and dissuasive factors or assigning particular nations relative propensities toward proliferation, Meyer appears to overreach his data base. Given the secrecy surrounding the subject, the timing of and motives for many past proliferation decisions are obscure. Did India make its decision in 1970 or 1972? Israel in 1957 or 1967? South Africa in 1970 or 1975? Did Iraq make one at all? Depending on the dates chosen, different motivating factors would presumably apply. Aggregating from one set of dates (and motives), as Meyer does, inevitably casts doubt on his more specific findings and in particular his attempts at forecasting.

The limitations of the quantitative approach to this difficult subject are also seen in Meyer's application of his statistical findings to the historical data. Repeatedly, he is forced to introduce case-specific qualifications and explanations. Meyer's efforts to build up a predictive model based on events since 1940 also results in his offering little guidance about the value of dissuasive measures currently under discussion—nuclear trade embargoes and diplomatic and economic sanctions.

Despite these reservations, so much of Meyer's incisive understanding of the proliferation process is displayed in this work that it remains a rich source of new thinking on the subject.

LEONARD S. SPECTOR
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

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Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat *by Mohamed Heikal. New York, Random House, 1984. 290 pp. $17.95.*

Mohamed Heikal, the prolific Egyptian writer and journalist, has added another volume to his numerous treatises on Arab politics. This time he takes a critical look at the multiple causes that lay behind the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar el Sadat in October 1981. Heikal's own prominence on the Arab intellectual scene emerged during the Nasser period when he enjoyed a direct and privileged access to the former Egyptian head of state. Heikal was Gamal Abdel Nasser's confidant, adviser, propagandist, diplomatic emissary, and friend. In these alternate roles the former editor-in-chief of the once prestigious daily Arabic-language Cairo newspaper, *Al-Ahram*, built himself a reputation as one of the most informed "outsiders" in Arab political life. Under Sadat, as well, Heikal initially continued his role as personal adviser to the president, but quickly this high profile was eroded. Eventually he lost all of his journalistic clout and political influence with Sadat who imprisoned Heikal, along with thousands of other "dissidents" of the right and left, a month prior to the president's assassination at the hands of extremist Muslim fundamentalists.

As one who was intimately involved in the institutionalization of the Nasser regime, of which Sadat was an integral part, Heikal writes with authority and insight. Although no longer a public figure of note, he remains a shrewd, engaging, and witty journalist whose lively prose and personal details add a dimension of intimacy rarely found in the biographies of Arab political leaders.

Despite a feeble disclaimer in the introduction that the author harbors no ill toward Sadat, this is a most unflattering portrayal. Should the reader, after countless exposés and revelations which have appeared since the death of the former Egyptian president, still cherish any myths about Sadat, then Mohamed Heikal intends to disabuse him once and for all. Almost from the outset, Heikal plunges into a depressing litany of character failures among Sadat and his family members. No one escapes Heikal's wrath. Singularly victimized is Sadat's wife Jihan who is portrayed as vain, manipulative, and power-hungry. Heikal either puts into serious question or completely discredits many aspects of Sadat's upbringing including his education, professional accomplishments, and political achievements. Making no claim to scholarly objectivity, Heikal utilizes pop psychology to explain Sadat's alleged personality failures—shortcomings which the Egyptian president, according to Heikal, worked hard to conceal from the Western media but which all "real" Egyptians were fully aware of. Thus, as a boy, Heikal informs us, Sadat was submissive to his parents and elders but "beneath the submissiveness there was lurking a hidden streak of violence, which was to make him in later life a ready participant in assassination conspiracies" (p. 11). Additionally, in attempting to explain the complex reasons behind Sadat's obsessive determination to gain acceptance in the West, Heikal feeds the reader with instant Freudian psychoanalysis, writing: "Sadat feared his father but could not love him; he could not respect his unfortunate mother, and had come to resent the badge of color which he inherited from her" (p. 12).

In belittling Sadat's role in the Free Officers movement which led to the Nasser-directed

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revolution in July 1952, Heikal tends to overstate his own importance in Egyptian political maneuverings. He exaggerates, for example, his role in the deliberations which led to the confirmation of Sadat as the new Egyptian president following Nasser's death in September 1970, giving certain credence to those in Egypt who have always considered Heikal a somewhat pretentious propagandist. The author gives quick treatment to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, extending full credit to the Egyptian army for the early successes and full blame to Sadat for the subsequent troop withdrawal agreements negotiated by the United States between Egypt and Israel. Heikal goes on to attack the Egyptian president's close ties with Henry Kissinger and is vitriolic about Sadat's historic journey to Jerusalem in November 1977, which he considers as an act of treason.

Yet one should not let Heikal's excessively harsh judgements of Sadat obscure the very many useful points he makes regarding the former president's loss of contact with his own people, his insensitivity to the widening gap between rich and poor that his Open Door economic policies generated, and the growing tide of discontent with the westernization of Egyptian society among many traditionally-minded Egyptians whose Islamic values were to be the force of Sadat's undoing. While Heikal presents the reader with nothing particularly revealing in terms of the facts and circumstances surrounding the fall of Sadat—corruption at the highest levels of power, insensitivity to popular demands, an authoritarian personality style—he does add numerous personal glimpses which the official record simply fails to capture. Nonetheless, one must be careful in accepting all of Heikal's interpretations. While he was directly or indirectly involved in many of the events of which he writes, his deep antipathy towards Sadat, the man and his policies, makes the author a highly biased observer. Anyone who concludes that Egypt's regaining all of her lost territories and achieving a comprehensive peace with her principal enemy amounted to nothing—"the saddest thing about Sadat's death is that none of his dreams came to anything" (p. 271)—must be read with caution.

JOHN P. ENTELIS
Fordham University

The Report of the President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. *New York, Macmillan, 1984. 158 pp. $7.95.*

From Gunboats to Diplomacy: New U.S. Policies for Latin America *edited by Richard Newfarmer. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. 254 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $11.95.*

As the National Bipartisan Commission or "Kissinger" Report acknowledges, "The debate over Central America has been polarized in the United States" (p. 111). Though it was the express purpose of the commission to reach a "bipartisan consensus" on Central America, both its report and the other book under consideration are representative specimens of the debate rather than of solutions. They express, rather than deliver us from, our impasse. This polarization reflects not only Central America's conflict but also the

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one within the U.S. foreign policy community—a schism that has rendered bipartisan foreign policy a chimera since the mid-1960s. The American debate, which to a great extent may determine the fate of Central America in the next few years, is rooted less in Central American realities than in the exigencies of the U.S. domestic and political struggle.

From Gunboats to Diplomacy is not a rejoinder to the Kissinger Report—its contents were circulating in Washington, D.C. well before the Kissinger panel was conceived. This collection of essays, originally commissioned by the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, accompanied by a foreword by Senate majority leader Robert C. Byrd, presents the standard "liberal" alternative to the administration policies endorsed by the Kissinger Commission.

Gunboats supports a negotiated solution in El Salvador versus the Kissinger Report's electoral solution; stygmatizes aid to the "contra" in opposition to the Kissinger Commission recommendation of maintenance of "existing pressures" on the Nicaraguan government; places cooperation with Contadora at the center of U.S. diplomacy as against the Kissinger Report warning not to permit Contadora to be a "substitute for U.S. foreign policy" (p. 142); and opposes or would sharply condition U.S. military aid to the region.

The collision over Central America does not derive simply from differing specific policy preferences but from rival conceptions of U.S. history, U.S. relations with the Third World, hemispheric relations, East-West relations, and the propriety of the use of force. Richard McCall's highly critical chapter on U.S.-Latin American relations is a bracing contrast to the apologetics of the corresponding Kissinger Commission section. *Gunboats'* chapter on El Salvador views the guerrillas as an outgrowth of "peaceful popular organizations"; the Kissinger Report as a result of external "exploitation" of indigenous social economic conditions. Underlying the debate is a conflict of ideologies, of world views.

Typical of the proponents in the national debate is the selective vision of both of these studies. Richard Newfarmer in *Gunboats* considers that by 1983 U.S. policy in El Salvador was a "failure": the government was increasingly isolated and U.S. allies were alienated by U.S. policy. Written well before the two successful Salvadoran elections of 1984 and the other events of this year, the writer certainly had grounds for pessimism. The Kissinger Commission, on the other hand, while acknowledging "poverty, repression, inequity" (p. 18) in El Salvador regards the left-led revolutionary movement as an "outside force." Thus Soviet-backed insurgents have intervened "to exacerbate the area's troubles and to exploit its anguish" (p. 15). In the case of the Salvadoran Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front-Democratic Revolutionary Front it would be more accurate to say that the administration's blockade of negotiations and the consequent prolongation of the war has enabled Moscow and Havana to gain influence over an indigenous revolutionary movement by rewarding the groups closest to them with arms supplies and penalizing the more independent ones.

If the Kissinger Report obscures the indigenous character of the Salvadoran rebellion, Lars Schoultz's essay in *Gunboats* is ingenuous, or disingenuous, about Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran rebels and obscures Sandinista responsibility for Nicaragua's civic and armed dissidence. He accepts at face value Nicaraguan head of state Daniel Ortega's assertion that "fewer than one hundred" (p. 121) Cuban military advisers remained in Nic-

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aragua in 1982. Fidel Castro himself acknowledged the presence of at least twice that number of Cuban military advisers not long thereafter. The Kissinger commission and the State and Defense Departments assert that the number is several times higher. Schoultz seems to regard "threatening behaviour by the United States" as the main factor behind the conflict between Managua and the Miskito Indians. He expresses confidence that the report of the Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights "will not be made public" because the Nicaraguans will "satisfy the Commission's requirement." The highly critical report was in fact made public and Miskito insurgency has pervaded the Atlantic coast.

Thus our domestic politics have engulfed not only politicians but also journalists, academics, and public figures pronouncing on Central America. Conservatives close their eyes to abuses in El Salvador or Guatemala so as not to weaken President Reagan. Liberals refuse to tell the truth on Nicaragua so as not to strengthen him. As a result, public discussions of Central America has devolved into a frenetic but tedious and stereotyped propaganda war. Our Central America debate has come to resemble the afflicted region itself: "We are here as on a darkling plain/Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,/Where ignorant armies clash by night." (Matthew Arnold, "Dover Beach").

ROBERT S. LEIKEN
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Perón: A Biography *by Joseph A. Page. New York, Random House, 1983. 594 pp. $25.00.*

The Populist Challenge: Argentine Electoral Behavior in the Postwar Era *by Lars Schoultz. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1983. 141 pp. $9.95.*

Very different in length, approach, and methodology, these two studies nevertheless succeed admirably in terms of their separate objectives. Coming at the peronist phenomenon from contrasting directions, each author illuminates a particular dimension of Argentine politics in the peronist era. Both writers clearly feel a personal sympathy for the Argentine people and the dilemmas that they have faced.

Page provides a detailed, intriguing biography, raising indirectly important issues of leadership and personality. He brings common sense and an absence of bias to his descriptions of the events that Argentines have argued so fiercely. The biography is nicely balanced between sympathy and criticism, and it is, therefore, an infinitely better book than one would gather from vitriolic attacks made upon it by reviewers who have felt injured by Peronism, such as the comments in the long article that appeared in the *New York Review of Books.*

Over and over, Page is critical of Perón, and he points to many areas where Perón recollections and stories about the past appear to differ from what actually occurred. On

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the other hand, he appreciates the essential pragmatism and political skills of *el conductor*, and he notes the warmth of sentiments toward Perón even by many of his old adversaries, including Ricardo Balbín, at the time of his death.

The emphasis upon historical detail rather than analytical theory is the strength as well as the weakness of this book. In descriptions such as a long comparison of the Boca Juniors with the Brooklyn Dodgers, Page shows how thoughtfully he understands the country. He makes no use whatsoever of insights by social scientists who have written from more general perspectives on leadership and personality, yet his biography will long be used by those who want to relate parts of this literature to the case of Juan Perón.

Like Denis Mack Smith's recent biography of Mussolini, Page criticizes more through descriptions than through overt attacks. The comments capture human drama, even if some readers will question them, as in the description of Perón urging his teenage mistress to read Plutarch (p. 294). The prose sometimes gets out of control, as in the early reference to Perón's "roller-coaster ride to immortality" (p. 5), but more often the volume attracts readers because Page is so evidently convinced of the inherent importance of his subject. Undergraduates will devour the book hungrily.

In contrast to the personal stories of the Page biography, Schoultz uses electoral analysis to study social mobilization and the rise of populism in Argentina. He defines the fundamental causes of instability in the country as resulting from a profound conflict between Manchesterian liberalism and a national populism long represented by the peronist movement. Happily, Schoultz comes to this work without baggage of past partisanship that seems, at least to some, seriously to mar the work of the late Gino Germani, whose hypotheses on social mobilization in Argentina are best known at present.

Two central chapters provide ecological analysis for Peronist elections from 1946 to 1973 and a worthwhile "index of fluidity," which measures the volatility of peronist support in various types of voting districts over time. The overall result of both chapters is to substantiate, once again, the disproportionately greater support for Peronism within the urban working class, although the fluidity index also confirms the comparative consistency of voting patterns among the opponents of Perón. Schoultz suggests that future studies, departing from what analysis of aggregate data has shown us, should draw out the fresh understanding that can only come from investigations of the ample, high quality survey data that exists for Argentina.

In style, *The Populist Challenge* is easy to read, and students who do not understand Pearson correlations and path analysis will still be able to follow the arguments in the text. From a stylistic standpoint, the only disconcerting element is a tendency to speak over and over again about what "this book" or "this volume" is trying to prove.

Schoultz is at his best in his broad understanding of Argentine politics. Two years after the book was written, some of the observations appear prophetic: "The Peronist movement will fragment . . . . Peronism will be as little able to lead the nation as Radicalism was following the death of Yrigoyen . . . . The success of Peronism will therefore come to depend largely upon the behavior of the opposition" (p. 85). In this light, it is interesting to note that Schoultz also predicts the ultimate victory of the national populists (p. 13).

Some readers, in the immediate afterglow of the election and the first year of the

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government of President Raúl Alfonsín, may carp at Schoultz's conclusion that the confrontation of Peronism and its antagonists has made Argentina virtually impossible to govern. The officical publication date of *The Populist Challenge* fell within weeks of the Alfonsín election. For the period that he covers, however, Schoultz presents thoughtful, meticulous, accurate analysis; his conclusions will stand the test of time. If indeed Alfonsín and his supporters can overcome the inheritance of the past, then *The Populist Challenge* will stand as a measure of their accomplishments.

FREDERICK C. TURNER
University of Connecticut

Scheming for the Poor: The Politics of Redistribution in Latin America *by William Ascher. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1984. 348 pp. $25.00.*

Latin American poverty is a vexing problem, both for obvious moral reasons and for the analytical puzzles it poses. Although Latin American economic growth has been impressive for most of the modern era, many of Latin America's people still live in abject and persistent poverty. William Ascher has looked carefully at one aspect of the problem of Latin American poverty—government attempts to redistribute income. He has examined a series of governments in Argentina, Chile, and Peru that have tried income redistribution with different degrees of commitment, consistency, and success. The purpose of *Scheming for the Poor* is to evaluate what government policies are most likely to achieve redistributive goals.

Ascher surveys three types of redistributive governments. The first is the "authoritarian populists" represented by Juan D. Perón in Argentina (1945–1955), General Carlos Ibañez in Chile (1952–1958), and General Manuel Odría in Peru (1948–1956). The second group, with whom Ascher's sympathies clearly lie, is the "centralist reformists," Argentina's Arturo Frondizi (1958–1962) and Arturo Illía (1963–1966), Chile's Eduardo Frei (1964–1970), and Peru's Fernando Belaúnde (1963–1968). The third group, to whom Ascher is also sympathetic if critical, is the "radicals," Salvador Allende in Chile (1970–1973) and Velasco Alvarado in Peru (1968–1975).

The centerpiece of *Scheming for the Poor* is a meticulous, well-presented, illuminating study of these regimes. The reasons for redistributive success or failure are carefully discussed, with a focus on the government's presentation of its program, its ability to neutralize opposition, and its success in building supportive coalitions.

Ascher concludes, not surprisingly, that "the choice of strategy and tactics makes a difference" (p. 305). Governments committed to redistribution should cultivate allies among the non-poor, use appropriate instruments with competence and an eye to proper timing, avoid presenting maximalist programs, and avoid mobilizing mass support in such a way as to inflame entrenched opposition. Ascher believes that cautious gradualism has been most successful, that "the masters of redistribution prove to be the tacticians rather

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than the warriors. The best records of redistribution are held by the pragmatic politicians whose familiarity with the policy process enables them to manipulate the political atmosphere to lull, disarm, or intimidate the potential opposition . . . " (p. 18).

This is a careful study. Nevertheless, the reader should be aware of two features of the book which may be disappointing. First, Ascher does not purport to analyze the underlying causes of Latin American poverty, of attempts to combat it, or of its persistence. The reader should not expect a theoretically grounded discussion of the origins and development of Latin American political struggles over income shares. Ascher's goal is clearly stated at the outset: "to develop a framework for strategic choice that will enable the policy maker to best serve the poor" (p. 10). The "how-to" focus is maintained throughout, which may frustrate the reader in search of broader analysis.

Second, what general discussion the book does provide is disappointing. The fifty-page introduction is overlong and needlessly abstract. The reader's attention wanders through a series of vague generalizations about definitions and concepts that do a disservice to the clarity of the rest of the book's focus.

Nonetheless, the case studies Ascher examines are sensitively presented and interpreted. His conclusions about the policies most likely to succeed are cogent and coherent. *Scheming for the Poor* is a good book about how reform-minded Latin American policy makers might pursue attempts to redistribute income. It will be useful both to policy makers and to scholars interested in understanding the complexities of redistributive efforts.

JEFF FRIEDEN
University of California, Los Angeles

The Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars *by Ezra Mendelsohn. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1983. 300 pp. $27.50.*

Ethnic minorities usually fare better in empires whose central elites seek to impose political order but are indifferent to the ethnosocial and ethnocultural heterogeneity of the subject populations than they do in would-be nation-states whose central elites view themselves as the custodians of explicit and specific national cultures that serve them as comprehensive integrationist ideologies and programs. Hence, from the Jewish perspective, the replacement of the pre-World War I Habsburg and Ottoman empires by a series of would-be nation-state successors in interwar East Central Europe was *a priori* an ominous development—even if not widely perceived as such at the time. Redoubling this ominous initial deterioration in the regional political environment after World War I was the simultaneous near-closure of the hitherto open immigration gates to the United States and western Europe and, after 1936, of those to Mandatory Palestine as well. Finally, the governmental instability, economic malaise, and chauvinistic public atmosphere that characterized East Central Europe for most of the interwar era further compounded the precarious condition of the region's Jews. This problematic situation and its steady deteri-

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oration are analyzed intelligently, fairly, and sensitively by Ezra Mendelsohn of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. My only substantial quarrel with him would be over his decision—for reasons that I do not find convincing (p. 3)—to omit from his survey any discussion of the admittedly small and partly Sephardi Jewish communities of interwar Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece. In effect, therefore, his is a history of the Ashkenazi Jewries of interwar Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the three Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. He analyzes their political conditions and strategies, their demographic, economic, and cultural profiles and developments, their internal communal structures and relations, as well as their different engagements with the external, gentile, host societies and regimes.

Appropriately organizing his book into chapters that are denoted by the eponymous names of the above-mentioned interwar host states—"Poland," "Hungary," "Czechoslovakia"—Mendelsohn nevertheless explicates with considerable skill how internal Jewish boundaries were not congruent with the international frontiers of the interwar state system and how those internal boundaries had an impact on Jewish political behavior and cultural styles. Thus, the variations among "Litvak," "Galician," "Polish," "Russian," and "German" Jews, between Hasidic and Haskalah Jews, between Yiddish-speaking and other-language-speaking Jews, between "kaftan Jews" and "cravat Jews," are finessed with dexterity and delicacy throughout the book.

The fact that the longest chapter by far is on Poland (pp. 11–83), expresses not only Mendelsohn's own particular expertize but also reflects the intrinsic paramount importance—demographic, historical, cultural, and political—of that country's Jewish communities in the history of world Jewry. The story that Mendelsohn records and analyzes is deeply troubling, especially to any reader aware of the splendidly productive symbiosis of the Polish and Jewish peoples during the medieval, renaissance, and baroque eras. While the cultural vigor of interwar Polish Jewry remained impressively high despite its slippage into economic misery, its political vicissitudes and divisions make depressing reading. Numbering about three million and thus accounting for approximately ten percent of the country's total population (and one third of its urban population), interwar Poland's Jews found themselves to be the storm center of a Polish national political debate that became increasingly obsessed by "the Jewish question" as general interwar tensions tightened. Yet, despite its ever-more beleaguered condition, Polish Jewry remained internally bitterly divided over several hypothetical—and increasingly unrealistic—political strategies: emigration, building a coalition with the state's other ethnonational minorities (Ukrainian, Belorussian, German), cutting a bilateral deal with the Polish government, or forming a *soi-disant* revolutionary alliance with the Polish left. Alas, all these options and their protagonists were to be overtaken by, and immolated in, the Nazi Holocaust.

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Columbia University

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Interpreting Elections *by Stanley Kelley, Jr. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1983. 267 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $8.95.*

Over the past few decades voting behavior research has been marked by the use of increasingly sophisticated statistical techniques to examine increasingly complicated models of individuals' voting decisions. Although there are notable exceptions, what this research has tended to slight is the issue of why elections come out as they do. The major strength of Kelley's book is that it is about elections as much as it is about voters.

The central analyses in this book are based upon responses to a battery of questions included in the University of Michigan National Election Studies which simply ask the interviewees to report what they particularly like and dislike about the major parties and their presidential candidates. Kelley uses these responses to predict voting decisions according to a decision calculus he and Thad Mirer developed in a 1972 American Political Science Reviews (*APSR*) article. Essentially, this voting model (which Kelley refers to as "the Rule") consists of adding up the various reasons why a given voter likes candidate A and dislikes candidate B, and then subtracting the number of reasons why the voter dislikes candidate A and likes candidate B. For example, a voter who liked three things about Mondale, disliked two things about Reagan, but also liked two things about Reagan and disliked one other aspect of Mondale would have a score of +2 (3 + 2 − 2 − 1) and would thus be predicted to vote for Mondale. Ties are decided on the basis of the voter's party identification. Kelley defends the Rule as an excellent predictor of vote choice without being tautological. I accept the first claim but am not too sure about the second. As long as this net like-dislike score does not go into the right hand side of a vote equation, however, I can live with nearly any use it is put to.

Most of the subsequent chapters do not focus upon the Rule per se, but rather examine the specific content of responses of the likes and dislikes questions. After grouping respondents (voters and nonvoters) into electorally meaningful categories, Kelley attempts to determine the nature of the considerations which placed them in one category as opposed to another. The groups Kelley focuses upon are the winner's and loser's core supporters, the winner's marginal supporters, and the losers's potential majority. Kelley's main finding is that the issues which make some voters core supporters are generally not the same as those issues which swing marginal voters one way or the other. Lyndon Johnson's and George McGovern's core supporters, for example, shared a commitment to the New Deal's legacy of a large, activist federal government. What swung millions of voters toward Johnson but away from McGovern, however, was their sense that the former was a competent leader with considerable personal qualities while the latter was not. This conclusion certainly makes sense, and I think most readers will find the analysis which produced it convincing. It is not, however, the most exciting finding to have emerged from research on voting behavior.

Interpreting Elections' strong suit is that it is indeed about elections. Consequently, the central questions of democratic theory, like old friends we have not seen for a long time, are called up for reconsideration: If casual, uninformed voters are usually the key swing group in an election, is modern democracy tantamount to "rule by the worst of the many?" Do large victory margins confer on the winner a policy mandate? Does the out-

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come of any American presidential election ever hinge on a single pivotal issue? Kelley's answers to these questions are all no. As in the voting analyses discussed earlier, however, I think that most readers will tend to be underwhelmed. Many of Kelley's insights are new, but they are not all that provocative.

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Campaigning for Congress *by Edie N. Goldenberg and Michael W. Traugott. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1984. 207 pp. $9.50.*

Campaigns are important links between candidates and citizens, mechanisms for leadership selection, and have not been adequately studied. Goldenberg and Traugott offer us this investigation of contemporary campaigns for the United States House of Representatives.

Campaigning for Congress focuses particularly on the determinants of electoral strategies and tactics, financial receipts and expenditures, the information environment, and voter response. The central finding is that "the incumbency status of opposing candidates, their assessments of their chances, and the structural constraints of media markets" (p. 188) explain much of the considerable variation in congressional campaigns.

The authors utilize four rich data sources: the 1978 American National Election Study (ANES); personal interviews with campaign managers; Federal Election Commission (FEC) reports filed by House and Senate candidates between 1977 and 1982; and a content analysis of selected newspapers. Interviews with campaign managers were conducted for this study by Survey Research Center personnel in 86 of the 108 ANES congressional districts (CDs) with contested general elections. The most novel and interesting findings result from this managers' survey.

Goldenberg and Traugott detail the considerable campaign advantages enjoyed by incumbents in staffing, finances, news coverage, and voter recognition and recall. In nonincumbent contests, the candidates were more evenly matched, and average spending was greater than in incumbent races.

Candidate status affects the type of message that campaigns stress. Incumbents were found to emphasize their personal characteristics; challengers the issues. Both types of appeals were common in nonincumbent races. Only in a few one-party Democratic districts was party loyalty the dominant campaign theme.

Assessment of November outcome is the second key explanatory variable. Incumbent campaigns were self-classified by the managers into sure winners (75 percent), and vulnerable (25 percent). Challengers were hopeful (61 percent), and sure losers (39 percent). Candidates in nonincumbent races were hopeful (80 percent), sure winners (10 percent), and sure losers (10 percent). Within incumbent categories, these assessments closely followed district partisanship and recent election results. It would have been interesting if

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the authors had more explicitly discussed the relationships between these assessments and the eventual election results.

The assessments are important because "it is the perception—whether or not it mirrors actual political reality—that is useful in understanding campaign behavior" (p. 38). In incumbent races, for example, vulnerables and hopefuls spent considerably more than sure winners and sure losers. Hopefuls in nonincumbent races spent more money than any other group of candidates. "Consequently, the accepted wisdom that incumbents spend more than challengers does not always hold" (p. 84).

Goldenberg and Traugott's third main explanatory variable is the structural constraints of district media—largely the fit of television and newspaper markets with CD boundaries. Mass media are particularly inappropriate for CDs in large metropolitan areas for each is but a small part of the total market and thus news coverage of district contests is minimal and advertising is very inefficient. In nonmetropolitan districts, multiple media markets may have to be covered.

Challenger success depends upon building name recognition and positive evaluations among the electorate. These require free news coverage and money for advertising. But in certain districts, especially those in large metropolitan areas, the media market constrains the potential information environment. CDs are thus not equally conducive to incumbent upsets. The authors speculate that on balance these factors favor the Democrats because of their party's dominance in large cities.

Overall, this book is an interesting treatment of House campaigns, corroborating earlier findings, building on the work of others, and perhaps giving a new direction to the subfield. The consequences of incumbency have been appropriately stressed previously. Psychological assessment of prospects is a key element of Richard Fenno's influential work and certainly merits considerable attention. The discussion of media market constraints is a valuable new emphasis for the scholarly literature.

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Louis D. Brandeis: Justice for the People *by Philippa Strum. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1984. 508 pp. $27.50.*

Philippa Strum has written what is indubitably a major volume on the person whom Franklin Delano Roosevelt referred to as "Isaiah." Arguably more comprehensive in terms of the total man and his cosmos—rather than merely an examination of his jurisprudence—than any other work in print on "The People's Attorney," Strum has performed a major service. *Louis D. Brandeis* is a long book and may well provide us with more detail than even the vast majority of the legion of admirers of the great American jurist and human being may wish to know. But it evinces a commitment to research and

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analytical scholarship that is wholly admirable. The author's world of sources is as vast as it is commendable, and her familiarity with the literature represents a model of commitment. (It is thus a bit astounding that she does not even mention, let alone discuss, the highly visible, albeit controversial, widely-reviewed, 1982 work by Bruce Allen Murphy, *The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection*, which is wholly devoted to the "extracurricular" activities of those two giants of the law.)

In twenty well-written, information-and-analysis-packed chapters, Strum takes the reader on a fascinating evaluative journey from her subject's "Beginnings" to "Possibilities and Limitations." We meet the worlds of his ancestors, his cultured home, his schooling in the United States and in Germany, and his early legal career; the world of "the Boston Brahmin," the syndrome that played such a key role in his professional, cultural, and political development; his warm family life—what a marvelous spouse he had—and his initial public career; his early embrace of ameliorative efforts in the realms of life insurance, trade unionism, and the emerging social welfare programs. We see the background and fruition of the legendary "Brandeis Brief," his commitment to Progressivism, and, clearly, his architecture *cum* authorship of much of Woodrow Wilson's "New Freedom." We witness the genesis of what would become his overriding cause during the first quarter of the twentieth century, namely, the making of Brandeis as a Zionist, a Zionist who was preeminently an American. The three chapters specifically dedicated to Brandeis's involvement in and leadership of that movement so seminal to the survival of a much-battered people provide new insights both in substantive and procedural contemplation. And then we see Brandeis's departure from Boston to assume his seat on the Supreme Court—the first member of his religious faith to mount the high bench—until his retirement in 1939. Wisely, Strum does not dwell too lengthily on that famed confirmation struggle, for it has been amply told. But her tableau of jurisprudential comparisons with his friend, colleague, and vote-mate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is an exciting and insightful one—even if it could reasonably be contended that she strains to exaggerate, or at least to oversimplify, their differences by advancing a fact (Brandeis) *versus* a philosophy (Holmes) dichotomy.

What Philippa Strum does so very well is to give the reader a picture of the towering Brandeis's whole *persona*. It is an awe-inspiring one of a mind and a man of such versatile gifts, capabilities, and achievements that even those who are solidly familiar with these stand in renewed awe. Teacher, philosopher, organizer, politician, advocate, adviser to presidents, executive, judicial, and legislative policy maker and policy determinant *par excellence*, theorist, pragmatist, orator, human being, Brandeis "was central to the growth of modern American public law; his major contributions were in sociological jurisprudence and civil liberties . . . and in his Progressive critique of orthodox assumptions about American society. . . . His role as a prophet of change . . . was demonstrated by the dwindling number of dissents he wrote during his last years on the bench. By the time Brandeis retired, public policy had begun to catch up with many of his ideas" (p. 339).

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Constitutional Faiths: Felix Frankfurter, Hugo Black, and the Process of Judicial Decision Making *by Mark Silverstein. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1984. 234 pp. $24.95.*

This important book appears halfway between the centennial anniversaries of the births of Felix Frankfurter and Hugo Black. As Supreme Court Justices each wrestled with a dilemma bequeathed by the framers of the Constitution: freedom from direct accountability to the electorate has invited rule by judges, but this independence has also worked a constraint. Frankfurter and Black were acutely aware of the tensions that abrogation of the popular will entailed. Each attempted to construct an elaborate resolution which helped to define constitutional jurisprudence for a third of a century. The reverberations of their debate continue.

Constitutional Faiths is more than a study of contrasting theories of constitutional interpretation. According to Silverstein, understanding of judicial decisions cannot come without appreciation of role, which in turn follows from basic political values. So, judging is more than legislating while wearing a robe. "Judges are different because . . . the operation of key personal values tends to limit rather than expand the range of discretion" judges possess (p. 20). Still, it is not clear from the book why judges are different. Maybe role is just as important for decision makers *outside* the judiciary. Maybe judicial discretion is simply a function of one's sense of official purpose: results, cost-benefit analysis, doctrinal faithfulness, or whatever.

With Black and Frankfurter, Silverstein's thesis is convincing because both were unusually consistent. Frankfurter came to the bench with an "unrelenting faith in education, expertise, and elites . . ." (p. 87). Even in the administrative state, individual liberty would flourish because "scientific training . . . would allow men to employ public power in a disinterested fashion to control private power" (p. 16). The judicial role could, therefore, be narrow since judges could trust others to make the correct decisions. This belief enabled Frankfurter to favor civil liberties but not *judicial* protection of them. Yet Frankfurter was never successful in explaining how his disinterested judicial judgment could be practiced by another. He was not always persuasive in removing the *self* from self-restraint.

By contrast, Hugo Black feared concentrations of public as well as private power, holding little faith in experts as the heralds of progress. Declaring absolutes and restraints on judicial judgment was his way of limiting the Court's influence on government. If the Justices were not accountable to the people, they would have to be accountable to the supreme voice of the people, the Constitution. Otherwise, judges were simply another elite which might strangle the popular will. Perhaps because (as Madison had said) abuses of power would more often than not be abuses of a minority in accord with the wishes of a majority, Black could admit the need for judges, but remain steadfastly unwilling to accept the *Palko v. Connecticut* (1937) open invitation.

Still, Silverstein acknowledges that role is a product of more than political values in a vacuum. These values are honed on the complexities of "personality and personal relations" (p. 218), a signal that the book continues, but does not conclude, the exploration of the dynamics between these two men. Moreover, even assuming the force of fun-

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damental values and role in judicial decisions, one is not persuaded that similar studies of different jurists would be as successful. Black and Frankfurter are natural subjects for role analysis for the obvious reason that their opinions frequently debated role. With others the question is decidedly less visible, and certainly more problematic. Frankfurter, especially, is one of a handful of judges who joined the Court with a lengthy bibliography already in hand, giving Silverstein ample material with which to assay values. For Black, whose pre-Court political writings were comparatively sparse, Silverstein is forced to find doctrines in deeds, not publications and letters. For other jurists, the task may prove extraordinarily more difficult.

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Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure *by Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. 266 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $8.95.*

The American version of Don Quixote is the minor party candidate. Americans are prepared to admire political crusaders of many stripes, but they are disinclined to see them displace the Republicans and Democrats who monopolize political office. Ignored by voters and dismissed by the public press, the best a minor party candidate can accomplish is the defeat of one of the major party candidates. He can drain off support a major party candidate might have received, but he cannot win. Recognizing this best/worst case scenario, our political establishment has erected and maintained barriers against minor parties. Yet minor parties have assaulted the barricades since the second party system settled America into a structure of two-party competition, and observers of American politics have never ceased attempting to explain it. *Third Parties* is the most recent addition to this literature.

However, Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus have written a different kind of third party analysis. Unlike most previous works on the subject, it is not ethnographic. It is a thematic work which draws from historical detail the data necessary to construct and test a model of third party politics. Their goal is a general theory of minor party voting which will also account for the decision of office seekers to pursue minor party candidacies.

The first part of the book is a narrative history which outlines minor party politics. One chapter is devoted to describing the hurdles and handicaps that minor parties must surmount; the next two chapters sketch the history of the major third parties of the nineteenth (Free Soil, Greenback, Populists, and so forth) and the twentieth centuries (Bull Moose, the Socialist parties, American Independents, etc.). Part II of *Third Parties* attempts to formalize this historical record into a testable theory, and then test it. Their "Theory of Third Party Voting" focuses upon the responsiveness of parties to the issue agenda of the society, the competence with which the major parties have managed the

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government, and relative attractiveness of the major party candidates. In the next two chapters they evaluate their theory with both aggregate and survey data.

Their theory fares reasonably well. Moreover, the data they draw together to test it have never, to the best of my knowledge, been examined as fully as they are studied in *Third Parties*. Indeed, the most interesting qualities of the book are the data. Their theory is not, as I am sure they would agree, original. It is conventional wisdom that minor parties have prospered in this country only when the major parties have failed to manage issues in ways which satisfy the constituents groups of their coalitions; and such failures are the centerpiece of this theory. Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus have significantly contributed to our understanding of minor parties not through a new theory, but by carefully and systematically testing the many conventional explanations that we have aggregated into a theory of minor party politics in America. This test is not without problems. The most striking feature of the analysis is the way in which the measures are specified. All kinds of variables are included, some are squared, others logged, still other are specified as interactions. The equations work, but the logical connections between the theory and the empirical formulation are never described to the reader. One has the feeling that the models look as they do simply because the particular formulation worked better than unnamed others that were tried and dismissed. In short, while the tests are statistically sound, the analysis cannot be described as theoretically elegant.

The authors also show a lamentable tendency to overlook earlier, related work by others. For example, Daniel Mazmanian's study of third parties is not even cited; Kristi Andersen's work on the New Deal is similarly ignored. This oversight by Rosenstone and his colleagues is curious because *Third Parties* frequently touches on questions which Mazmanian and Andersen examined in their books. In fact, some of the analysis and conclusions in *Third Parties* appeared in Mazmanian's or Andersen's books.

Still, *Third Parties* is a useful book. Specialists will appreciate the two chapters that evaluate various explanations of minor party support. The data are novel and the analysis is well done. The first four chapters summarize a basic history of minor parties in a fashion that will certainly find applications in undergraduate courses. *Third Parties* has two different audiences; both will find something in it.

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The Politics of Parliamentary Reform *edited by David Judge. Cranbury, N.J., Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1984. 214 pp. $27.50.*

David Judge's collection of ten chapters on parliamentary reform is a little broader in perspective and subject matter than one might expect from its title and its entirely British origin. Except for one chapter, written by a Member of Parliament (M.P.) and his research assistant, all of the contributors hold British academic positions. And the M.P.,

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Bruce George, had formerly been a British academic lecturer. Nevertheless, the book is not merely about the new select committees and other procedural changes in the British House of Commons. Comparative chapters on American, Canadian, and West German parliamentary systems are included, and so are essays on electoral arrangements, regional devolution, and the House of Lords. There is an introductory chapter in which the editor seeks to place the problem of British parliamentary reform in a historical and theoretical frame of reference. Even more distinctive is the editor's undertaking, in a conclusion, to report and analyze the several authors' criticisms of each other's contributions. No effort is made to reduce evident disagreements. The authors address a common subject, but from different viewpoints.

The editor himself labels his approach "Marxist," but it is explicated in such "neo" terms that orthodox Marxists—be they Leninists or something softer—would have trouble recognizing the doctrine as at all close to their own. Many non-Marxists may well see Judge's analysis as broadly similar to mainstream political science despite the use of a few Marxist terms. Judge, it should be said, indicates an awareness of that possibility.

Among the several other viewpoints represented in the volume, S. A. Walkland's is distinctive because it insists that a new electoral system is the prime necessity. Some form of proportional representation (PR) is his means for eliminating the adversary system under which, in the Commons, a majority party of M.P.s, now produced by a decided minority of voters, exercises power against an opposition party of M.P.s elected by another minority. PR, Walkland argues, would lead to moderate coalitions. Presumably, the Commons would then in some sense be reformed and more effective in relation to a government of party leaders. In any case, Walkland is emphatic in his contention that the present strength of parliamentary parties, under the adversary two-party system, is incompatible with the movement for a stronger committee system in the House.

Significantly, the last point is not directly contradicted even by authors who propose internal changes to make the House of Commons a more effective body. For example, Philip Norton, well-known for his detailed studies of the growth of dissent in the House, expects only a little more useful parliamentary resistance to executive authority as a result of the moderate reforms that he favors within the system of party government that Walkland rejects.

The chapters on American, Canadian, and West German legislative developments are all useful summaries. Malcolm Shaw's analysis of reform in the U.S. Congress will, I believe, strike even American legislative-behavior specialists as both well-informed and insightful.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
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Relief or Reform? Reagan's Regulatory Dilemma *by George C. Eads and Michael Fix. Washington, D.C., The Urban Institute Press, 1984. 285 pp. Cloth, $19.95; paper, $12.95.*

This book is a contribution to the small, but growing, literary genre that might be called the "analytical assessment of current affairs." The distinguishing characteristic of the genre is its synthesis of data about current trends and policies from a wide variety of sources and its interpretation of these data through certifiably academic analytical lenses. The earliest inventors of the genre were the several presidentially appointed special commissions that appeared in the middle and late 1960s. Their successors continue to the present day. Other notable contributors to the genre are the Urban Institute, the Brookings Institution, and, to a lesser extent, the American Enterprise Institute, and Resources for the Future. Naturally, the advent of the Reagan administration, with its bold claims to be setting the nation on a new and better course, has stimulated many contributions to the analytical assessment genre.

Given the relative novelty of this genre, the relatively small number of creations belonging to it, and the still evolving sense of what it is and what it ought to be, it is not surprising that we have no clear-cut standards by which to evaluate the works within it. They must be more analytical than journalism, more *engagé* than scholarship, more dispassionate than debate, more balanced than partisan advocacy. But how much more? At the same time, they need be less analytical than social science, less *engagé* than social criticism, less dispassionate than scholarship, and less balanced than judgments offered by historians *sub specie aeternitatis*. But how much less? And can these works tread the cautious middle way and still produce commentary that is lively and interesting to read?

However one might define the appropriate evaluative standards for the genre, the contribution by Eads and Fix is a clear success. It casts a wide net for data on the Reagan administration's efforts to furnish American industry with some combination of both "relief" from and "reform" of "social regulation" like the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, affirmative action, worker safety and health statutes. It is especially informative on the subject of shifts in the pattern and levels of field enforcement and on the devolution of regulatory powers and responsibilities to the states. These, after all, are activities dispersed in the nooks and crannies of a large and complex economy and obscured by many layers of political and bureaucratic discretion.

The authors' verdict on the Reagan administration's efforts is many-sided and very sophisticated. It did provide relief, but much less than was promised or was advertised *ex post* (pp. 235–254). Some of it was, by the authors' lights, in the public interest, but some—and here one must read between the lines more than one should have to—was not. Furthermore, the administration backed away from reforming some of the most egregious instances of regulatory excess. Eads and Fix explain this by reference to a backlash of justifiable suspicion that gained force when it was observed that the administration's objectives seemed not to include the protection of the objects, both natural and human, that the regulatory statutes aimed at in the first place (p. 256). Relieving business of regulatory costs seemed to many the only clear objective. The authors claim that the Reaganities squandered an opportunity (pp. 259–263). True. But they do not squarely confront the

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question whether the Reaganites, taken as a group, cared much for "reform" rather than "relief" in the first place. The constituency for "reform," being mainly academically-oriented policy intellectuals, simply does not have many votes.

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Black Police, White Society *by Stephen Leinen. New York, New York University Press, 1984. 280 pp. $20.00.*

By the end of the 1960s, the literature on police was limited to manuals for practitioners, with few scholarly works available on police behavior, organization, and politics. Within a decade, however, there have been substantial entries in the field. This book, one of latest works in this expanding area, attempts to show that the character of police race relations has changed, and that the way in which black and white officers relate has improved significantly. Although the title seems to promise an exploration of the role of black police officers in white society, the book is mainly about internal police race relations and relations between the police (black and white) and the black community. While the author suggests significant improvements in the former, the latter have improved only to the extent that the riots and unrest of the 1960s have quieted. Racial conflict continues to mark the relationship between police and minority communities.

In addition to using traditional sources to document his report of the progress of black police during the past twenty years, the author relies heavily on interviews of forty-six black New York City policemen in his explanation of the occupational world of black police. The sample is not random. Most of the officers contacted by the author declined participation forcing the author to rely on "a convenience sample consisting of those men who were willing to talk with me" (p. 4). By relying upon the beliefs of a small number of self-selected individuals to draw conclusions about black police in New York City and "by extrapolation-in-all-of-urban-America" (p. 2), serious questions arise about the representative nature of the insights. Are the views expressed on the position, role, and identities of black officers widely or narrowly held? Is it the view of the majority that internal race relations have improved? Or, are the views expressed by the minority, of mostly younger officers, that "conflict and division along racial lines continue to exist" (p. 117) more widely held than the reported response rate indicates? Today more than 80 percent of the 15,000 officers assigned to patrol have entered the police department since 1979. If, as the author maintains, a pattern exists between attitude and length of employment with younger patrol officers expressing dissatisfaction with current race relations, it is quite possible that conditions may not be as positive as the author would have us believe.

Yet it is reassuring to learn that pluralism is alive and well, that through associations black police have organized and brought pressure on recalcitrant bureaucracies. That progress, though incremental, continues. However, the argument that police race relations

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will continue to improve as the number of minority officers increases through the current quota system is predicated on a faulty premise. In fact, court-imposed quotas have been short-term solutions designed to remedy the disparate impact of court-determined biased examinations. Quotas have been applied to specific exams and extend only to the civil service life of that exam. For each new test, minority groups who perceive discrimination must seek remedy through the courts. Although quotas have been imposed on certain police hiring and promotional exams, a quota system as such is not in place and is not a sound indicator of future conditions.

The recent experience of the New York City police sergeants is a case in point. To avoid continuing charges of discriminatory testing, the City of New York sought the development of a bias-free examination for the rank of sergeant. Representatives of the police, city personnel, and minority organizations were invited to join in the vendor selection and test development process. All parties expressed satisfaction with the steps taken and with the new testing instrument. Yet the minority pass rate was well below expectations. Representatives of the minority organizations are protesting the results as discriminatory while agreeing that the test itself was fair. Once again, the issue is before the courts and this time the outcome is less certain. Where, then, does the answer to improving race relations reside? The author's prescriptions include education requirements, improved in-house training, and more flexible assignment policies to break down traditional definitions and belief systems.

Black Police, White Society is a thought-provoking contribution to the studies of police and race relations. In spite of troubling questions, the author is faithful to his useful purpose: to present from a participant-observer's perspective an objective insider's view of changing political, legal, and organizational structures on the position, role, and identity of black male police officers (p. 2). The author treats his subject matter sensitively and is able to decode confusing police jargon with only occasional lapses of his own in the narrative. While the effort raises more questions than it answers, it also raises the level of discussion on the role of the police in a free society.

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Governor Reagan, Governor Brown: A Sociology of Executive Power *by Gary C. Hamilton and Nicole Woolsey Biggart. New York, Columbia University Press, 1984. 268 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $17.50.*

There are at least three reasons why those interested in executive power in the United States should give close attention to this insightful volume. First, it is a valuable comparative study of two recent California governorships of contrasting personal style, partisan stripe, and policy inclination. Second, it helps reveal how Ronald Reagan's later approach to the presidency was shaped by his gubernatorial experience. And finally, it is a rich, theoretically grounded source of insight into the tensions between person and role that are

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omnipresent in the executive branch at every level of contemporary American government.

Hamilton and Biggart rely for their evidence principally upon 110 interviews with key figures in the administrations of Ronald Reagan and Jerry Brown. The authors are interested in the development of the California government's organizational structure, for they are convinced that structure both creates expectations of political executives and constrains their choices. Within the limits of structure the roles of three different groups of actors are examined – gubernatorial staff aides, cabinet level administrative appointees, and higher civil servants (California Executive Assignees). Each of these is seen to have a different base of legitimacy. For the staff, seeking centralized control, it is loyalty to the governor. For the cabinet members, seeking to organize government, it is "allegiance" to the governor's program. And for the civil servants, seeking bureaucratic responsiveness, it is expertise.

Members of each of these groups experienced tensions within their roles. Department heads balanced "autonomy" and "allegiance." Expert civil servants faced the contrasting dangers of becoming "people without content" or of political co-optation. And the staff learned that "conspicuous displays [of loyalty] . . . were always open to cynical interpretation. . . . Hence the paradox: the harder one tried to be loyal, the more vulnerable one became" (p. 40).

As governor, Ronald Reagan's leadership style was that of a ratifier. He became the "emotional" center for his cabinet and sought goals through cabinet members' collective action within established bureaucratic processes. In contrast, Jerry Brown inspired little personal loyalty. He dealt individually with department heads who shared his policy objectives and showed little regard for established channels.

Hamilton and Biggart conclude that Brown was a less successful governor than Reagan. His refusal to accept his organizational role ". . . disrupted the continuity of administration by decreasing the overall calculability of strategies" (p. 175). The lesson of the importance of a political chief executive's style is easily generalized. In New York, for example, severe stylistic problems similar to Jerry Brown's diminished Hugh Carey's effectiveness as governor, while sensitivity to the symbolic nuances of role expectations contributed to Mario Cuomo's early success.

Its value notwithstanding, this book is not without some flaws. It would have benefited, for example, from a more thorough review of the secondary literature on state government organization and the American chief executive. And though their own value preferences rarely emerge in the text, they are evident when the authors comment that Governor Reagan ". . . sought to minimize the role of government in society . . .," while Governor Brown sought to ". . . improve social arrangements. . . ." (p. 182). Surely Reagan would argue that one consequence of less government would be improved social arrangements.

But these are small caveats, and one major contribution of this work has not yet been mentioned. It clearly demonstrates that theoretically valuable comparative research on the functioning of the executive in America need not be conducted solely on the national level. As in society, scholars interested in the chief executive have been excessively preoc-

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cupied with the presidency. This book demonstrates the rewards that await us if this preoccupation can be transcended.

GERALD BENJAMIN
The Rockefeller Institute

Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy *by John W. Kingdon. Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1984. 240 pp. $9.95*

This book's chief objective is to discover how and why policy issues rise and fall from the U.S. government's agenda. Kingdon defines the agenda as "the list of subjects to which government officials and those around them are paying serious attention" (p. 4). This is equivalent to what others have called the "institutional" agenda, in contrast to the "systemic" agenda, which includes subjects that do not crystallize into public issues. Because of its focus on the institutional agenda, this book misses an opportunity to directly challenge critics of pluralist theory who focus on the discrepancies between these two types of agendas in order to demonstrate that some issues and groups are systematically excluded from the political process. Or, as E. E. Schattschneider put it in *The Semi-Sovereign People*, "the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper class accent."

Kingdon's analysis is based on 247 interviews, about half with government officials and half with other active participants in health and transportation policy. Individuals were questioned annually over a four-year period (1976–1979) about what problems they were interested in, why they were paying attention to them, and what they thought might be important in the future. The time-series data are supplemented by four case studies, only briefly described in the book, concerning proposals for health maintenance organizations, national health insurance, waterway user charges, and the deregulation of aviation, railroads, and trucking.

Analytically, Kingdon approaches agenda-building from the perspective of Michael Cohen, James March, and John Olsen's "garbage can model of organizational choice." He describes the federal government as an "organized anarchy" (p. 89) in which preferences and technological solutions are problematic and participation is fluid (p. 92). He concludes that an issue is most likely to achieve agenda status when problems, policy alternatives, and political opportunities intersect.

The author usefully distinguishes between agenda issues and policy alternatives as components of agenda-setting. He, then, is able to argue that elected officials have considerable influence over the creation of agenda issues, while experts inside and outside of the bureaucracy play a more significant role in defining the policy alternatives that receive serious consideration. He also contends that interest groups are relatively weak in promoting issues to agenda status, but are more influential in promoting specific policy alternatives.

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Overall, Kingdon's data lead him to conclude that "nobody dominates" agenda-setting (p. 47), issue attention is highly contingent, and agenda-setting processes are fluid. These findings add to the already considerable empirical evidence that supports pluralist theory. However, those who are familiar with the arguments of pluralism's critics in this area—among them, Peter Bachratz and Morton S. Baratz, Matthew A. Crenson, and Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder—may have considerable difficulty with the inferences Kingdon draws from his data. One might ask, for example, how issues such as health and transportation compare to issues involving international trade or taxation when one examines the role of political and economic elites. Also, how do internalized values, institutional pressures, and funding opportunities influence the experts that Kingdon credits with developing policy alternatives?

Kingdon's book is valuable in providing an account of how policy participants perceive their own roles and the influence of others in bringing issues to government's attention and in framing debate on those issues. However its greatest value may be in stimulating further empirical investigation and debate on competing models of the agenda-setting process.

EVELYN BRODKIN
Harvard University

The Making of the Mayor: Chicago 1983 *edited by Melvin G. Holli and Paul M. Green. Grand Rapids, Mich., Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1984. 172 pp. $13.95.*

The election of Chicago's mayor in 1983 was a national event. Democratic presidential candidates endorsed the Democrat of their choice in the primary; when party choices were complete Walter Mondale joined Harold Washington in campaigning. After Washington won the Democratic primary the Republican National Committee, sniffing victory for the first time in decades, met with candidate Bernard Epton to pledge generous financial support. All the major actors in Chicago politics for the last twenty years played a part in this election; the fortunes of every politician in town were affected for better or for worse. The election of Harold Washington as Chicago's mayor raises many questions: Is the machine dead? Is Washington really a reformer? Which white voters supported Washington? More simply but perhaps fundamentally, how could it possibly have come to pass that a black, self-proclaimed reformer is mayor of Chicago?

The book of essays reviewed here offers answers to these questions and provides a surprisingly coherent account of what happened. I say surprising, because one expects a collection of essays to offer a variety of perspectives without necessarily paying close attention to telling the story. In contrast to these expectations, this volume is so well organized that it might well have had the same chapter titles if a single author had set out to describe the election.

The book begins with a sketch of Harold Washington and his political career. This is followed by a close account of the primary and some commentary on the role of the

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media and pollsters. The late Milton Rakove contributed a succinct, trenchant, and witty characterization of the Daley machine and changes in Chicago politics since the mayor's death in 1976. Don Rose's "How the 1983 Election Was Won" charts Washington's electoral strategy and explains from whom Washington garnered his winning votes. It is not clear here whether those voting had enough in common to be called a coalition.

Most importantly, Michael Preston and William Grimshaw provide in their essays an account of changes in Chicago's black community in the last several decades. Preston describes the long decline in black turnout (the 1963 turnout was not matched until this most recent election), particularly the withdrawal of middle class blacks. Of these, 57 percent voted in 1971, while only 24 percent voted in 1977. Byrne's candidacy was the beginning of a change; the 1983 turnout was nearly 84 percent. Grimshaw, in a more elaborately argued chapter, claims that both "machine" and "reform" politics are white people's politics. The political culture behind Washington's victory, Grimshaw argues, is neither of those, but a political culture nurtured in the black church, supporting what Grimshaw calls "status reform." "The new black politics," he tells us, is best "understood as a lower-class reform style of politics" (p. 146).

Changes in the black community are, of course, central to Washington's victory. Nevertheless, this book would be more complete if there were comparably empathic accounts of Washington's supporters in the Hispanic and white communities (not to mention the opposition). The book also suffers a bit from the repetition of some anecdotes several times over in various essays. All things considered, though, this book offers a good story, well told, and worth reading.

AMY BRIDGES
Harvard University

The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise of Business Political Activity in the U.S. and U.K. *by Michael Useem. New York, Oxford University Press, 1984. 246 pp. $22.95.*

This book offers an interesting and challenging analysis of the impact of recent changes in the corporate form on business politics in two advanced capitalist societies. Useem's subject is one of the hoarier problems in the study of political power: to what extent do modern corporate executives constitute a unified, organized, and politically-conscious class capable of exercising political power to promote its common interests? Here, conceptual disputes are inflamed by political passions and confounded by gaping holes in our knowledge about the informal activities of economic elites. Analysts enter the field at their peril for they are likely to be found naive, or, conversely, paranoid.

Useem is an elite theorist but his focus is on organization—specifically, how changes in the corporate form of property have affected relations among corporate managers—rather than social class. Based on a study of British and American corporate executives, Useem argues that the diversification of corporate activities and the rise of the con-

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glomerate form have led to the emergence of a corporate elite that takes class-wide as well as firm-specific concerns into account when it enters politics. He calls this group the "inner circle" and he suggest that it is changing the face of business politics.

The first half of the book is a study of stratification within the business community and it makes for fascinating reading. Useem identifies and describes the inner circle by comparing the levels and kinds of economic and political activities undertaken by senior executives who sit on the main boards of two or more large corporations with the activities of executives who sit on one board. He paints a portrait of an elite within an elite—managers who make up a "transcorporate network" (p. 5) that includes nearly all important companies. These executives disproportionately fill the most important positions of leadership in major business associations, such as the Confederation of British Industry and the Business Roundtable, take their political and charitable obligations especially seriously, and have become heavily involved in recent years in corporate efforts to sell free enterprise to the British and American publics.

Useem's analysis of the relationship between corporate organization and ideological conflict is particularly provocative. The separation of corporate management and ownership and the bureaucratization of capitalist property in the twentieth century—Adolph Berle's and Gardiner Means's "managerial revolution"—helped corporate executives to deny that they exercised class power. Now, he suggests, diversification and the rise of the conglomerate encourage them to raise class issues in order to defend the corporate form of production itself.

Unfortunately, *The Inner Circle* tries to do much more than identify this group or probe the sources of free market ideology in the U.S. and U.K. The author also argues that these capitalists are the "leading edge" (p. 3) of business political activity and dominant within their class. At this point the argument becomes strained. Useem suggests that members of the inner circle are more liberal and class conscious than other executives and able to impose political unity on their lesser colleagues. But the author does not demonstrate that this group does in fact impose class-wide unity where it counts, on the kinds of substantive economic issues such as tariffs, tax subsidies, and labor relations that might be expected to divide large corporations and their managers along firm and industry lines. The consumer, environmental, and public interest movements' attack on corporate capital as a whole in the 1960s and 1970s does not appear to have led individual firms to bury their differences on these policy issues to fight the common political challenge from below. In the end, as Useem admits, class-wide political activity is most likely to occur when the firms' profits are not at stake. Consequently, the view that capitalists are divided among themselves, and that these divisions preclude direct, class-conscious political rule—a view shared by pluralists, structural Marxists, and elite theorists who focus on conflicts among industrial sectors—is not effectively rebutted.

CHARLES NOBLE
Rutgers University

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The Regulation of American Federalism *by Donald F. Kettl. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1983. 195 pp. $20.00.*

Intergovernmental relations are not what they used to be. That, at least implicitly, is the central argument of this excellent study of federal regulations in community development. Donald Kettl demonstrates convincingly that federal-state-local relations no longer can be understood primarily in terms of the fiscal attributes of grant-in-aid programs: how formulas are written and who benefits; whether grants stimulate or substitute for recipient spending; what trends are apparent in the levels of intergovernmental transfers. Of equal importance are the growing numbers and new forms of federal regulations that can either accompany or exist independently of federal aid programs. As Kettl shows, along with the regulations come a variety of new intergovernmental relationships and political actors in both the policy-making and implementation spheres.

Specifically, the book examines implementation of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program over a ten year period, concluding with a brief review of the Reagan administration's regulatory reform efforts in this field. It traces the ironic process by which a program designed to be a model of the "New Federalism" became a vehicle for extending the reach of federal influence more deeply into more localities than ever before. In fact, this is a book filled with ironies. The author observes that the pace of federal regulatory enactments was most rapid during the early 1970s, a time when popular and scholarly attention was fixed on the more visible issues of grant reform and decentralization. Moreover, Kettl suggests that the federal government may encounter a fundamental paradox when embellishing aid programs with multiple regulations. Federal influence, he argues, may ultimately be diminished by excessively centralizing policy making, so that national oversight becomes dispersed among a multitude of secondary issues rather than focused effectively on a few priority goals (p. 171).

As a case study, the book does many things well. It is clearly and concisely written, well documented, and tightly argued. It is particularly good in tracing the evolution of specific rules governing the administration of CDBG over time. Accounts of the political dynamics of establishing program-specific regulations and the critical roles played by interest groups, congressional specialists, program administrators, and the courts are also strong points of the book.

The book's principal weakness stems from the author's attempts to generalize beyond the scope of his study. Despite the title, this is not an overview of intergovernmental regulation in general but, as the author freely admits, a case study of a single, rather unique, program. Consequently, Kettl occasionally encounters difficulties when seeking to evaluate all intergovernmental regulation from the perspective of CDBG. For example, he suggests at one point that all federal requirements are conditions of aid and are comparable to private contractual relations (p. 3). He overlooks the fact that most regulatory programs in the environmental, health, and safety fields derive instead from Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce and utilize intergovernmental arrangements very different from those in federal grant programs. Moreover, although he does emphasize the growth of crosscutting requirements, Kettl fails to differentiate adequately between fairly conventional grant-specific requirements and newer, more intrusive forms of inter-

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governmental regulation, which include not only crosscuts but crossover sanctions, direct order mandates, and "partial" preemptions. Readers interested in these mechanisms may wish to refer to other works on regulation and federalism by Lewis Kaden, David Beam, and Melvin Dubnik.

Nevertheless, what Kettl essentially sets out to do, he does very well. The result is a valuable and informative addition to the literature on contemporary federalism of interest to students of regulation and intergovernmental relations alike and suitable for graduate and upper level classes.

TIMOTHY J. CONLAN
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations

Public Sector Performance: A Conceptual Turning Point *edited by Trudi C. Miller. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. 276 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $12.95.*

The editor and the dozen other contributors to this volume address two questions: What are the recent trends in the size of the public sector and its subsectors? How well do or can the social sciences explain these phenomena? Because definition, measurement, and causal analysis are among the skills claimed by social scientists, the two questions intertwine. And because the public-sector share of the economy is affected both by normative preferences and by productivity, several authors consider the modes of achieving both equity and efficiency.

From the 1950s to the 1970s the rates of public-sector growth were sharpest for state and local governments, especially the latter. Accordingly, but to a degree that may surprise readers, the book focuses almost wholly on these governments and their place in the intergovernmental system. From the late 1970s forward the growth rate slowed. This prompts several authors, benefited by hindsight, to criticize social scientists' construction of theories and models to explain *growth* rather than to explain *change* in public-sector size, whether expansive or contractive.

Trudi Miller, a program manager of the National Science Foundation, commissioned the authors to review the relevant literature. They responded variously to that charge, some skillfully writing first-rate, comprehensive reviews, others choosing different tasks, a few indulging excessively in self-citation. The editor had an additional objective: to question social scientists' commitment to the model of "natural science" and logical positivism. It proved easy for the contributors to dissect and display the failings of social science research (mixed, though, with attributions of difficulties to lack of consensus on categories, gaps and incomparability of official data, underfinancing of unofficial data assemblage, and other ills commonly afflicting scholarship). Miller proposes displacement of the natural science model by "design science," which focuses on extreme cases rather than on central tendencies, "borrows from the hard sciences . . . such as engineering, computer science, and operations research" (p. 265), and yet somehow "is com-

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patible with humanistic perspectives that emphasize moral leadership and motivation" (p. 259).

The most valuable chapters are those of Thomas J. Anton on "Intergovernmental Change," a superb assessment of the literature from the 1920s forward; Patrick D. Larkey, Chandler Stolp, and Mark Winer on "Why Does Government Grow?," a persuasively unappreciative appreciation of "the disparity between how much has been written and how little is known about governmental growth (and decline)" (p. 88); John J. Kerlin, with "A Political Perspective," a thoughtful critique of where scholars (including fellow contributors) have gone wrong and a provocative indication of how their ways might be mended; and J. Richard Aronson and Eli Schwarz, with "A Public Finance Perspective," a sophisticated analysis of a wide range of theories (especially those of the public choice school) and practices (property taxes, tax limitations, user charges, etc.), though it is not for those who read while running.

Other essays, less valuable as wholes, contain nuggets of information or interpretation: that though inmigration increases local governments' revenues and expenditures, outmigration does not commensurately reduce them; that, despite inflated claims, information systems are appropriate only for local governments' humdrum operations, not for planning and management; that measurement of local governments' performance, despite decades of professional attention, remains resistant to real-world solutions.

Given the impressive quality of over half the essays, the collection is a valuable contribution to the understanding of changes in the size of the local government portion of the economy and of local governments' place in the intergovernmental system. The subtitle to the contrary, it does not appear to constitute a conceptual turning point.

JAMES W. FESLER
Yale University

The Democratic Muse: Visual Arts and the Public Interest *by Edward C. Banfield. New York, Basic Books, 1984. 244 pp. $15.95.*

If this book had been written by someone less well-known than Edward Banfield, it would most certainly not have received comparable attention nor have been the subject of so much debate. As the author of past controversial works, Banfield is no stranger to sharply-worded disagreements. Offending the received wisdom can be important scholarly duty. Unfortunately, *The Democratic Muse* offers neither a fresh theoretical insight, nor a convincing reassessment, of the arguments for public culture. Indeed, it is somewhat baffling as to why Banfield felt such an urgent need to address a subject that has been analyzed by others in greater detail and with more rigor.

Taking issue with cultural subsidies is not the preserve of any special group of policy analysts. Economist Dick Netzer has been critical of the policies of the National Endowment for the Arts, and sociologist Herbert Gans has called into question the valuational justifications for public cultural programming. Banfield, however, seems generally una-

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ware of the specialized literature in the area of public policy and the arts including that of his fellow political scientists. His conclusions may not have been altered by these studies, but *The Democratic Muse* would have gained a scholarly authority that one would expect from someone with Banfield's professional standing.

Deficiencies of scholarship aside, *The Democratic Muse* is fatally marred by some policy proposals that strike this reviewer as verging on the absurd. For example, while rightly noting the high cost of European masters and the sometimes untoward competition among museums for such reputed crowd-pleasers, Banfield proposes that this be avoided by showing "high-quality fakes" in place of the originals (p. 143). The cost of these reproductions would be infinitely less than the originals and the public, unable to discern any difference, would be satisfied (p. 145). It may suffice to ask the professor what his reaction would be if he passed favorably on a term paper that proved to be plagiarized? After all, it looked the same as the original and the course requirements were satisfied.

Banfield is also distressed by the crowded conditions under which art must often be viewed and the emphasis on blockbuster exhibitions designed to lure the mass public into museums. This is the same public that, according to Banfield, would largely be as happy viewing the $2.3 million paid by the Metropolitan Museum for Rembrandt's *Aristotle Contemplating the Bust of Homer* as the painting itself (p. 154). One can feel nostalgic about the days in which art could be viewed in splendid relative isolation; there are also serious objections to be raised about certain kinds of museum shows. However, would one want to have the market dictate the price of admission to museums as it does for the Broadway theater? Even Banfield must hesitate about recommending a national cultural policy modeled exclusively on the entertainment industry's economics or Hollywood's aesthetics.

As a proponent of government support for the arts (and a past beneficiary of free admission to museums), my judgment may be inevitably biased. However, it might be noted that none of the reservations expressed about Banfield's proposals are to suggest that the policies of cultural institutions are beyond criticism or that the case for public culture is unassailable. Regrettably, *The Democratic Muse* substitutes an undeveloped theory of market economics for a sustained analysis of cultural production. Nonetheless, it may be hoped that the controversy that Banfield has sparked will prompt another scholar to write a critically balanced assessment of public support for the arts in the United States.

KEVIN V. MULCAHY
Louisiana State University

Congressional Television: A Legislative History *by Ronald Garay. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1984. 195 pp. $27.95.*

Students of Congress are increasingly coming to an understanding of how important the mass media are to the political fortunes of individual members. The partisan dispute

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during spring 1984 concerning control of the television camera during House special orders further revealed the depth of member interest in what channel C-SPAN shows to the public. Some of us may labor under the impression that the issues and controversies over the terms and conditions of broadcasting congressional activities are relatively new. Ronald Garay's volume shows otherwise.

The main title of the book promises some political if not theoretical excitement. The subtitle suggests more accurately what the author has attempted to achieve, namely a review of sixty years of legislative effort to establish and manage radio and television coverage of congressional hearings and floor proceedings. Political scientists may find Garay's first chapter on factors influencing congressional television a competent overview of the empirical literature and chief controversies. Although Garay is a journalism professor he has read and synthesized most of the pertinent political science literature intelligently.

The book proceeds in a routine and uninspired fashion to track the episodic history of efforts, first, to bring radio coverage and, later, television coverage to both chambers. Students of Congress may find the straightforward legislative history occasionally interesting, but on the whole it is not. There should be no confusion between a legislative history and a legislative case study. The latter entails a sensitive effort to explain why certain actions were or were not taken. The former consists mostly of brief accounts of who introduced a particular resolution (say, to permit committee hearings to be televised), when hearings were held, who said what in debate, and how the proposal fared. Rarely does a hint of political drama or passion enter the narratives.

Insofar as a concise review of the high points of television activity in covering Congress may be helpful to some scholars, the book is worthwhile. Among these important developments are the 1951 Kefauver Committee hearings, the 1954 Army-McCarthy hearings, the 1973 Ervin Committee hearings, and the 1974 House Judiciary Committee presidential impeachment hearings. Each of these is dealt with in a straightforward, nonanalytical fashion.

The most valuable chapters are those dealing with the House deliberations during the 1970s over the questions of whether and how to televise the chamber, the episodic negative and nondecisions of the Senate regarding television's presence, and the impact of television. What makes these chapters interesting is that the tedious legislative history is supplemented by a more engaging narrative incorporating some flesh-and-blood politics. For example, Garay skillfully reconstructs the struggle between House members preferring network control of cameras and those insisting upon in-house control.

Although Garay contends that the impact of C-SPAN has been minimal because of its restricted and demographically nonrepresentative character, there are signs that the influence of the medium may be growing. Use of taped excerpts on network news broadcasts has been on the rise, and the spring 1984 squabble over Republican use of the special orders period (often during prime time) to launch attacks on Democrats shows that C-SPAN may yet become a good political show. The complexities of Congress do not lend themselves to easy public comprehension, and there is good reason to doubt that more coverage of floor debate, committees, and subcommittees will necessarily enhance public comprehension and support.

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Garay's workmanlike volume should be of modest interest to scholars of Congress and the mass media. However, one is tempted to say "stay tuned" for new developments in congressional television.

CHARLES M. TIDMARCH
Union College

Political Elites and Social Change: Studies of Elite Roles and Attitudes *edited by Moshe M. Czudnowski. DeKalb, Northern Illinois University Press, 1983. 255 pp. $25.00.*

Czudnowski's book, the second volume of the International Yearbook for Studies of Leaders and Leadership, is a collection of studies on elites in the tradition of several other books on elites which have appeared over the last twenty-five years. It builds on and augments Dwaine Marvick's *Political Decision-makers: Recruitment and Performance,* 1961; Rupert Wilkinson's *Governing Elites, Studies in Training and Selection,* 1969; and Heinz Eulau and Moshe M. Czudnowski's *Elite Recruitment in Democratic Polities: Comparative Studies Across Nations*, 1976.

Like the previous collections of essays, this volume focuses on changing recruitment patterns of elites in other societies, deals with the interaction patterns between groups of elites, and addresses various kinds of role behavior elites demonstrate in regular party politics and in revolutionary situations. There is a greater emphasis in this book on North and South American societies (with the exception of one article on the Middle East) than in the previous volumes which focused on Western Europe or historical studies in Europe, the Far East, and Asia. The not-so-invisible college of elites experts, Eulau, Marvick, Chong Lim Kim, and Czudnowski, are authors of articles which appear in several of the volumes.

This collection is not bound by a "theory" of elites but instead gathers empirical studies and insightful essays on the changing character and impact of elites. (However, five of the ten papers do refer to Gaetano Mosca in the first paragraph as a point of reference or departure.) Czudnowski's final essay "Toward a Second Generation of Empirical Elite and Leadership Studies" brings together some of the themes of the volume.

One of these is the rise of a new sector of elites—celebrities, as described by Suzanne Keller. Indeed, her work is somewhat prescient considering the role of celebrities in the 1984 U.S. presidential campaign and the use of television technology in creating a celebrity consciousness. Czudnowski suggests that the technological revolution in other countries may well affect the influence of elites even as it has in the United States.

The spread of education also creates change in elites. Even in our own country, as Czudnowski's paper on higher education points out, legislative elites are more educated than their predecessors. Other studies have documented the decrease of lawyers and the increase in Ph.D.s in prior adminstrations in the U.S. Czudnowski is also alert to the fact that change comes about because of planned policy and points to the fact that higher edu-

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cation did not just develop as an independent institution in the U.S., but was fostered by government intervention and fiscal aid; it was shaped by elites.

Other articles in this volume give food for theoretical exploration as well as provide some useful data to add to our storehouse of comparative data. Among these is Harold D. Clarke's and Allan Kornberg's paper on cronyism in the U.S. and Canada. Their research indicates that kin and friends may introduce one to a political career but these ties do not account for much of the variance in party careers. They claim ascriptive criteria remain highly relevant for understanding how parties recruit personnel and distribute the organizational rewards, but that not surprisingly, commitment and effort on behalf of the party is another important part of the equation. Curiously, Wendell Bell and Juan J. Baldrich's article on democratic process in Jamaica points to ties of kinship and friendship as a unifying component contributing to a norm of fairness.

Michael Keren's interesting article on Prime Minister of Israel David Ben Gurion's interaction with intellectuals and the ways in which he interpreted their information suggests a line of inquiry into the exchange between different elites in a society.

Marvick's paper on party activists indicates how alignment perspectives reflect "both ideological constraint and contextual realism" in spite of persistent ideological commitments, using data collected over a fifteen year period.

This book is a valuable addition to the corpus of elite studies.

CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN
City University of New York Graduate Center

Biopolitics and Gender *edited by Meredith W. Watts. New York, Haworth Press, 1984. 210 pp. $19.95.*

One of the most important questions for social scientists studying gender is how much the sex link predisposes organisms to certain types of behavior. Although the most extreme choices, ascribing all behavior to male or female characteristics or none to these characteristics, may safely be ruled out, discovering an appropriate level of gender-linked behavior remains elusive and controversial. Much of the controversy surrounding this type of research stems from the apparent ease with which some scholars in the past have labeled certain political behavior as "male" or "female"—with a nearly uniform implication that male behavior is preferable. By contrast, the authors in this collection are quite cautious about making broad generalizations. They also tread circumspectly through the "nature/nurture" debate, skirting biological determinism without rejecting all generic correlates of behavior.

Of the separate chapters, Watts' "Introduction" and Denise Baer's, and David Bositis's "Biology, Gender and Politics" present illuminating reviews of the work that has been done on biopolitics and gender. For those who are unfamiliar with this work, both chapters classify and critique a range of studies clearly and with special sensitivity to general interests within political science. These authors also put forth thought-provoking

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suggestions about how biopolitics research might be redirected in the future. Susan Ann Kay's and Douglas Meikle's chapter on "Political Ideology, Sociobiology, and the U.S. Women's Rights Movement" will be of great interest to people studying or espousing reform feminism. Kay and Meikle do a nice job of arguing that within American political ideology rests a presumption that humans must be "invariant across the sexes on certain relevant biological characteristics" (pp. 67–68) to achieve equality.

The questions addressed in Glendon Schubert's and Dean Jaros's and Elizabeth White's chapters originate in biological research. Schubert argues that political science research should contribute to human knowledge about sexual behavior. He summarizes a number of the recent findings in the life sciences about sex and suggests that political science adopt an epigenetic approach to human behavior. Some of Schubert's initial conclusions in applying life science research to the study of politics may give readers pause. His assertion that brain lateralization research carries the implication that women may be better suited for certain positions of political leadership than men is deliberately provocative, but may encourage less careful scholars to drift back to the biological determinism that Schubert himself rejects. Jaros and White conducted a study of undergraduates at the University of Kentucky to see if the variation in hormonal levels during the female menstrual cycle correlated with an increase in "typical female" responses to political stimuli—examining aggression, political efficacy, localism/cosmopolitanism, candidate evaluation and social welfare concerns. They found no consistent link.

Finally, Diane Carlson Jones's chapter analyzes power, leadership, and affect within all-boy and all-girl kindergarden playgroups. Jones finds experimental proof that girls use power differently from boys and that "powerful" boys are liked by their peers while "powerful" girls are disliked. Roger Masters's chapter considers the link between contrasting types of political cultures and chauvinism and feminism. Masters argues that although most cultures benefit from either dominance or sex equality, depending on conditions within the society, gender roles are frequently so rigid that societies are too slow in adopting more appropriate sex role responses.

This collection and the volume of *Women and Politics* from which it is taken provide a highly varied and provocative set of readings. With the exception of the Kay and Meikle piece, most do not fit in neatly to standard treatments of women and politics. *Biopolitics and Gender* is to be welcomed as a way to broaden discussion of gender beyond an exclusive focus on sex links to oppression and discrimination. It is also a healthy corrective to some of the early work done on the biopolitics of sex.

ANNE N. COSTAIN
University of Colorado, Boulder

The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling *by Arlie Russell Hochschild. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1983. 307 pp. $14.95.*

"Thank you for being so patient and for flying *Air Never on Time*," the flight attendant cheerily announced as we finally landed at our destination—only one hour late on a half

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hour flight. In fact I hadn't been very patient, just resigned—as I assume most of the other passengers were—but I doubt that any of the others reacted to his remarks as I did. I had just finished reading *The Managed Heart* and thus knew that what I had witnessed was an example of emotion work.

Hochschild's book is a report of a field study of two occupations, flight attendants and bill collectors, designed to explore the utilization of emotional labor in commerce. The theory and findings are presented in two major sections. The first, dealing with private life, introduces the theory in the context of emotion management at the personal level and in close relationships. The theory, which is fundamentally interactionist, is also discussed in an appendix which provides summaries and critical comparisons of several important sociological and psychological theories of emotion. In contrast to that of Erving Goffman, Hochschild's view of the person is as an active and reactive actor in a social context, rather than as the passive object of social institutions.

The most exciting part of this book is in the second section. Here we are introduced to the work places, the institutions, and the people involved in this drama of the commercial use of feeling. Here we see concretely how an aspect of inner life is transformed into a capital resource. Here we meet the fight attendants. We learn about their work and work place and how they are trained. There are many illustrations of the central thesis that emotional labor is part of the "deal" and we are told about all of this in effective, compelling langauge. At this point, the empiricist side of me was looking for more data, more detail on methodology, on characteristics of the respondents, etc. However, I had to be satisfied with generalized statements illustrated by anecdotes. Since all the anecdotes confirm the thesis, some aggregate data, as further confirmation, would have been comforting. It appears not to have been that kind of study and it is to be hoped that further research will check out some of the provocative ideas that Hochschild presents so well.

The most important chapter for students of sexual politics, especially as regards inequities in the labor market, is Chapter 8, "Gender, Status and Feeling." Although both men and women are in occupations that use emotional labor, men's work uses it to a significantly lesser degree than does women's work. Even more interesting is the author's argument that there is a difference in the kind and costs of this emotion work for the two genders. Here both the fact that there is a fair number of male flight attendants, and the use of the second group, the bill collectors (mostly men), help to illustrate these points. Even for male flight attendants, presumably selected and trained in exactly the same way as the women, emotion management reflects male role expectations. So while the women, just as would be expected, managed pleasant feelings and good relations, the male was expected to be in charge, even when he clearly was the youngest of the crew, more assertive, on his way up in the organization, and even someone to be "obeyed" more. The assumption of male authority in this setting was glaring and not necessarily eschewed by those given this status so gratuitously. The bill collector study showed how male gender emotional specialization, especially the permission to be aggressive in public, is also commercialized. With respect to women's work, Hochschild argues that its low status is tied to the peculiar character of women's emotional labor. Since women are defined as emotion managers in private and hence public life, and charged with keeping things "nice," such labor has been rendered invisible, ". . . an unseen effort, which, like housework, does

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not quite count as labor but is nevertheless crucial to getting other things done. As with doing housework well, the trick is to erase any evidence of effort . . . (p. 167)." One outcome of the commercialization of that which is socially defined as intrinsic to women's nature (and thus available free of charge) is the gross pay inequility for women's work.

This book has moved us a bit further in our efforts to understand the sexual politics of work, and it is in this domain that it will be most useful and stimulating to other researchers, theorists, and teachers.

MARTHA T. MEDNICK
Howard University

The Influence of British Arms. An Analysis of British Military Intervention since 1956 *by James H. Wyllie. Winchester, Mass., Allen and Unwin, 1984. 125 pp. $19.95.*

This book provides a brief account of British military interventions since the disastrous attack on Egypt in 1956. The "lessons of Suez" were that intervention should not take place unless there is a sound domestic and international moral basis for them, an invitation from the government of the target state, a clear and realistic political objective, an adequate military capability for the task in hand, and an assurance that the United States supports the intervention or at least does not actively oppose it.

These lessons, according to Wyllie, were learned. British interventions since that time (in Oman 1957, Jordan 1958, Kuwait 1961, Malaysia 1963–5, the three East-African ex-colonies 1964) have been remarkably successful. He also notes and approves two British decisions not to intervene in circumstances in which intervention might have been expected and forces were available: Rhodesia in 1965 and Cyprus in 1974. The author, however, also notes the contraction of British capabilities for intervention that has occurred in the last two decades with the increasing economic constraints on British defense expenditure, the withdrawal from positions east of Suez (and some west of Suez) that took place in the 1970s, the decision to cut aircraft carriers in 1975, the rising military capabilities of likely adversaries, the rise of the Soviet Union as a world power, and the stabilization of Britain's position as a chiefly European power. The Falklands war of 1982, which Wyllie rightly says was not an intervention but a war of liberation of British territory and people from a foreign invader, he thinks was atypical and provides no basis for concluding that Britain will or should return to the conception of herself as a world power. While he does not entirely exclude a future for British military intenvention, the author concludes that "it is imprudent for Britain to use military forces in support of foreign policy objectives in faraway places" (p. 114).

If Wyllie were really to inform us about the *influence* of British arms, as his title implies, he would need to give much closer attention than he does here to the effects and

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repercussions of British interventions on world affairs. But within the terms of its subtitle, as opposed to its title, this is a worthwhile book.

HEDLEY BULL
Balliol College, Oxford

Labour in Power, 1945–1951 *by Kenneth O. Morgan. New York, Oxford University Press, 1984. 546 pp. $29.95.*

The Labour Governments, 1945–51 *by Henry Pelling. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984. 313 pp. $27.50.*

The Attlee government left office a third of a century ago. Despite the detachment which the passage of time brings and the many source materials now available, its performance remains a matter of controversy and contrasting interpretation. A major biography of Clement Attlee appeared two years ago, and now there are two substantial histories of the period.

Pelling's is the popular (in the best sense) treatment—considerably shorter and assuming little previous knowledge on the reader's part. He has a highly readable, almost journalistic, writing style. Morgan has a more academic tone, without, however, ever being ponderous. Greater length does permit Morgan to examine topics in more depth. Nonetheless, Pelling certainly is not superficial and includes some detailed information not contained in Morgan. The scholarship of both authors is equally strong. Public documents, biographies, personal papers, interviews—all have been utilized extensively. Pelling seems to have a somewhat broader knowledge of the literature, especially secondary sources, while Morgan has made the more extensive use of interviews. In both books the errors are few and trivial. In general, the contrast is that between an account and an assessment.

The organization of the books is broadly similar. After background chapters, each devotes four separate chapters to the key policy areas of the period—nationalization and industrial relations, the welfare state, Commonwealth and colonial affairs, and foreign affairs and defense. Morgan's greater length enables him to indicate Labour's goals in these areas and to assess the government's accomplishments in attaining them. Both books then focus on the crucial year of 1947 and its aftermath. For Pelling this was a "year of crises," while for Morgan it was the turning point after which everything was downhill. Each covers the second Attlee government in a single chapter. Pelling then summarizes briefly, while Morgan projects the trends of 1945–51 on into the next thirteen years of Conservative rule and assesses the stature of the Attlee government more extensively.

One of the interesting contrasts is the authors' treatment of Attlee himself. Both agree that he deserves a considerable amount of the credit for the successful British disengage-

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ment from India, a judgment documented more fully by Morgan. Beyond that, while Pelling does not make Attlee a predominant figure, he does credit him with more importance than does Morgan, who regards him almost as a cipher and especially weak in a crisis. This is a rather curious judgment, since Morgan's account frequently shows Attlee to have been the decisive voice in several decisions. Morgan seems unwilling to attach much importance to the power inherent in summing up the disparate opinions expressed in Cabinet so that a clear-cut course of action emerged.

Morgan specifically disavows any intention of having written his book to pass "judgment on the troubled history of the labour movement in Britain in the 1980s" (p. viii) but the contemporary implications of these studies cannot be avoided. Morgan tends to accuse the Attlee government of hostility toward the Soviet Union virtually from its first day in office. Pelling shows Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin to have been open-minded, even somewhat sympathetic, until Russian intransigence turned him against them. These contrasting judgments lead Morgan to argue that American pressure for British involvement in the Korean War and for a massive rearmament program helped to destroy the Attlee government. He provides much more information than does Pelling on the Bevanite split (so-named for left-winger Aneurin Bevan), concluding that they were right on the fundamental issue, that the defense cuts of the subsequent Churchill government indicated that "we were all Bevanites now" (p. 460). Furthermore, Hugh Gaitskell's one budget with its heavy shift toward defense was a primary cause of the stagnation of the British economy. Pelling regards the government as more willing on its own to send troops to Korea and to rearm. For him, economic stagnation resulted from the government's allowing the unions to entrench themselves as the price for Labour peace. The result was low productivity and restrictive practices.

For Pelling the welfare state and full employment were the most valuable accomplishments of the Attlee governments. While granting various failures, his assessment is favorable. Morgan is most impressed with the decolonization that occurred during the period. While sympathetic to Labour and crediting the government with a number of achievements, his book has a tone of regret. He seems to feel that the Attlee governments did not achieve all that they could have and that they now tend to be praised rather more than is deserved. The problem is that Labour is fundamentally flawed, torn between a "streak of populist protest" and an "urge for power" (p. 501), these tendencies being institutionalized in the conflict between Conference and the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP). While this division is virtually unreconcilable, a set of fortuitous circumstances made the Labour machine work from 1945 to 1951. But the ultimate failure of the Attlee governments was that they attained their many achievements "by evading, rather than resolving, these dilemmas inherent in the potent, beguiling vision of socialism in our time" (p. 503).

These books, especially read together, are stimulating works. Despite their impressive scholarship, however, neither can be labelled the definitive history of the Attlee period. Perhaps another third of a century will be needed to supply the detachment required for that.

JORGEN RASMUSSEN
Iowa State University

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Reference Books and Source Materials Received

The American Atom: A Documentary History of Nuclear Policies from the Discovery of Fission to the Present, 1939–1984 *edited by Robert C. Williams and Philip L. Cantelon. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984. 333 pp. Cloth, $30.00; paper $8.95.*

American Family History: A Historical Bibliography. *Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-Clio Information Services, 1984. 282 pp. $28.50.*

American Third Parties Since the Civil War: An Annotated Bibliography *by D. Stephen Rockwood et al. New York, Garland Publishing, Inc., 1985. 177 pp. $25.00.*

The Annual Register: A Record of World Events, 1983 *edited by H. V. Hudson. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1984. 543 pp. $90.00.*

Biography and Geneology Master Index, 2nd ed., 1984 Supplement edited by Barbara McNeil. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1984. 914 pp. $170.00.

Churchill and Roosevelt, The Complete Correspondence, vol. I: Alliance Emerging, October 8, 1933–November 14, 1942 *edited by Warren F. Kimball.* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1984. 674 pp. $150.00/3 vol. set.

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Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 1985 (2 vols.) *Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1984. 1,548 pp. $95.00/set.*

Encyclopedia of American Political History: Studies of Principal Movements and Ideas (3 vols.) *edited by Jack P. Greene. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1984. 1,420 pp. $180.00/set.*

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Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, vol. II: National Security Affairs (in two parts) *edited by William Z. Slany et al. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1984. 1,928 pp. $28.00.*

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Governmental Finances in 1982–83. *Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1984. 89 pp. $4.25.*

The Grenada Papers *edited by Paul Seabury and Walter A. McDougall. San Francisco, Calif., Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984. 346 pp. Cloth, $16.95; paper, $8.95.*

Handbook of the Nations: A Brief Guide to the Economy, Government, Land, Demographics, Communications, and National Defense Establishments of Each of 191 Nations and Other Political Entities, 4th ed. *compiled by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1984. 274 pp. $64.00.*

Historical Materials in the Gerald R. Ford Library *compiled by David Horrocks and William McNitt. Ann Arbor, Mich., Gerald R. Ford Library, 1984. 54 pp. Free upon request.*

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The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict *edited and updated by Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin. New York, Viking Penguin Inc., 1984. 704 pp. $7.95.*

Latin America 1979–1983: A Social Science Bibliography *by Robert L. Delorme. Santa Barbara, Calif., ABC-Clio Information Services, 1984. 225 pp. $45.00.*

Law and Legal Information Directory, 3rd ed., *edited by Paul Wasserman and Steven Wasserman. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1984. 902 pp. $225.00.*

NATO: A Bibliography and Resource Guide *by Augustus Richard Norton et al. New York, Garland Publishing, Inc., 1985. 252 pp. $50.00.*

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The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 47: 1918 *edited by Arthur Link et al. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1984. 651 pp. $40.00.*

The Party Statutes of the Communist World, No. 27 of Law in Eastern Europe series *edited by William B. Simons and Stephen White. Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984. 543 pp. $92.00.*

Persian Gulf and United States Policy: A Guide to Issues and References *by Bruce R. Kuniholm. Claremont, Calif., Regina Books, 1984. 220 pp. $21.95.*

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The Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, vol. II: Classical Marxism, 1850–1895 *by Richard N. Hunt. Pittsburgh, Pa., University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984. 421 pp. $37.95.*

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. I in Second Series *edited by S. Gopal. New York, Oxford University Press, 1984. 653 pp. $34.95.*

Sisterhood Is Global: The International Women's Movement Anthology *edited by Robin Morgan. Garden City, N.Y., Anchor Books, 1984. 815 pp. Cloth, $24.95; paper, $12.95.*

The Government and the Jews 1948–1967: A Documented Study *by Benjamin Pinkus. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1984. 612 pp. $59.50.*

State Government Finances in 1983. *Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Commerce, 1984. 73 pp. $3.00.*

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Vital Statistics on Congress, 1984–1985 Edition *edited by Norman J. Ornstein et al. Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984. 261 pp. Cloth, $19.95; paper, $9.95.*

War and Society in East Central Europe, vol. IV: East European Society and War in the Era of Revolutions, 1775–1856 *edited by Béla K. Király. New York, Columbia University Press, 1984. 651 pp. $40.00.*

The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1985. *New York, Newspaper Enterprise Association, 1984. 928 pp. $11.95.*

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

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

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

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

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